the predicate offences for ML are limited by the threshold of EUR 15,000, and terrorist financing is inadequately criminalised as a predicate offence;

the offence of ML effectively requires the prosecution to prove all the elements of the predicate offence;

self-laundering is not clearly criminalised;

the limited data available indicates that the offence is not being effectively implemented, as shown by the very low number of convictions

criminal liability does not apply to legal persons and there is no fundamental principle of law prohibiting it;

taking all the relevant provisions into account, penalties are not sufficiently dissuasive (the sentence for money laundering cannot exceed the sentence for the predicate offence with regard to a misdemeanour);

there are doubts about the effectiveness of the current administrative sanctions regime;

the limited data available indicates that the offence is not being effectively implemented, as shown by the very low number of convictions.

indirect proceeds cannot be confiscated;

seizure does not extend to all property that is the proceeds of crime;

courts cannot void or prevent transactions from the time the crime has been committed;

there is insufficient evidence to indicate the current provisions have been effectively implemented and used;

generally, there is a lack of uniformity when applying the confiscation provisions which raises issues of effective implementation.

it has not been clearly shown that bank secrecy has been fully lifted by the AML Law. The AML Law potentially only lifts bank secrecy for STRs in respect of money laundering.

the requirement to conduct CDD does not extend to all sectors of the financial services sector (notably insurance brokers and agents);

the basic obligations, such as when to conduct CDD or measures to identify legal persons are not consistently set out in law or regulation;

there are no secondary and more detailed requirements for the insurance sector;

the duty to conduct CDD is not extended to all of the situations required by the FATF Recommendations, notably where there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, and where doubts arise as to previously obtained CDD information;

simplified due diligence measures in the general law appear to be unduly permissive;

there is a lack of clarity in the simplified due diligence measures in the BOG Governor’s Act Annex 4;

the law, guidance and industry practice in relation to identifying legal persons is not in line with FATF requirements;

the law and guidance in relation to ascertaining beneficial ownership is fragmented and inconsistent. The obligation for identifying the beneficial owners of legal persons is too limited and there is no obligation to take proactive steps to identify persons who exercise ultimate effective control of the customer;

no obligation to apply enhanced measures for high risk customers in the securities and insurance sectors;

there are only limited requirements to conduct ongoing CDD for firms supervised by the HCMC and the MoD;

allowing a period of 30 days to complete verification of the identity of two categories of high risk customers is not in line with FATF requirements;

there are limited requirements to conduct CDD in respect of existing clients in the AML Law and the securities and insurance sectors;

the requirement to ascertain the nature and purpose of the business relationship is not clearly set out in the AML Law or provisions issued by the competent authorities;

the BOG measures have just been adopted and there is very limited evidence that AML/CFT measures have been effectively implemented.

the requirement to identify and conduct CDD on PEPs does not extend to the securities and insurance sectors;

BOG Governor’s Act applies the requirements relating only to PEPs from countries outside the EU;

the nature and extent of the enhanced CDD measures required for PEPs are not clearly stated;

the requirement to identify a PEP’s source of wealth is not explicitly stated;

BOG Governor’s Act does not require a SI to obtain senior management approval before setting up a business relationship with a PEP;

the BOG measures have just been adopted and there is no evidence generally that AML/CFT measures have been effectively implemented.

the definition of “cross-border” is too narrow, and excludes EU member states;

the BOG measures have just been adopted and there is no evidence generally that AML/CFT measures have been effectively implemented.

there are no requirements for the securities or insurance sectors;

there is no requirement for SIs to have measures to prevent misuse of technological developments;

the means proposed for dealing with the risks of non face to face business issued by the BOG appears to be limited to customers having an account with a financial institution based in the EU.

the BOG has introduced specific provisions for third party reliance but they are partially inconsistent and do not address all the requirements under Recommendation 9;

there is no provision for third party reliance in the general AML Law or the HCMC/MOD provisions;

insurance brokers/agents are not covered by the AML Law, and there is lack of clarity over the role they play in the customer due diligence process.

the provisions on record keeping in the AML Law do not clearly require keeping business correspondence;

there are no specific record-keeping requirements or guidelines to ensure that (i) transactions can be fully reconstructed, and (ii) recorded information is available on a timely basis to domestic competent authority.

there is no specific requirement in the AML Law or guidance to monitor all complex, unusual large transactions unless they raise specific suspicions of ML or TF;

BOG guidance is not sufficiently clear and appears to suggest that certain findings need only be documented when consideration is given to submission of an STR;

the provisions adopted by the HCMC limit the requirement to monitor transactions that could be connected with ML;

the MOD/ID Circular does not contain any requirement for insurance companies as set out in Recommendation 11.

