Switzerland
2009 Article IV Consultation: Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Switzerland
Author:
International Monetary Fund
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Publication Date:
26 May 2009
eISBN:
9781451807417
Language:
English
Keywords:
ISCR; CR; Switzerland; introduced SNB bill; repo transaction; asset; SNB balance sheet; banking sector; operating income; investment banking; financial crisis; exchange rate
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Switzerland is affected by the global crisis through the stock effect, the flow effect, and the trade effect. Along with a sharp contraction in exports, investments are now being postponed. Consumption has held up well so far, but as unemployment rises, household spending will lose momentum. The Swiss National Bank has appropriately loosened monetary policy, bringing the policy rates almost to zero. Maintaining financial stability will be essential for ensuring macroeconomic stability and growth in Switzerland.

Abstract

Switzerland is affected by the global crisis through the stock effect, the flow effect, and the trade effect. Along with a sharp contraction in exports, investments are now being postponed. Consumption has held up well so far, but as unemployment rises, household spending will lose momentum. The Swiss National Bank has appropriately loosened monetary policy, bringing the policy rates almost to zero. Maintaining financial stability will be essential for ensuring macroeconomic stability and growth in Switzerland.

I. The Context 1

1. Switzerland is affected by the global crisis through three important channels. First, the decline in asset prices impacts the large Swiss banks and insurance companies directly through their balance sheets—the stock effect. Second, the turmoil will have longer-lasting implications for financial industry earnings—the flow effect. Third, the open Swiss economy will be affected by the crisis through the sharp downturn in growth prospects in key trading partners—the trade effect. As a result, after years of strong economic performance, the Swiss economy is now expected to shrink by 3 percent in 2009, before picking up again in the second half of 2010.

2. The authorities’ response to the financial turmoil in 2008 was comprehensive; the key issue looking forward will be whether more might be needed. The authorities pushed for an early recapitalization of UBS, extended deposit insurance, negotiated new capital requirements and liquidity buffers for the large banks, and stepped up supervision. The SNB has been an active supplier of liquidity to the market, while the monetary policy stance has been relaxed aggressively. In addition, there has been a fiscal expansion. However, more may yet be needed if the turmoil continues; determining the optimal policy mix to address both possible further economic weakening and continuing financial sector vulnerabilities will be the key challenge for the authorities looking ahead.

3. Strong macro-financial linkages will drive policy choices. Maintaining financial stability will be essential for ensuring macroeconomic stability and a return to growth in Switzerland—while also having positive spillovers to international financial stability. However, despite sound fundamentals, the limited size of the Swiss economy places a constraint on what the government can responsibly do to support the large financial sector. This puts a premium on tight regulation and effective supervision, and on coordination and cooperation between home and host country authorities. Potential problems will need to be addressed at an early stage, before large-scale rescue packages with major fiscal implications become unavoidable.

II. Recent Developments and Near-Term Outlook

4. Switzerland’s economic performance in recent years has been strong. Real GDP growth averaged 3 percent from 2004 to 2007—significantly above potential (about 2 percent) and the euro-area average (2.3 percent)—while inflation remained muted (1 percent). Exports and financial service flows rose rapidly in line with a favorable external environment, allowing the 2006 current account surplus to peak at 14.5 percent of GDP. Investment was supported by strong corporate profitability and capacity utilization—at 87 percent—was well above its long-term average. Unemployment fell under 2½ percent, even as cross border working and immigration flows increased labor supply. A fiscal rule resulted in budgetary surpluses in 2006–07 of some 2 percent of GDP.

uA01fig01

Switzerland’s economic performance during the expansion has been impressive.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

uA01fig02

External demand and consumption drove growth.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

5. The financial sector crisis, however, has hit Switzerland hard. While UBS has been affected the most, both large banks have reported write-downs and losses, and underwent multiple capital injections, mostly via preference shares and convertible bonds. Job cuts have so far been mostly outside of Switzerland but are now also affecting domestic operations. In 2008, total revenues at the two big banks fell by 81 percent, while net new money flows into assets under management (AUM) dropped. Some institutions have suffered rating downgrades. Reflecting these losses, and the turmoil in global markets, the Swiss equity index fell by about 40 percent over last year. Investment and bank financial service income in the balance of payments—a key source of external income—declined by over 80 percent in 2008.

6. The economy entered a recession in the second half of 2008. Although the economy expanded by 1.6 percent in 2008, real GDP contracted by 0.2 percent in the second half of the year. Growth in exports slowed, falling from 9½ percent in 2007 to under 2½ percent in 2008, with a marked fall in the fourth quarter, as world trade collapsed. From the supply side, financial intermediation value added declined by about 7½ percent. Investment spending contracted since the second quarter, as firms scaled back plans given the deteriorating outlook. However, with labor markets robust, private consumption grew by a still healthy 1.7 percent, a rate not much lower than in 2007.

Switzerland: Financial Crisis - Write-downs, Capital Injections, and Job Losses 1/

(Billions of U.S. dollars unless noted otherwise, as of March 31, 2009)

article image
Sources: Bloomberg; Bankscope; Moody’s; The Banker; and IMF staff estimates.

Since start of the crisis in June 2007 until March 2009.

Writedowns and charges related to sub-prime and other assets.

7. There was agreement that the slowdown will deepen (Figure 1). At the time of the mission, staff expected Swiss GDP to contract by 2.3 percent in 2009, and hover around zero in 2010. Given a further deterioration in the indicators, the growth forecast has declined to -3.0 percent in 2009 and -0.3 percent in 2010 (Table 1). The government (SECO) forecast was somewhat more positive; the SNB estimated a contraction of between -2.5 and -3.0 percent in 2009. The slowdown will work its way mainly through reduced exports and investment. The authorities stressed that consumption is expected to still be relatively strong in the first half of 2009, and recede thereafter. Disposable income is the main determinant for consumption, and with relatively solid wage growth2, it will take a while until the sentiment is affected. However, weaker export growth and lower job prospects should impact employment with a lag and dent consumption growth afterwards.

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Switzerland: Developments and Outlook, 1998-2010

(Year-on-year growth rates in percent, unless otherwise indicated)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Table 1.

Switzerland: Basic Data

article image
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; Swiss National Bank; and Swiss Institute for Business Cycle Research.

Fund staff estimates and projections unless otherwise noted.

Change as percent of previous year’s GDP.

Including railway loans as expenditure.

Excludes cyclical items only.

Excludes cyclical and one-off items (about 2.1 percent of GDP in 2008).

2009 values as of April 14, 2009.

Based on relative consumer prices.