similar technical deficiencies in the AML Law relating to Rec. 5, 6 and 8-11 that apply to financial institutions also apply to DNFBPs (see comments and ratings in Section 3.2);

although DNFBPs are technically subject to various provisions of the AML Law, practical application is extremely limited. This raises serious concerns in relation to the effectiveness of the measures in place;

no AML/CFT measures apply to TCSPs;

internet casinos are covered by law but there is no action taken in practice;

it is unclear if casinos on Greek owned or operated vessels are covered by the AML Law.

insurance agents and brokers are not covered by the obligation to report;

not all predicate offences required in Recommendation 1 are included in scope;

not all the required aspects of terrorist financing are included in the scope of the reporting requirement;

industry practice would suggest that not all attempted transactions are reported;

the weaknesses in the STR system (especially low numbers in total and very low numbers of STRs outside the banking system) raise significant concerns in relation to the effectiveness of the reporting system.

for FIs supervised by BOG: the requirements on internal controls (e.g. screening procedures) are not fully AML/CFT oriented and there are doubts about their proper implementation by SIs;

for the FIs supervised by HCMC and in the insurance sector: existing requirements are either very general (on internal procedures and controls and screening procedures) or non-existent (on independent audit function and training).

similar technical deficiencies in the AML Law relating to Rec. 13, 15 & 21 that apply to financial institutions also apply to DNFBPs (see comments and ratings in Sections 3.6, 3.7 & 3.8);

although DNFBPs are covered by the scope of the AML Law, in practice nothing has been done to implement the provisions within the DNFBP community, and thus practical application is extremely limited. This raises serious concerns in relation to effectiveness of the measures in place;

no AML/CFT measures apply to TCSPs;

there are insufficient detailed requirements concerning the implementation of internal controls.

for FIs supervised by the BOG: (1) the current use of sanctions (non-interest bearing deposit) is neither sufficiently effective nor sufficiently dissuasive; (2) the range of sanctions imposed is not sufficiently broad and is not proportionate to the severity of a situation; (3) the implementation of sanctions to FIs directors or senior management is uncertain;

for FIs supervised by the HCMC: (1) based on the information available, there is insufficient evidence to show that the sanctions regime in place offers a sufficiently broad range of sanctions for failing to comply with AML/CFT requirements: (2) due to the very low volume of compliance monitoring carried out by the HCMC, the effectiveness of the sanctions regimes cannot be measured;

for FIs supervised by MOD/ID: there is insufficient information to show that the MOD/ID has the authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance with the AML Law and MOD Circulars. No sanctions have been imposed for AML/CFT breaches.

there is no obligation on financial institutions to satisfy themselves that a respondent financial institution in a foreign country does not permit its accounts to be used by shell banks.

there is no evidence that Greece has considered implementing a system for reporting currency transactions across all regulated sectors.

Greece has not taken sufficient steps to encourage the development and use of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering.

absent an NCCT list, there are effectively no requirements for the securities sector;

there are no requirements for the insurance sector;

banking sector guidance does not contain any directly relevant criteria pursuant to which SIs should examine with special attention countries that are not applying the FATF Recommendations;

industry practice suggests that very limited measures are currently being taken and that there is no effective implementation.

the AML Law provisions are insufficient to address all the elements of Recommendation 22;

for FIs supervised by BOG: Greek provisions do not explicitly require branches and subsidiaries of Greek SIs located in third countries to apply the higher standard, to the extent that local laws and regulations permit;

for the FIs supervised by HCMC and in the insurance sector: (1) the HCMC and MOD/ID provisions do not apply to subsidiaries; (2) there is no requirement applicable to the securities and insurance sectors to pay particular attention to situations where branches and subsidiaries are based in countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations; (3) there is no explicit provision to require FSIs to inform their home country supervisor when a foreign branch or subsidiary is unable to observe appropriate AML/CFT measures because this is prohibited by local laws, regulations or other measures.

absence of a licensing requirement for insurance agents;

fit and proper tests are not conducted for all directors of credit institutions;

BOG: the current supervisory programme adopted by the BOG raises important doubts in terms of effectiveness (lack of resources and qualified personnel, quality of inspections);

HCMC AML/CFT supervision of securities firms is very recent and effectiveness has not been demonstrated;

MOD/ID: there is no AML/CFT supervision of insurance companies.

although most DNFBPs are now included within the scope of the AML Law, little, if any, effective supervision is currently taking place;

there is a lack of designed supervisors for some DNFBPs;

the regime for supervision of DNFBPs is ineffective, as is demonstrated by the lack of awareness among firms;

it is unclear whether ship casinos are covered by the AML/CFT Law;

no AML/CFT measures apply to TCSPs.

very little feedback is given by the FIU or other competent authorities;

BOG guidance on STRs is not sufficiently specific to cover the diverse sector it supervises

Other BOG guidelines are very general and their relevance to certain SIs (e.g. money remitters and leasing companies) is limited;

HCMC and MOD/ID guidelines are incomplete and generally too broad

with regard to DNFBPs, there is no current guidance issued by competent authorities on AML/CTF;

the FIU does not provide guidance/feedback to the DNFBPs

the FIU is inappropriately structured to properly and effectively undertake its functions;

the current composition and functions of the Committee raise potential conflicts of interest when dealing with STRs that adversely affect the FIU’s operational independence and autonomy and potentially could lead to undue influence or interference;

reporting forms and procedures have not yet been provided to all reporting entities;

the FIU does not have adequate and timely access to all the financial, administrative and law enforcement information it requires to properly perform its functions;

there are insufficient physical and electronic security systems to securely protect the information held by the FIU;

the reports published by the FIU do not provide adequate information on statistics, typologies and trends;

in practice, there are real issues as to whether the Egmont principles are applied in relation to security of information and the FIU is not connected to the Egmont Secure Web thus impacting effective co-operation;

the lack of human resources, the paper based STR system, the lack of appropriate IT infrastructure and the current system for processing STRs has resulted in a serious lack of effectiveness in the FIU, which in turn impedes the overall effectiveness of the AML/CFT system.

the system put in place by the AML Law does not prevent parallel investigations (and then duplication of efforts) on ML or FT cases;

the resources of the prosecution service are insufficient for it to effectively perform its functions, taking into account the structure of the criminal justice system and the appeal procedures.

the data and other information available is insufficient to demonstrate that the ML/FT investigation and prosecution process is effective.

while appropriate supervision powers have been given to the BOG, there is limited capacity of the BOG to use them in an effective way;

the BOG has not used the full range of sanctions it has at its disposal;

the HCMC has only recently started to use its supervision powers and there is insufficient evidence of effectiveness,

the MOD/ID has not used its supervision powers in the AML/CFT area.

the FIU is understaffed and critically lacks organisational and technical resources to fully and effectively perform its functions (in particular, there is no permanent financial analysts);

insufficient resources are allocated to ML and FT investigations in the Hellenic Police and the Customs and the training in AML/CFT matters is generally insufficient;

insufficient resources are allocated to the over-worked public prosecutor service;

the BOG lacks sufficient numbers of staff with specialist qualifications and expertise in AML/CFT matters to enable it to carry out its supervisory duties effectively;

the HCMC dramatically lacks staff with relevant AML/CFT qualifications, skills and experience to carry out its supervisory powers;

the MOD/ID dramatically lacks qualified staff to carry out its supervisory powers.

mechanisms for cooperation between the FIU, law enforcement, supervisors and other competent authorities are insufficient and ineffective to address the need for domestic AML/CFT coordination;

there is no regular review of the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system.

Greece does not review its AML/CFT system on a regular basis. Collection of statistics

in relation to the FIU: no statistics on the number of requests made or received by/from foreign FIUs, including whether the request was granted or refused, and on spontaneous referral made to foreign authorities;

in relation to law enforcement authorities/MOJ: no statistics on ML/FT investigations, prosecutions and convictions, and on property frozen, seized and confiscated;

in relation to mutual legal assistance: (1) no statistics on requests relating to freezing and confiscation made or received; (2) no statistics on requests relating to TF; (3) no statistics on requests relating to predicate offences; (4) generally no statistics on the nature of the request, whether it was granted or refused and the time to respond;

in relation to extradition: (1) incomplete statistics on requests relating to ML, TF and predicate offences; (2) no statistics on requests relating to predicate offences; (3) generally no data on the nature of the request, whether it was granted or refused and the time to respond;

in relation to the BOG: no statistics on the formal requests for assistance made or received by BOG, including whether the request was granted or refused.

there is no requirement to collect or make available information on beneficial ownership and ultimate control of legal persons;

the system in place does not provide access to adequate, accurate and current information on beneficial ownership and ultimate control in a timely manner;

there is no appropriate measure to ensure transparency as to the shareholders of corporations that have issued bearer shares (unless the corporation is listed on a stock exchange).

Trusts are not recognised under Greek law. There are no other legal arrangements similar to trusts that exist in Greece..