2009 Growth Forecasts

(Percent)

article image
Sources: SECO, KoF, Consensus forecasts, and IMF WEO.

April Consensus forecast.

Machinery and equipment investment for SECO and KoF.

8. Headline inflation is set to decline rapidly and deflationary risks have increased (Figure 2).3 Inflation (y-o-y) peaked in July 2008 at 3.1 percent (the highest level in 15 years) on the back of higher fuel and clothing prices. As energy and food prices eased, headline inflation dropped to -0.4 percent in March. At the time of the mission, deflationary tendencies were not expected to persist, as core inflation remained above 1¼ percent. However, the rapid deterioration in the outlook has increased risks of deflationary expectations setting in. Inflation is now projected to reach -0.6 percent in 2009. The authorities have a similar (negative) inflation forecast for this year and noted the presence of deflationary risks.

Figure 2.
Figure 2.

Switzerland: Inflation Developments, 2005-11

(Year-on-year growth rates, unless otherwise indicated)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

uA01fig03

Growing slack in the economy should place downward pressure on inflation.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

9. The precise impact of the financial crisis on potential output growth remains uncertain. The authorities noted that potential output growth would be constrained over the next few years, but it was too early to quantify this. Given the financial sector’s weight in value added and the importance of financial intermediation to growth, estimates of potential growth should decline. However, the permanence of recent labor migration and productivity gains—which could bolster the economy’s resilience—were unknown. The authorities noted that under purely statistical methodologies potential growth would fall below 1.5 percent and that uncertainty surrounding potential output spilled over into uncertainty regarding output-gap/inflation dynamics.

III. Macro-Financial Linkages and Risks

10. Risks to the outlook are sizeable, on the downside, and depend on developments in global demand and financial markets.

  • The baseline outlook incorporates a contraction in Switzerland similar to the one experienced by the euro zone. Swiss real sector activity is correlated with euro area growth. The euro area is facing the prospect of a sizable and extended downturn which will spill over into Swiss export activity (63 percent of Swiss exports are to the European countries). However, as an open economy with a large financial sector, the probabilities of a larger contraction are non-trivial. Possible mitigating factors include the diversification of the Swiss economy, aggressive monetary policy relaxation, and the absence of a housing boom.

  • Swiss fortunes are aligned with the health of the global financial system (Box 1). A fall in equity prices is associated with declines in financial service exports, and real growth. Returns on equity for the two large banks have been good predictors of the future direction of the economy. There is a risk to the outlook in case the problems at the two large banks continue—which will show up in a further reduction in investment income and financial service flows, and a deeper, more protracted recession. The financial crisis is affecting other parts of the Swiss financial system (e.g., insurance companies and pension funds) as well.

uA01fig04

Lower market capitalization tends to be reflected in lower Swiss growth.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

uA01fig05

The large banks’ RoE outcomes also suggest a decline in growth.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Macro-Financial Linkages and Spillovers

The financial sector accounts for a large share of economic activity. In 2008, financial intermediation accounted for about 9 percent of GDP (12 percent including insurance and pensions) and 5½ percent of employment. In terms of growth rates, financial intermediation directly contributed about 1 percentage point (pp) to Swiss real GDP growth (annually) between 2004 and 2007.

As the financial sector deleverages and shrinks, the amount of assets available to generate value added (VA) will decline. Growth in banking sector assets and financial sector VA is highly correlated (0.75). In 2008, the banking systems’ total assets fell by 10.4 percent, while financial sector VA fell by 7.2 percent. Given the financial sector’s overall weight in VA, the drop in banking assets placed direct downward pressure on growth of about 1.4 pp. At the same time, negative shocks to financial intermediation will also spill over onto the rest of the economy placing added indirect downward pressure on growth. A VAR regression using quarterly data for 1980-2008 suggests that a 1 percent contraction in the value added of financial intermediation reduces real GDP over the next 4-6 quarters by about ½ pp. Thus a 7.2 percent decline in financial intermediation could result in a 3.5 pp decline in real GDP growth (which encompasses both effects) within a year. This reduction in growth is in line with the staff’s projected swing in Swiss growth rates (from +1.6 to -3.0 percent). Other real sector shocks (e.g., trade), which are not included here, are also expected to hit the economy.

uA01fig06

Growth in financial sector assets underpins growth in financial sector value added.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

uA01fig07

Contribution to Real GDP Growth, 1990-2008

(percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

In addition to growth effects, financial sector balance sheet shocks also imply sizable contingent fiscal liabilities. The April 2009 GFSR indicated that Switzerland’s financial system is systemically vulnerable to shocks emanating from other international financial centers.

11. Increased equity market volatility has resulted in safe haven flows and upward pressure on the Swiss franc. The Swiss franc plays a traditional role as a safe haven—appreciating in times of heightened uncertainty. With the decline in equity prices and return of risk aversion, real and nominal exchange rates became quite volatile. The franc appreciated by 8 percent against the euro in the span of a few months, reaching less than SFr 1.45 per euro at the end of October 2008, due in part to the unwinding of carry-trades. A marked reduction of interest rates pushed the rate above SFr 1.57 per euro by mid-December—which was reversed by early March as the rate declined to 1.47 leading up to the SNB policy meeting. There has been a clear link between exchange rate appreciation and economic growth in recent years.

uA01fig08

Volatility of currencies jumped in late 2008…

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Source: Bloomberg; and Swiss National Bank.
uA01fig09

…meanwhile, the Swiss franc REER appreciated sharply.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

12. There is little evidence of a domestic credit crunch. Private sector financing costs are rising and lending conditions are becoming stricter in trading partner economies (Figure 3). However, the SNB’s survey of 20 major Swiss banks indicated that the vast majority had not tightened lending conditions. Given that the majority of Swiss private sector credit is in mortgages, the absence of a housing bubble, and a resurgent Pfandbrief (covered mortgage bond) market which has supported credit supply, Switzerland is expected to avoid a sharp contraction in domestic credit. The decline in domestic private sector credit growth (down 6 percentage points from its 2007 peak to 3.8 percent year-on-year in February) has stabilized. However, private household demand for credit, both mortgage and non-mortgage related, has slowed.

Figure 3.
Figure 3.

Switzerland: Developments in Credit

Risk premiums have increased…

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Sources: SNB Monthly Statistical Bulletin; SNB Bulletin of Banking Statistics; and IMF staff estimates.1/ Reported as an indicator of broader European lending conditions in main export markets. An SNB survey started in early 2008 and only a few observations are available.2/ Reported at bank office level (113 banks; at least SFr 280 million in lending); domestic credit by residence of borrower. Coverage does not include lending by Swiss banks outside of Switzerland.