Greece has not ratified the Palermo Convention;

the scope of the ML offence is too limited (see comments in relation to Rec.1);

self-laundering is not properly criminalised in Greece, and this cannot be justified on the basis of its being contrary to the Greek fundamental law (see comments in relation to Rec.1);

the penalties are not dissuasive and there are doubts about their effectiveness (see comments in relation to Rec.2);

The Greek provisions do not permit the confiscation of indirect proceeds (see comments in relation to Rec.3).

the penalties are not dissuasive and there doubts about their effectiveness (see comments in relation to Rec.2);

the CDD requirements are inadequate and the implementation of STR reporting is not fully effective (see comments in relation to Rec.5 & 13).

in the absence of a treaty the apparent limitation on the forms of assistance available for mutual assistance appear to constitute an obstacle to undertaking certain types of investigatory acts that are authorised in the domestic context;

the effectiveness of the current laws cannot be demonstrated due to the lack of quantitative and qualitative data; moreover the overloaded court system seems to have impacted on effectiveness;

the current limitations in relation to the criminalisation of ML and FT may have a impact on Greece’s ability to deliver mutual legal assistance in ML/FT cases.

there is a lack of consensus on the scope and application of the dual criminality requirement;

there is a risk that the dual criminality requirement for extradition is applied in a narrow sense

Greece has not considered establishing an asset-forfeiture fund;

Greece’s limitations on the definition of ML may limit its ability to seize and confiscate property derived from predicate offences that are covered by the AML Law.

the current limitations in relation to the criminalisation of ML may have a impact on Greece’s ability to extradite persons sought for this offence;

there are potentially some cases where extradition could be limited because a different threshold of punishment exists for some of the predicate offences of ML (some threshold are below the two year threshold applicable in extradition cases).

due to a lack of personnel and technical resources and limited database access, there is an issue of effectiveness with regard to the information exchange of the FIU with foreign authorities on AML matters;

there are no formal statistics to suggest that cooperation between financial supervisors and their counterparts in AML matters is effective and is provided in line with the FATF standards.

the CDD requirements are inadequate and the implementation of STR reporting is not fully effective (see comments in relation to Rec.5 & 13).

the current process does not allow freezing of terrorist assets without delay (see comments in relation to SR.III);

Greece has a limited ability to freeze funds in accordance with S/RES/1373(2001) of designated terrorists outside the EU listing system (see comments in relation to SR.III).

the scope of the offence is excessively narrow as it does not make it a crime to collect or provide funds or material support to terrorist individuals or for specific terrorist acts;

terrorist financing ought to be a stand alone offence for which prosecution is available, regardless of whether the group actually carries out or attempts a specific terrorist attack;

the defence in Article 187A(8) is too broad and appears to undermine and negate the intentions of the provision;

it is unclear that Article 2.5 of the Terrorist Financing Convention is applicable in relation to the FT offence;

administrative liability with regard to the financing of terrorism is too restrictive;

criminal liability does not apply to legal persons and there is no fundamental principle of law prohibiting it;

there have been no TF cases and it is too early to assess whether the offence is effectively implemented.

the definition of funds in the EC Regulations does not fully cover the terms in SR III and assets that are wholly owned or controlled by a listed entity are not covered;

Greece has a limited ability to freeze funds in accordance with S/RES/1373(2001) of designated terrorists outside the EU listing system;

the current process for notifying ministries and the financial sector of entities on UN lists takes too long and therefore these entities would not be able to comply with freezing terrorist assets without delay;

Greece does not provide guidance to financial institutions as well as DNFBPs on freezing assets of listed entities without delay and does not monitor FIs and DNFBPs for compliance with measures taken under the Resolutions;

there are no sanctions for failure to follow freezing requests;

processes for de-listing and unfreezing funds are not publicly known and it is impossible to determine their effectiveness, if they exist at all;

Greece has no procedure in place for allowing payment of basic living expenses and fees in line with UNSCR 1452;

Greece does not have appropriate procedures through which a person or entity whose funds have been frozen can challenge that measure before a court;

Greek authorities should be able to freeze terrorist assets without first having to open a criminal investigation;

Greece does not have any measures in place to protect the rights of bona fide third party owners of property that may be involved in terrorist financing.

insurance agents and brokers are not covered by the obligation to report;

not all the required aspects of terrorist financing are included in the scope of the reporting requirement;

industry practice would suggest that not all attempted transactions are reported;

the weaknesses in the STR system (especially low numbers in total and very low numbers of STRs outside the banking system) raise significant concerns in relation to the effectiveness of the reporting system.

there are concerns on the ability of Greece to provide a full range mutual legal assistance in cases involving FT as it is currently defined in Greece (in relation to Recommendation 36);

the application of the dual criminality may create an obstacle to extradition in cases involving FT activities that are not specifically criminalised in Greece (in relation to Recommendation 39);

due to a lack of personnel and technical resources and limited database access, there is an issue of effectiveness with regard to the information exchange of the FIU with foreign authorities on CFT matters (in relation with Rec.40);

there is no information to suggest that cooperation between financial supervisors and their counterparts in AML/CFT matters is effective and is provided in line with the FATF standards (in relation with Rec.40).