IV. Assessment of External Stability

13. Switzerland remains a competitive economy but export market shares have declined. Switzerland’s exports have expanded rapidly along with the cyclical up-tick in world trade. In many capital-intensive and luxury good areas, Swiss exporters were well placed to increase gross volumes as the world economy boomed. However, Switzerland’s goods exports have lost market share in their major markets in recent years. Exports declined by 8 percent in real terms in 2008Q4 and by 14 percent in the first two months of 2009. While pharmaceuticals and chemicals—which make up about 1/3 of total exports—have remained relatively stable, demand for raw and semi-finished materials, and luxury goods has fallen sharply. At the same time, growth in labor productivity (GDP over hours worked) averaged about one percent from 2002–07, slightly under its historical norm of about 1.3 percent. Over the same period, average euro area and U.S. labor productivity rose by 1.1 and 1.8 percent, respectively.

uA01fig10

The Swiss franc has appreciated since the start of the crisis.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics and WEO.
uA01fig11

Swiss goods exporters have lost market share in all major markets.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

14. The current account has deteriorated but is expected to remain in surplus.4 The recent turbulence in financial markets and commodity price reversals have caused substantial adjustments in certain current account components. The most significant change is the shift in net investment income, which has fallen by 83 percent as banks’ direct investment income is cut with subsidiaries reporting persistent losses. Given the size of the investment income component, the overall current account surplus has declined by 33 percent since 2006 and stood at 9.1 percent of GDP in 2008. Looking ahead, there was agreement that the surplus will remain under double digits over the next few years as financial sector activity declines, and investment banks restructure. WEO projections for the components of the current account reflect moderating commodity prices which will keep merchanting receipts low, and subdued bank commission and fee income will reduce financial service revenues. Investment income is not expected to quickly come back to 2004–07 levels given the uncertain outlook for investment banking.

uA01fig12

The current account surplus has fallen from it’s 2006 peak.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

uA01fig13

Losses by banks’ foreign subsidiaries have cut net direct investment income…

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Source: Swiss National Bank.
uA01fig14

…and offset increases in goods and services balances.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

15. CGER finds the exchange rate to be broadly in equilibrium, but a stronger-than-expected deterioration in the financial sector could imply overvaluation pressures going forward. The equilibrium exchange rate approach in the current reference period suggests an overvaluation of about 1 percent, while the two current account based approaches (macrobalance and external stability) imply an undervaluation of about 1 and 9 percent, respectively (based on Fall 2008 CGER). On net, the average of the three methodologies suggests that the franc is broadly in equilibrium. Given sizable downside risks to the Swiss financial center and potential growth, a sharp decline in export market shares, as well as large contingent liabilities, a more pessimistic scenario may suggest that the exchange rate is on the strong side.

V. Financial Sector Issues

A. The Authorities’ Response to the Crisis

16. The authorities have moved proactively to reduce the impact of the crisis on the economy and to stabilize the financial system. In hindsight (and in common with other countries), the authorities did not act forcefully enough to mitigate the buildup of risks to financial stability in the run-up to the crisis. However, since the start of the turmoil they have reacted swiftly. The SNB has actively cooperated with other central banks to ensure liquidity in the international interbank market. They pushed for recapitalization of the two large banks at an early stage and, when the crisis worsened in October 2008, introduced a plan to relieve pressures on UBS from bad assets without weakening its capital adequacy. They enhanced deposit insurance arrangements. Swiss regulators have also taken a lead in developing tighter financial sector regulation to help prevent crises in the future. The various measures have been coordinated to maximize the impact on fragile market confidence.

Interbank Liquidity

17. In cooperation with other central banks, the SNB provided liquidity to calm interbank tensions. Risk premiums in unsecured markets have remained volatile since the start of the financial turbulence. The SNB extended maturities on refinancing operations, starting in December 2007, and cooperated with the ECB in auctioning off U.S. dollar liquidity obtained via newly established swap lines with the U.S. Fed to ease dollar shortages. In late 2008, it offered Swiss francs through swap arrangements with the ECB and the National Bank of Poland, and in early 2009 with the National Bank of Hungary, to avoid tensions in the offshore Swiss franc market. Moreover, it has issued SNB bills in U.S. dollars to finance the Stabilization Fund (see below), and in Swiss francs to mop op excess liquidity from the domestically oriented banks.

uA01fig15

Interbank tensions have declined since October.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Source: Bloomberg; IMF staff estimates.

Financial Sector Stabilization Package

18. The stabilization initiative for UBS comprised both asset purchases and recapitalization (Appendix I). The main measures were the transfer of $39 billion (equivalent to 8½ percent of GDP) of distressed assets to an SNB-sponsored special purpose vehicle and a capital injection of SFr 6 billion from the Swiss Confederation into UBS. Funds for the capital injection came from budgetary surpluses and did not require additional borrowing. The government’s stake is in the form of mandatory convertible notes, which it hopes to sell before conversion. Credit Suisse did not participate in the asset purchasing plan but instead undertook a SFr 10 billion capital increase, placed with major global investors.

19. The government made clear its readiness for further action if needed—and if private sector solutions proved insufficient. At The the same time as it announced the arrangements for UBS, the government indicated that it (and the SNB) would take further steps, if necessary, to safeguard financial stability. In particular, it would guarantee, as needed, new medium-term bank borrowings of Swiss banks in the capital market. No guarantees have so far been given. Further losses, including on banking book risks (which have not been addressed by the stabilization measures to date) may yet create a need for new intervention, including capital injections accompanied by shareholder dilution. However, the authorities would look for private sector solutions first. In this regard, the mission welcomed efforts to channel funds from the small banks, increasingly favored by depositors, to the larger banks through the covered bond market.

Financial Safety Net

20. Switzerland has a developed bank resolution and insolvency framework. The Swiss government reformed the law applying to insolvency of banks and securities dealers in line with the April 2008 FSF recommendations. The regulatory authority has extensive intervention powers and is itself the authority for initiating and overseeing insolvency proceedings. Until recently, the only need to use these arrangements was in respect of unauthorized firms, but in 2008 they were applied successfully to the small Swiss subsidiary of a foreign bank.

21. The authorities have moved to strengthen deposit insurance, while initiating a fundamental review of the arrangements (Box 2). The pre-crisis deposit insurance system factually could only protect smaller depositors at the small and medium-sized banks. Coverage was limited, overall covered payouts capped, financing ex post, and there could be delays in larger payouts. These arrangements risked being insufficient to maintain depositor confidence in case of problems. While coverage has now been extended, the mission noted that the system remains unfunded and still cannot fully cover large banks’ deposits. The Federal Council has initiated a fundamental review of the system, due for completion later this year. The mission welcomed the review, noting the importance for countries with large banking systems of containing the contingent liabilities for government that can be created by deposit insurance. In this context, the mission noted that a blanket guarantee for deposits, as given last year by governments in some major economies, would not have been credible in Switzerland, where deposits are about six times GDP.