the lack of specialised, trained staff means that there are general concerns about the effectiveness of the BOG supervision programme as applied to MVT services;

there was some evidence of informal transfer services, which were not applying AML/CFT measures and not being supervised;

in general, Greece should take immediate steps to properly implement Recommendations 5-7, SR.VII and other relevant FATF Recommendations and to apply them also to bureaux de change and money remittance companies.

the derogation set out in the EU regulation for wire transfers within the EU (classified as domestic transfers) is not in compliance with the FATF requirements under SR.VII;

there are currently no sanctions for non-compliance with the EU regulation, and the sanctions regime generally is not effective or dissuasive;

in terms of effectiveness, there is insufficient evidence that the Regulation has been properly implemented, nor is there sufficient evidence of effective compliance monitoring of credit institutions with the requirements under the EU Regulation.

Greece has not implemented the requirements set out in SR VIII.

there is no system for declaring or disclosing cash or bearer negotiable instruments in line with SR IX.

Greece should ensure that the list of predicate offences includes all of the FATF designated predicate offences and amend Article 1.A.q) of the AML Law to include all offences punishable by at least six months in prison, regardless of the value of the property generated by the offence;

Greece should criminalise self-laundering;

Greece should extend criminal liability to legal persons and ensure that the existing system of administrative and civil liability of companies is used effectively;

The authorities should ensure that ML is a stand alone offence that does not require, in effect and practice, a conviction for the predicate offence.

Greece should amend the scope of the FT offence to make it a crime to collect or provide funds or material support to terrorist individuals or for specific terrorist acts. In addition, terrorist financing should be an offence in itself, whether or not a terrorist act has actually occurred and whether or not funds were used to finance a particular act;

Greece should review and limit the legal defence to the law in Article 187.A (8);

Greece should clarify what “funds” means for the purpose of Article 187A and ensure that the FT offence does not require that the funds be actually used;

Greece should expand the administrative liability with regard to the financing of terrorism.

Greece should adopt measures that allow: (1) the confiscation of indirect proceeds; (2) to give courts the power to void or prevent actions involving the proceeds of crime from the time the predicate offence was convicted;

Greece should extend the powers of to all property that could be the proceeds of crime, not just accounts, safe deposit boxes and immovable property;

The Greek general confiscation legislation should provide for freezing on an ex parte basis, with the right to appeal;

Greece should provide guidance on what they consider an instrumentality intended for use in a crime;

Greece should provide guidance on using the various confiscation regimes;

Greece should review its laws and administrative structures so as to have an effective system to trace, seize and confiscate criminal proceeds.

Greece should develop its ability to freeze funds in accordance with S/RES/1373(2001) of designated terrorists outside the EU listing system;

Greek authorities should ensure that the authorities can freeze terrorist assets without first having to open a criminal investigation;

Greece should take the appropriate measures to speed the current process for notifying ministries and the financial sector of entities on UN lists;

Greece should provide guidance to financial institutions as well as DNFBPs on freezing assets of listed entities and should monitor FIs and DNFBPs for compliance with measures taken under the Resolutions;

Greece should adopt a regime of sanctions for failure to follow freezing requests;

Greece should develop publicly known processes for de-listing and unfreezing funds and procedures for allowing payment of basic living expenses and fees in line with UNSCR 1452;

Greece should adopt appropriate procedures through which a person or entity whose funds have been frozen can challenge that measure before a court;

Greece should adopt measures to protect the rights of bona fide third party owners of property that may be involved in terrorist financing.

The Greek authorities should consider restructuring the FIU (especially more specialised personnel should be hired to carry out STRs analysis functions and Greece should give consideration to tasking the Committee members with a broad oversight and/or coordination role at national level);

Greece should review the effectiveness of the FIU. For instance, a mechanism for exchange of information with the judiciary would be very helpful to provide the FIU with some useful indicators of effectiveness and more broadly, Greece should adopt measures that ease the mechanisms for exchange of information between the FIU and other competent authorities;

Greece should ensure that the FIU is allocated with sufficient and skilled staff and has a comprehensive IT system to collect and process the STRs (for instance, the FIU should as soon as possible ensure its connection to the FIU.net);

The FIU should take all necessary measures to ensure that the information held is securely protected. The physical security of the facilities should be appropriately ensured and the current STR data system should be properly protected and backed up;

Greece should ensure that the FIU has a more direct and timely access to all financial, administrative and law enforcement information it requires to properly undertake its functions;

More reporting forms should be adopted and the reports published by the FIU should provide information on statistics, typologies and trends.

Greece should promote a more proactive approach to detect and expose third party ML cases as opposed to self-laundering and consideration should be given to a greater specialisation of prosecutors and judges in financial crime and ML cases;

Consideration should be given to making use of special investigative techniques in relation to ML and FT as they have proved successful in relation to drug trafficking;

Particular attention should be paid to establish effective coordination and information sharing between Customs and other law enforcement authorities in relation to the implementation of the controls on cash and bearer negotiable instruments leaving and entering the Greek territory, so as to enable the use of special investigative techniques in relation to cash.

Greece should implement measures conforming to the requirements of SR.IX.

Greece should develop a less selective and partial approach to risk and carry out full risk assessments in order to identify areas of higher or lower ML/FT risk.

Greece should make sure that all basic CDD obligations as defined by the FATF are set out in the AML Law;

Greece should take steps for insurance brokers and agents to be brought within the scope of the AML law, and thus the CDD requirements;

Greece should engage with the private sector to promote compliance with the CDD requirements;

Greece should consider adopting an express requirement precluding the opening and maintenance of anonymous or numbered accounts;

Financial institutions should be required to conduct CDD in all of the situations required by the FATF Recommendations, notably where there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, and where doubts arise as to previously obtained CDD information;

In relation to simplified and enhanced due diligence, Greece should consider expanding and updating the guidance issued by competent authorities, and consider including more guidance on how to apply the provisions on a risk-based basis;

Financial institutions should be required to identify legal persons and beneficial ownership in the circumstances set out in FATF standards;

Firms supervised by the HCMC and firms in the insurance sector should be required to conduct ongoing CDD in line with FATF requirements;

The timing of verification of high risk customers should be properly regulated and be in line with FATF requirements;

The requirements to conduct CDD in respect of existing clients in the AML Law and the securities and insurance sectors should be in line with the FATF standards;

All financial institutions should be subject to a clear requirement to ascertain the nature and purpose of the business relationship;

Competent authorities should clarify SIs’ responsibilities in situations where full CDD information cannot be obtained.

The securities and insurance sectors should be required to identify and conduct CDD on PEPs;

The requirements relating to PEPs should cover PEPs from EU countries and impose a specific requirement to obtain senior management approval before the business relationship commences;

The requirement to identify a PEP’s source of wealth should be explicitly stated;

The provisions in relation to cross-border correspondent banking should be extended to include institutions in EU member states;

Measures should be mandated to fully implement Recommendation 8 (i.e. introduce requirements for the securities or insurance sectors; adopt requirements for SIs to have measures in place to prevent misuse of technological developments and ensure that the existing BOG measures to deal with the risks of non face to face business apply to all FIs).

Greece should review the use of third parties to conduct CDD in all sectors (particularly in the insurance sector and in situations involving group companies);

Competent authorities should ensure that any appropriate guidance deemed necessary after considering the operation of third party reliance in the financial services sector covers all sectors where this is practised (particularly the insurance sector);

The current provisions adopted of the BOG should be clarified to be fully consistent and in line with the requirements under Recommendation 9.

Greece should consider clarifying exactly when the bank secrecy law (Law 1059/1971) is over-ridden by other statutory provisions, and clarify the provisions of the AML Law on matters such as the scope of money laundering/terrorist financing.

The provisions on record keeping in the AML Law should clearly require retention of business correspondence;

Greece should adopt specific record-keeping requirements or guidelines to ensure that (i) transactions can be fully reconstructed, and (ii) recorded information is available on a timely basis to domestic competent authority.

More effort should be made vis-à-vis the financial community to raise awareness with regard to the new requirements applicable to domestic (in the FATF sense) and cross-border wire transfers;

The Greek authorities should adopt effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions applicable to infringements of the provision laid down in the EU Regulation on wire transfers.

Greece should require all financial institutions to examine all complex, unusual etc. transactions, even if suspicion does not technically arise, and impose a clear requirement to document the findings of any examination undertaken;

All financial institutions should be required to monitor business relationships with persons from countries not or insufficiently applying the FATF standards.

The obligation to submit STRs should be extended to cover all sectors of the financial services industry, and should cover all predicate offences in full (including tax evasion) and all aspects of terrorist financing;

The obligation to report attempted transactions should be clarified;

Greece should review the effectiveness of the reporting system;

Greece should consider the feasibility and utility of implementing a currency reporting system across all regulated sectors;

The competent authorities should provide more comprehensive guidance (and take steps to update existing guidance, where appropriate) to improve the effectiveness of suspicious transaction reporting;

The FIU should provide greater and a further range of feedback to competent authorities and reporting institutions to assist in improving the quality of STRs submitted, and to help identify new areas where suspicion might arise.