Deposit Insurance

On December 20, 2008, protected coverage was raised to SFr 100,000 per depositor from SFr 30,000 per depositor previously. In addition, the overall cap on the system-wide liabilities of the deposit insurance system was raised to SFr 6 billion from SFr 4 billion. The move followed increases in deposit insurance in other financial centers (a blanket guarantee for household deposits in Germany and Ireland in October 2008, and increases in limits in the U.S. and the U.K. in December 2008). The coverage of the insurance system is broad, comparable to that in the U.S. and the U.K., but the limit per depositor is less than that temporarily imposed in the U.S.

Comparison of Deposit Insurance Schemes

article image
Sources: National authorities.

Increased on December 20, 2008 from SFr 30,000 previously.

Announced but not legally implemented.

Since October 14, 2008.

Regulation and Supervision

22. The authorities have moved swiftly to enhance financial sector oversight and strengthen regulation (Appendix II, Box 3). Supervisors intensified their oversight of major banks early in the crisis and have been extending this approach to insurance companies as they began to suffer from the economic downturn. Extensive regulatory reforms are being introduced, to take effect, where appropriate, when the crisis is over (to avoid reinforcing the downturn) but giving a clear signal now that regulation will be much more demanding in the future. The authorities noted that they will continue to balance participation in international regulatory work (e.g., FSF, Basel Committee) with a readiness to implement measures that they think appropriate to the Swiss financial sector. Similarly, they have been taking a stronger lead in international cooperation on the supervision of major groups, responding to some limitations of previous arrangements with foreign supervisors that have been highlighted during the crisis.

Key Elements of Regulatory Reform in Switzerland

Capital adequacy

  • Basel II requirements to be strengthened in line with the Basel Committee’s evolving standards;

  • Increased capital buffers (under Pillar 2) above the Basel II minimum requirements for the two major banks, including a cyclical adjustment (by 2013);

  • The introduction of a minimum leverage ratio, including a cyclical adjustment (by 2013);

  • A redefinition of eligible capital.

Stress-testing

  • FINMA is developing a “building block approach” to supplement the existing top down stress tests conducted by the SNB. Results will inform management discussions and can be input in capital adequacy decisions.

Liquidity

  • New requirements are planned for the two large banks in 2009 and will be extended as appropriate to other banks.

Remuneration

  • FINMA will issue guidance on remuneration practices.

Note: See Appendix II for details.

23. The reform of capital requirements for the big banks is an important step with innovative elements. In addition to increased capital under Basel II, for the large banks FINMA has introduced a minimum leverage ratio (core tier 1 capital as a percentage of assets excluding domestic lending) and provisions to vary the actual minimum required of banks to reflect economic conditions. The two banks have until 2013 to comply, with a longer deadline possible. By applying Basel II and leverage ratios together, with higher requirements in “good times”, FINMA expects to address both the procyclicality of existing risk-based requirements and incentives created by leverage ratios for banks to increase risk assets and off-balance sheet business. The authorities noted that by defining “good times” by reference to profit cycles of individual banks, they have ensured that adjustments will be automatic and independent of judgmental estimates of the economic cycle.

24. FINMA is also reforming its requirements in relation to stress-testing, bank liquidity, and remuneration. In addition to the focus on capital, the reforms are addressing other weaknesses in regulation, in some cases extending work that was started before the financial crisis. For the stress test and liquidity requirements for banks, FINMA will apply the new approach initially to the major banks only, reflecting the significance of the shortcomings in these areas. But they will also be applied to other banks in due course, depending on experience with the major banks. The authorities emphasized that planned FINMA guidance on remuneration, helpful in the context of controlling investment banking risks, will apply to all regulated entities.

25. Overall, the reforms address key issues for the large Swiss banks but should be kept under review. In particular, the reforms tackle pressing needs for improved liquidity standards and higher capital for investment banking. They respond well to the international reform agenda. The program needs to be kept under review in the light of further international work, for example on developing a macroprudential focus to regulation. While welcoming the new capital framework, the mission suggested that the exclusion of domestic lending from the leverage ratio calculation, while necessary in current economic circumstances, should be reconsidered in the future. The authorities noted they would do so, particularly if a minimum leverage ratio were introduced by the Basel Committee.

26. Insurance regulation is also now being tested by the crisis. While overall insurance sector exposure to US subprime and related risks is limited, regulators are having to respond to strains imposed by wider market falls, on life companies in particular. Major reforms since the sector’s problems in 2001–03 have strengthened balance sheets and helped equip FINMA to manage the crisis. But the full benefits of the reforms, including those of the Swiss Solvency Test and the Swiss Quality Assessment, will be felt over coming years. In the meantime, the authorities have resorted to intensive monitoring of existing solvency standards and “tied assets” (those backing reserves). They are responding to solvency and liquidity pressures and have stepped up cooperation with foreign supervisors of major groups.

27. The new integrated regulator FINMA is well-placed to strengthen supervision. The Federal Office of Private Insurance (FOPI), the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) and the Anti-Money Laundering Control Authority were merged on January 1, 2009 under a long-planned reform. The creation of FINMA has enhanced the capacity of regulators to implement changes resulting from the crisis and strengthened their hands in the supervision of the major banking and insurance groups. FINMA had a somewhat challenging start and a debate about its governance and staffing model was reopened. The authorities emphasized their commitment to strengthening governance as necessary.

28. Additional resources will help to ensure the effectiveness of the new organization. FINMA is a public law body, accountable to the Federal government but enjoying institutional and financial independence. In particular, it has appropriate flexibility to recruit staff with required skills. FINMA has 315 full-time staff at present (April 2009) and a budget in 2009 equivalent to $88 million. The authorities noted that FINMA will increase total resources to 355 full-time staff, while emphasizing the need for the appropriate level of skills and experience. The mission welcomed the planned strengthening of staffing and noted that FINMA currently has somewhat light resources compared with those of other integrated regulators. 5

B. Risks to Financial Stability

Balance Sheets and Income Statements

29. The size and composition of the banks’ balance sheets creates risks for the public sector. The banking sector’s total on-balance sheet assets (at the group level) alone exceeded SFr 4.7 trillion at end-2007 or over nine times the size of Swiss annual GDP.6 Off-balance-sheet activities and emerging market exposure are also large. The rapid growth of the two big banks almost exclusively reflected the development of foreign business. For example, based on BIS data, as of the third quarter of 2008 Swiss banking exposure to emerging market countries was close to 50 percent of GDP—in Europe, second only to Austria. At end-2005, Swiss emerging market exposure had been only 28 percent of GDP.

uA01fig16

Swiss banking system exposure to emerging markets is well diversified, but large.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Source: BIS banking statistics, October 2008.