Financial institutions supervised by the BOG are required to have screening procedures but the link to AML/CFT provisions should be strengthened;

Financial institutions in the securities and insurance sectors should be required to adopt internal procedures and policies;

Branches and subsidiaries of Greek SIs located in third countries should be required to apply the higher standard, to the extent that local laws and regulations permit;

In the securities and the insurance sectors: (1) Greece should adopt provisions in relation to Rec. 22 that apply to subsidiaries; (2) Greece should adopt some requirements to pay particular attention to situations where branches and subsidiaries are based in countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations; (3) Greece should adopt an explicit provision to require FIs to inform their home country supervisor when a foreign branch or subsidiary is unable to observe appropriate AML/CFT measures because this is prohibited by local laws, regulations or other measure.

Financial institutions should be required to determine that a respondent financial institution in a foreign country does not permit its accounts to be used by shell banks.

The Greek authorities should introduce a licensing requirement for insurance agents by the insurance regulator. Fit and proper tests should be conducted for all directors of credit institutions;

The BOG should implement a risk-based supervisory program for AML/CFT and adopt a more systematic consolidated approach to the supervision of AML/CFT policies risk management systems. The BOG should improve the quality of the assessment of bureaux de change and money remitters.

The HCMC and the HPISC should implement a robust supervisory programme for AML/CFT purposes with proper inspection procedures.

The adoption of a proper risk based approach should be considered by the BOG to improve its capacity to use its supervision powers in an effective way;

The BOG should review its use of sanctions to ensure that they are effective, proportionate and dissuasive;

The HCMC should use its supervision powers on a regular and effective basis;

Once established, the HPISC should be given appropriate supervision powers in the AML/CFT area;

The BOG should review the regime of sanctions applicable for failing to apply AML/CFT requirements and specific sanctions for directors and senior managers should be available and implemented where appropriate;

The HCMC should ensure that the sanctions in place fully meet the FATF standards i.e. are effective, proportionate and dissuasive and are implemented properly;

In the insurance sector, the Greek authorities should adopt sanctions for violations of the AML Law requirements that are in line with the FATF standards and are sufficiently dissuasive.

The BOG, the HCMC and the HPISC should adopt sector-specific guidance with updated information on ML and FT trends and techniques and a broader scope in order to comprehensively address the FATF requirements.

Current provisions in relation to agents of bureaux de change should be clarified since it is not certain that bureaux de change are obliged to inform the BOG of the names and addresses of their agents;

The BOG should improve the quality of the supervision carried in bureaux de change and money remittance companies;

Sanctions should be available to directors and senior management of money remittance companies;

The Greek authorities should review the existence of informal remittance businesses for purposes of registration of licensing and oversight for AML/CFT purposes;

In general, Greece should take immediate steps to properly implement Recommendations 5-7, SR.VII and other relevant FATF Recommendations and to apply them also to the bureaux de change and money remittance companies.

Greece should take steps to fully implement the provisions of the AML Law in respect of DNFBPs and to clarify the drafting in the AML Law to ensure that each relevant section fully applies not only to credit and financial institutions;

The relevant competent authorities should take urgent steps to raise awareness of the relevant provisions of the AML Law as they apply to the DNFBPs they supervise, and to develop guidance relevant to the individual sectors.

TCSPs, internet casinos and casinos on Greek owned or operated vessels should be fully subject to the AML/CFT requirements.

Greece should take action to ensure that the requirements in relation to Recommendations 13, 14, 15 and 21 are fully implemented within the DNFBP community.

Greece should ensure that DNFBPs are subject to effective supervision.

The competent authorities and the FIU should provide guidance and feedback to DNFBPs to ensure that they are aware of their obligations.

The Greek authorities could take further steps to encourage the development and use of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering.

Greece should adopt measures that improve transparency concerning beneficial ownership and ultimate control of legal persons and ease the access from competent authorities to that information;

A centralised registration system for all legal persons should be established;

The Greek authorities should consider removing bearer shares from their law or otherwise taking measures to ensure adequate transparency regarding beneficial ownership.

Greece should implement adequate measures in line with the requirements under SR.VIII;

In particular, Greece should (1) carry out a comprehensive domestic review of its non-profit sector; (2) adopt the necessary measures to protect this sector from terrorist financing through outreach and effective oversight; and (3) implement effective domestic co-operation and information-sharing mechanisms among competent authorities that hold information on non-profit organisations.