30. The deleveraging process has been slow among the large banks (Figure 4). Although the Swiss banking sector remains well-capitalized on a risk-weighted basis (Tier 1 capital ratio and capital adequacy ratio), low “permanence of capital” (in the form of tangible common equity) and still high balance sheet leverage have dented confidence in the ability of large Swiss banks to absorb further valuation losses. Despite a significant amount of noncore asset sales, basic leverage ratios have even reverted back to levels last seen in early 2008. Estimates could be higher depending if securities holdings were marked-to-market and how negative deferred tax liabilities are applied in the calculation of Tier I ratios.

Figure 4.
Figure 4.

Switzerland: Banking Sector - Capital Ratios1/

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Source: Bloomberg.1/ The data covers only the largest banks in the system. For Switzerland and Germany, two banks each; for the U.K., four banks; and for the U.S., seven banks. U.S. averages and 2008 first quarter data exclude Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley in the first two panels.

31. Funding pressures for the large banks require close monitoring. The funding market for bank-issued debt instruments remains depressed as banks strive to bolster their balance sheets and shore up their capital basis in anticipation of higher leverage ratios. Given that demand for bank term debt has largely disappeared, markets may demand some form of government guarantee—a contingency the authorities would consider, as announced in the October package of stabilization measures—to secure short-term financing of the two large banks. At the same time, the shift of deposits from the large to the smaller banks within the system, has added to liquidity concerns. At the time of the mission, the large banks felt that they had sufficient sources of short-term funding.

32. Financial sector revenues will remain under pressure. Investment banking revenues have declined sharply. At the same time, other key business areas, such as private banking, have been weakened. Net new money (from private banking and asset management) for the two large banks fell substantially in 2008 and outflows have continued in early 2009 for one institution. On March 13, Switzerland adopted the OECD standard on administrative assistance in fiscal matters, which will permit a fuller exchange of information with foreign tax authorities.7 It is not possible, at this stage, to gauge the impact of the enhanced information exchange on Swiss banking.

uA01fig17

Investment banking has underperformed while market risks have almost doubled … Large Swiss Banks: Net Income and Market Value-at-Risk VaR, 2004-08

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Sources: Financial statements (UBS, Credit Suisse); and IMF staff calculations.

Insurance and Pension Funds

33. The insurance sector has suffered from the downturn in markets:

  • Most life companies reduced equity risk following the 2001–03 market falls but retained other significant market risk through corporate bonds and alternative investments that were not either matched by liabilities or fully hedged. Rising credit spreads, higher liquidity premiums, lower interest rates and increased market

  • volatility have combined to cause large, mostly unrealized losses in the second half of 2008, while increasing the cost of hedging.

  • While non-life insurance is less affected, the reinsurance sector faces particular challenges. Non-life business globally is relatively unaffected by the crisis. However, a major reinsurance group is exposed to deteriorating credit conditions through some credit default swap contracts and other structured finance exposure acquired under a strategy to diversify from core business.

34. Further market weakness could create serious stress at life insurance companies in particular, with implications also for pension funds. The authorities noted that life insurers’ liquidity is not now under pressure, giving them time to take strengthening measures, while solvency ratios still exceed the minimum at major firms. For most companies, the key pressures may arise from weaknesses in the business model exposed by the crisis (particularly the high capital drain and risk management challenges in guaranteed business). However, more severe pressures, even liquidity strains, are not impossible should there be a further market downturn. Given the high proportion of pension funds underwritten by insurers, there would be adverse impacts on the pensions sector were life insurance policyholder benefits to be put at risk.

35. Occupational pension funds also face direct financial pressures from falling asset values. A growing number of Pillar II pension funds, which had total assets of around SFr 630 billion at end-2007, have funding ratios of below 100 percent. Their average ratios are estimated to have fallen to around 95 percent from 112 percent at end-2007, comparable to the low point of 2002. Further market falls would require more measures to restore adequate funding ratios, for example through increased employee or employer contributions.

36. The authorities are monitoring the impact of the crisis on these sectors and their wider implications. The guarantees provided by the insurance and pension sectors are insulating Swiss policyholders and pension fund members from some of the direct wealth losses experienced in some other countries. But their capacity to absorb shocks is clearly limited. In this context, there is a particular need for pension fund supervisors (based in the cantons, but coordinated by a new confederation level body) to balance the needs both to restore funding ratios promptly and to avoid exacerbating the downturn through strong measures.

uA01fig18

Switzerland has a sizable stock of pension fund assets.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Source: OECD.

VI. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies

37. The SNB has used monetary policy to good effect in a difficult environment (Figure 5).

  • The SNB kept the monetary stance unchanged in the first three quarters of 2008, offsetting higher risk premiums through lower repo rates. Infusions of SFr liquidity in interbank markets, use of longer-term repos, foreign exchange swaps, and new refinancing facilities lowered risk premiums and helped to ease appreciation pressures on the currency. Monetary and financial conditions continued to tighten nonetheless.

  • With the economic slowdown worsening, inflationary expectations rapidly falling and the currency appreciating, the SNB moved forcefully, relaxing the monetary policy stance by 225 basis points over a period of about two months at the end of 2008. With 1-week repo rates at 5 bps since September, the SNB had effectively moved to a zero interest rate policy at a relatively early stage. Longer-term rates, however, remained elevated.

Figure 5.
Figure 5.

Switzerland: Monetary Developments

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Sources: SNB Monthly Statistic Bulletin; and IMF staff estimates.
uA01fig19

The SNB aggressively relaxed the monetary stance in October by adjusting the 1-week repo rate.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Source: Swiss National Bank.
uA01fig20

The Confederation yield curve shifted down but long-term rates remain elevated.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

38. At the time of the discussions, the SNB saw rapid Swiss franc appreciation as the main risk to the economy. Despite a widening of interest rate differentials as the SNB cut policy rates, the Swiss franc had continued to appreciate against the euro on the back of safe haven flows. Currency volatility had also significantly increased. Given that anticipated reductions in euro-area rates would only exacerbate these tendencies, there was a concern that deflationary risks could accelerate uncontrollably in the middle of a severe recession. Waiting for a reversal in market sentiment could prove risky—and some insurance was felt to be necessary. Steering expectations, either by verbal intervention or “thinking aloud” to weaken the currency against the euro, or by a public recommitment to keep rates close to zero for a longer than expected period of time had worked during the last episode of deflationary risks in 2003. However, the SNB emphasized verbal intervention alone might prove insufficient in the current environment of risk aversion.

uA01fig21

Monetary and financial conditions tightened despite interest rate cuts.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Source: Staff estimates, based on real exchange rates, interest rates, and equities.

39. However, options to counter an unwanted tightening of monetary and financial conditions are limited. It was acknowledged that deflation risks, while increased, are still limited, credit is still available, and that the full effect of the already considerable monetary easing has yet to be realized. The authorities agreed that quantitative easing measures may not be overly effective, and entail increased risk to the SNB balance sheet. However, they emphasized the need to employ them, both to affect expectations and avoid the worse-case scenario of a deflationary spiral. With banks hoarding liquidity, a further sharp increase in the monetary base may not generate a subsequent rise in credit. Most short-term Swiss interest rates were already near zero. Direct bond purchases could be undertaken to lower longer-term interest rates, but Swiss debt markets are quite shallow, and an intervention could prove disruptive. In this context, direct foreign exchange intervention was seen by the SNB as the most effective monetary policy option.

uA01fig22

Domestic debt markets are relatively small…

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Source: BIS. Domestic debt in domestic currency (issued by nationals).1/ Based on 12 euro area countries.
uA01fig23

… and domestic bond issues have fallen with budget surpluses.1/

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Source: SNB Monthly Statistical Bulletin.1/ Includes public and private issuers.

40. At the mid-March meeting after the Article IV mission, the SNB announced measures—including currency intervention—to force a relaxation in monetary and financial conditions.8 The SNB noted that a sharp deterioration in the economic situation since last December and heightened deflationary risks over the next three years required decisive action. With the SNB forecasting -0.5 percent inflation for 2009 and zero inflation in the period 2010–11, the Libor target range was reduced by ¼ percentage point to between zero and 75 basis points. Moreover, the SNB will target the lower part of the band, as opposed to the usual middle point, a de facto easing of 25 basis points. Given unstable risk premiums that are hampering the transmission of monetary policy, the SNB decided to directly purchase private sector Swiss franc bonds. In order to counter an inappropriate tightening of monetary conditions, the SNB also announced it would buy euros on foreign exchange markets. This was the first foreign exchange intervention since 1995.9

VII. Public Finances

A. Fiscal Developments

41. The fiscal position has improved significantly over the past four years (Figure 6). The economic upswing and the consolidation since the introduction of the federal government debt brake rule have culminated in a general government surplus of 2.2 percent of GDP in 2007 (Tables 5 and6). Despite the support for UBS in 2008, Switzerland’s stock of debt at end-2008 remained about 30–35 percentage points of GDP below that of the Euro area average and Germany, and 20 percentage points below the U.S., as also reflected in relatively low financing costs. At end-2008, the public sector had a net international asset position of 21 percent of GDP, and 25 percent of GDP in the short-term.

Figure 6.
Figure 6.

Switzerland: Fiscal Developments

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Sources: Ministry of Finance; and IMF staff estimates.1/ Projection.
Table 2.

Switzerland: Balance of Payments, 2006-141/

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Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and Swiss National Bank.

Fund staff estimates and projections unless otherwise noted.

Includes errors and omissions.

Table 3.

Switzerland: Major Financial Institutions---Key Indicators, 2003-08

(Millions of Swiss francs, unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Company reports; and IMF staff estimates.

Total assets divided by shareholders equity.

In millions of US$, unless otherwise indicated.

Table 4

Switzerland: SNB Balance Sheet

(Millions of Swiss francs; unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: SNB; and IMF staff estimates.
Table 5.

General Government Finances, 2007-11

(In billions of Swiss francs, unless otherwise specified)

article image
Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance; and IMF staff estimates.

Confederation and extra budgetary funds. Excludes transfers of proceeds from gold sales from confederation to social security fund (SwF 7 billion, or 1.3 percent of GDP).

Computed as in OECD (2005). Excluding one-off items (1.1 percent of GDP in 2008).

Table 6.

Switzerland: Federal Government Finances, 2007-12

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Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance; and IMF staff estimates.

Includes the balance of the Confederation and extrabudgetary funds (Public Transport Fund, ETH, Infrastructure Fund, Federal Pension Fund).

Excludes VAT increase planned for 2010 since it has not yet been approved.

2008 total expenditures include extraordinary spending. Exclude transfers of proceeds from gold sales from confederation to social security fund.

Excludes cyclical and one-off items (about 1.4 percent of GDP) in 2008.

uA01fig25

General Government Debt and Yield Spreads

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics; IMF IFS; and IMF staff estimates.1/ Spread of local currency 10-year government bond yield over German 10-year government bond yield, as of March 16, 2009.

42. In 2008, the fiscal stance was appropriately neutral. The federal government’s surplus swung into a deficit of 0.4 percent of GDP as UBS support and accounting adjustments were less than fully offset by early payments and lagged revenue effects linked to 2007’s surprisingly strong economic growth. Continued surpluses at other levels of government, however, allowed the general government to record a surplus of 0.9 percent of GDP in 2008. Structural surpluses at both the general and federal government levels were broadly unchanged.

General Government Accounts

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified)

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2008 includes one-off expenditure of SFr 6 billion in support for UBS

Excludes cyclical items but includes one-off items.

Excludes cyclical and one-off items.

B. Fiscal Projections and Policy

43. Planned stimulus measures—and full use of automatic stabilizers—will result in a general government deficit in 2009. The federal government’s plan to cancel some deferred corporate tax liabilities, to bring forward investment spending (which triggers cantonal cofinancing expenditures) as well as additional cantonal discretionary measures, will result in a fiscal stimulus of about 0.8 percent of GDP. Accelerated public investment plans account for about three-quarters of the stimulus measures at the federal government level, which amount to 0.3 percent of GDP including cantonal cofinancing. Cantonal stimulus measures, in contrast, include a substantial portion (about half) in tax cuts and rebates. Apart from unemployment insurance, the impact of automatic stabilizers would be relatively limited given the moderate size of government, and there was agreement that they should be allowed to play fully at all levels. Although the direct impact of crisis-related financial sector losses is limited, automatic stabilizers and planned fiscal stimulus measures will lead to a significant deterioration in government balances. Deficits are now expected for federal as well as cantonal, municipal, and social security budgets. At the general government level, a deficit of 1.6 percent of GDP is expected.