The AML/CFT topic should be subject to a broad consultation and debate at national level;

Greece should develop and implement effective mechanisms to enable all authorities dealing with AML/CFT issues to co-operate and collaborate closely and effectively with each other.

Greece should ratify the Palermo Convention and fully implement it (in particular, the predicate offences for ML should cover all serious offences; Greece should extend the scope of the ML offence; self-laundering should be properly criminalised and Greece should adopt effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions);

Greece should fully implement the Vienna Convention as well as the Terrorist Financing Convention (in particular, Greece should permit the confiscation of indirect proceeds and extend the scope of the FT offence);

Greece should fully implement the UN Security Council Resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of FT (in particular, Greece should adopt a process that allows freezing of terrorist assets without delay).

The application or not of the dual criminality condition in the context of mutual legal assistance should be clarified and subject to clear guidance;

Greece should review the current limitations in relation to the criminalisation of ML and FT to improve Greece’s ability to deliver mutual legal assistance in ML/FT cases and extend its ability to seize and confiscate property derived from predicate offences that are covered by the AML Law;

In the absence of a treaty, Greece should clarify the forms of assistance available for mutual assistance;

Greece should adopt mechanisms that allow the execution of mutual legal assistance requests in a timely way and without undue delays;

Greece should consider establishing an asset-forfeiture fund.

Greece should take the necessary steps to ensure that the dual criminality requirement for extradition does not limit its capacity to answer extradition requests;

Greece should review the current limitations in relation to the criminalisation of ML and the applicable thresholds of punishment for some of the predicate offences of ML to improve Greece’s ability to extradite persons sought for this offence.

Greece should take measures to strengthen the capacity of the FIU to exchange information with foreign authorities on AML/CFT matters;

Greece should take measures to ensure that cooperation between financial supervisors and their counterparts in AML matters is effective and is provided in line with the FATF standards.

The FIU should employ a permanent professional staff of experienced financial analysts and should be provided with a comprehensive IT system to collect and process the STRs and any type of information it receives, including link analysis software;

The FIU should consider adopt a secure electronic reporting system;

The FIU should ensure its connection to the FIU.net;

The FIU staff should be provided with adequate ongoing training in AML and CFT matters;

The FIU should ensure that high professional standards are maintained when hiring new personnel.

Additional resources should be allocated to ML and FT investigations in the Hellenic Police and the Customs and their staff should be provided with adequate training in AML/CFT matters;

AML/CFT and financial crime training programs should be continued and developed, including typologies/methods and trends, to improve prosecutorial AML/CFT expertise;

Additional resources should be allocated to the over-worked public prosecutor service so that it can fully and effectively performs its functions;

Consideration should be given to a greater specialisation of prosecutors and judges in financial crime and ML cases (including identification, tracing, seizure and confiscation of criminal proceeds).

the BOG should be provided with more staff with specialist qualifications and expertise in AML/CFT matters to enable it to carry out its supervisory duties effectively;

the HCMC should be provided with more staff with specialist qualifications and expertise in AML/CFT matters to enable it to carry out its supervisory duties effectively;

the HPISC should be provided with more staff with specialist qualifications and expertise in AML/CFT matters to enable it to carry out its supervisory duties effectively.

Greece should review the effectiveness of its AML/CFT system on a regular basis;

in relation to the FIU: the FIU should publish more comprehensive periodic reports on its activity including detailed statistics, typologies and trends as well as sanitised cases. The Greek FIU should maintain more comprehensive and detailed statistics on STRs and other reports received. The FIU should collect statistics on the number of requests made or received by/from foreign FIUs, including whether the request was granted or refused, and on spontaneous referral made to foreign authorities;

in relation to law enforcement authorities/MOJ: Greece should establish a reliable and comprehensive system to collect statistics on ML/FT investigations, prosecutions and convictions, and on property frozen, seized and confiscated;

in relation to mutual legal assistance: statistics should be collected on (1) requests relating to freezing and confiscation made or received; (2) requests relating to TF; (3) requests relating to predicate offences; (4) the nature of the request, whether it was granted or refused and the time to respond;

in relation to extradition: statistics should be collected on (1) requests relating to ML, TF and predicate offences; (2) requests relating to predicate offences; (3) the nature of the request, whether it was granted or refused and the time to respond;

in relation to the BOG: statistics should be collected on the formal requests for assistance made or received by BOG, including whether the request was granted or refused.

Greece should review the effectiveness of its criminal justice system to understand and address the factors that impact adversely on the ability of the system to commence and complete money laundering and terrorist financing cases within a reasonable timeframe;

In their project to adopt a new AML Law, the Greek authorities should elaborate a more harmonised and sophisticated set of measures in line with international standards keeping in mind the necessary elaboration and integration with existing domestic legislation.