Elasticity of Selected Budget Items to Output Gap

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Source: OECD.

44. The authorities will consider an additional stimulus for the 2010 budget. At ¾ percent of GDP, current measures are smaller than those envisaged in other European countries. The mission argued that additional fiscal stimulus when part of a coordinated approach, could help dampen a negative confidence spiral. A package similar in size to the 2009 one would bring the average stimulus closer to the European average. The stimulus could target one-off payments to low-income households with high multipliers and be followed by more sustained, but slower, public investment. The authorities were open to a further stimulus but noted that there are limits to the effectiveness of fiscal expansion given Switzerland’s open economy. New initiatives would require further coordination with cantonal governments—they undertake two-thirds of public investment and are the main distributors of social assistance—and would take time to implement. The measures would require use of the escape clause under the debt brake rule, which has just been extended to include extraordinary expenditures from 2010. Moreover, it was noted that personal and corporate income tax reforms are expected to widen structural deficits starting in 2011.

45. Comprehensive reforms of entitlement programs, especially in pension and disability insurance, will be required to ensure long-term sustainability. The Long-Term Sustainability Report estimated that a permanent fiscal consolidation of 1½ to 2 percent of GDP would be required to stabilize the stock of debt at its 2003 level. The Assessment of the Tasks of Government identifies areas which could yield further expenditure savings in the short- to medium-term. These are being implemented beginning with the 2010 budget, but initial amounts are small. With the approval of a temporary VAT increase to finance deficits in disability insurance (subject to approval in a September referendum), parliament has requested a proposal for a comprehensive reform of the disability insurance system by end-2010. Parliamentary approval is pending for an increase in women’s retirement age from 2014, after which more fundamental pension reform will be considered.

uA01fig26

Without corrective measures, long-term demographic pressures will push up debt.

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 164; 10.5089/9781451807417.002.A001

Sources: Ministry of Finance; and IMF staff projections.1/ Projection assumes current revenue and expenditure patterns continue, and uses expected demographic parameters from the Long-Term Sustainability Report.

VIII. Staff Appraisal

46. The global crisis will result in a significant decline in growth. Strong trade and financial linkages underpinned above-average growth during the global upswing. These same linkages, however, expose Switzerland to the negative shocks that are now weighing heavily on global activity. Indeed, the economy entered a recession in the second half of 2008, as the financial crisis intensified and world trade fell sharply. Looking ahead, there are signs that the decline will accelerate—creating additional domestic and international risks given Switzerland’s large international financial center—before positive growth is expected to return in the course of 2010.

47. The size of the Swiss financial sector and its importance to the global economy call for a clear focus on ensuring financial stability. Safeguarding stability is essential for a return to growth and will also contribute to restoring international financial stability. However, the size of the Swiss economy and limited public sector resources constrain the authorities’ ability to support the financial sector without incurring unsustainable liabilities. At the same time, the scope for market-based support mechanisms, such as industry-funded deposit insurance schemes, is constrained by the high degree of concentration in the banking sector. All this calls for strong, effective regulation and supervision, with a particular focus on close monitoring of vulnerabilities, early identification of and response to risks, and contingency planning to deal with possible stresses.

48. The authorities have taken a proactive approach in reducing the impact of the crisis on the economy—but more may be needed. They have relaxed the policy mix, injected liquidity, and introduced measures to address risks to the stability of the banking system. The creation of the bank stabilization fund, enhancements to deposit insurance, new capital adequacy targets, and initiatives to channel funds to banks in need of liquidity have bolstered confidence in the financial system. However, uncertainty about future economic and financial sector developments remains, and further policy action—including capital injections and government guarantees—may be required if the turmoil continues.

49. Banks and other parts of the diverse Swiss financial sector will remain under increasing stress. The two large banks continue to be highly leveraged despite a marked shedding of assets, continue to hold some amount of distressed assets, and the system as a whole is significantly exposed to creditors in emerging market countries. At the same time, earnings streams will remain under pressure as credit demand falters and revenues from private banking and wealth management business lines slow. Therefore, funding of banks continues to require close monitoring. Life insurance companies and pension funds operations are affected by lower asset prices. While many smaller and medium-sized banks have benefited from cash outflows from larger banks, strong liquidity at these firms also creates some risk of less prudent lending practices.

50. The authorities are further developing the regulatory framework. Last year they introduced an innovative reform of capital regulation for the large banks—applying both higher risk-based capital adequacy requirements that adjust to downturns in bank performance and a minimum leverage ratio—while acknowledging the need to avoid enhancing the current downturn by tightening capital and other rules too early. More stringent liquidity regulations to be introduced this year for the large banks respond to some weaknesses in international bank liquidity standards highlighted by the crisis. Switzerland has a developed bank resolution framework, but the recently extended deposit insurance regime should be put on a sounder footing to ensure adequate protection of depositors in case of failure, regardless of the size of bank. This requires, amongst other measures, the introduction of ex ante funding. The authorities are addressing these issues and will bring forward plans later in the year.

51. The establishment of a new integrated supervisor (FINMA) provides a good opportunity to strengthen financial supervision. An independent and well-resourced supervisory authority capable of responding effectively to the lessons of the financial crisis is essential to maintaining financial stability. FINMA should continue its progress in enhancing skills and resources, integrating sectoral regulatory approaches, and strengthening its forward-looking systemic surveillance. It needs to develop a strong supervisory style, in close cooperation with the SNB and foreign regulators. Continued intensive oversight of the large banks, including their foreign operations, is essential. With stresses spreading to other parts of the financial sector, there is also a need for close supervisory focus on the large (re)insurance sector and on medium-sized and small banks. With respect to the supervision of the smaller banks, this may require further development of the dual approach (with auditors) with increased on-site examination by FINMA staff and close attention to potential weaknesses in work delegated to auditors. In addition, there is a need to continue strengthening pension fund supervision (by cantons) in line with earlier recommendations.

52. An additional temporary fiscal stimulus—that does not undermine long-term fiscal sustainability—is recommended. A low stock of debt and previous surpluses provided space for the announced discretionary spending measures of about ¾ percent of GDP in 2009. Full use of automatic stabilizers, and flexible application of debt brake rules, should also help to limit any procyclical tightening impulses. Looking ahead, the deteriorating outlook calls for some further stimulus in 2010, which could be similar in size to that of 2009. However, with bond markets becoming more sensitive to long-run sustainability concerns, as well as the need to preserve sufficient room for possible additional financial sector support, any new stimulus should be temporary in nature and well targeted. Long-term reforms of entitlement programs should remain on the authorities’ agenda.

53. Policy interest rates have been appropriately steered toward zero as growth prospects and inflationary expectations declined. Rising risk premia and persistent currency appreciation due to safe-haven flows caused an undesirable tightening in monetary conditions. Given the sharp deterioration in the economy and increasing deflation concerns, there was a legitimate need to relax monetary conditions. The SNB’s shift to a quantitative easing track in March—including intervention in currency markets to stem further appreciation pressures—reflects limited options to further influence monetary conditions. Unsterilized foreign exchange intervention within Switzerland’s floating regime should be aimed at countering disruptive pressures, including those caused by safe haven flows. This would also provide some positive spillovers, including for Eastern European countries. Once the recovery commences, the SNB will need to exit quantitative easing, and reverse the build-up in monetary base to protect price stability.

54. Switzerland’s current account surplus reflects structural factors. The surplus is mostly structural, reflecting the country’s high per capita income, an aging population, and its position as an international financial centre. The writedowns of financial assets and decline in investment income flows will cause a reduction in the surplus in the near term. Some of this decline is structural, although it is too early to assess how much.

55. It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12 month cycle.

Table 7.

Switzerland’s International Investment Position, 2003-08

(in millions of Swiss francs, unless otherwise indicated; total at year’s end)

article image
Source: April 2009 SNB Monthly Bulletin.

Expansion of reporting population in 2004.

In 2005, distribution to Confederation and cantons of proceeds from gold sales.

In percent of GDP.

Table 8.

Switzerland: Financial Soundness Indicators

article image
Source: Swiss National Bank.

The 2007 and 2008 ratios were calculated from numbers that originate from the Basle I as well as from the Basle II approach. Therefore, interpretation must be done carefully since they can vary within +/- 10%.

Until 2004, general loan-loss provisions were made; as of 2005, specific loan-loss provisions have been carried out.

As percent of total credit to the private sector.

Table 9.

Switzerland: Structure of the Financial System

article image
Source: Swiss National Bank.

Trading banks reclassified in 2008 as stock exchange or other banking institutions.

Data for 2008 not yet available.

Share in percent of three largest banks in total assets of the sector.

Appendix I. The SNB Stabilization Fund

The authorities undertook a stabilization initiative for UBS through distressed asset purchases and a capital injection (Table A). On October 16, 2008, the Swiss Confederation announced that it will strengthen the UBS capital base by subscribing to mandatory convertible notes to the amount of SFr 6 billion, while the SNB created an SPV entity that would absorb problem assets (“bad bank” model). The SPV is funded by a first loss position taken by UBS, which is assumed to cover 10 percent of the SPV asset portfolio, and by a $35 billion non-recourse SNB loan—collateralized by the assets of the fund. The capital injection from the government came from the structural surplus, while the SNB initially procured the funds required for the transfer of the illiquid assets into the SPV from the U.S. Federal Reserve by means of a U.S. dollar–Swiss franc swap.

Table A.

Global Banking: Overview of Selected Bank Recapitalization Measures

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Degree of existing shareholder dilution6 Notes:

sovereign wealth funds, existing/new investors;

issuance in conjunction with £3bn warrants. Any proportion exceeding the 15 percent limit of (innovative) Tier 1 hybrid capital instruments is classified as Upper Tier 2 capital;

only classified as core Tier 1 capital and ranking as ordinary equity upon conversion in June 2009;

includes some capped participation on redemption;

convertible hybrid securities represent a form of subordinated debt that obligates the holder to accept common or perpetual preferred stock in lieu of cash for repayment of principal;

increasing pure equity features, generally rating agency treatment

Sources: Dealogic, Datastream, Bloomberg, Reuters, Barclays Capital, ING. Capital injections of financial institutions have been administered through a wide range of capital and subordinated debt instruments.

Owing in particular to amendments made to international accounting standards since the announcement of the stabilization measure, the transfer of assets has been reduced from its original level of approximately $60 billion to approximately $39 billion. The SNB and UBS agreed that certain categories of assets (structured products backed by student loans and assets that have been wrapped by monoline insurers) are to be withheld from the StabFund. The decision to retain the structured products on student loans reflected changes to IFRS accounting standards (IAS39) in October 2008 that made it possible for UBS to reclassify these assets (from “held for trading” to “loans and receivables”). The reclassification resulted in cost savings from accepting a low impairment charge (in lieu of the 10% equity contribution and possibly an additional write-off at the transfer price agreed by the SNB). The impact on UBS in the short term is similar to that of the StabFund in that further pressures on net income from mark-to-market losses have been avoided. By not transferring these assets, UBS remains exposed to possible impairment of the assets.

Assets have been transferred at prices set by an independent valuation process. In two steps, the SNB StabFund acquired assets from UBS in the equivalent amount of about $39 billion. Asset prices were determined by the SNB based on a valuation conducted by third-party valuation experts. The assets purchased were primarily U.S. and European residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities as well as other asset-backed securities.

Appendix II: Regulatory Reform in Switzerland

The financial services regulator FINMA, in collaboration with the SNB, is undertaking extensive reforms to its regulatory framework to respond to the lessons of the financial crisis. The main elements are as follows.

Capital adequacy

Basel II, including the Pillar 3 disclosure requirements, has been implemented for all Swiss banks. Six groups use the Internal Ratings-Based approach for credit risk and two the Advanced Measurement Approach for operational risk. Under Pillar 2, all banks are required to hold capital at least 20 percent above the Basel II 8 percent minimum ratio (the “Swiss finish”). The reforms will provide for:

  • Changes in the calculation of the Basel II ratio in line with Basel Committee standards. The emphasis on revised requirements for trading book risks will make the impact particularly strong for the major Swiss banks because of the continuing significance of their investment banking business.

  • Increased capital buffers (under pillar 2) above the Basel II minimum requirements for the two major banks: starting on 1 January 2013, they will have to meet a minimum ratio (capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets) of 12 percent—but higher “in good times” (see below).

  • The introduction, also from 1 January 2013 and just for the two major banks, of a minimum leverage ratio: they will have to hold capital as a percentage of (unweighted) assets of 3 percent at group level and 4 percent at bank level–and higher “in good times”; the ratio calculation excludes domestic lending (except interbank) and selected assets used in central bank repos, and allows use of Swiss GAAP measures of positive replacement value on derivatives that recognize a higher degree of netting than IFRS.

  • Variations to address the procyclicality of existing requirements: the Basel II minimum will rise to as much as 16 percent of risk-weighted assets in good times and the minimum leverage ratio will also be significantly higher. “Good times” are defined as periods of at least two years in which a bank generates profits of at least the normal level for the industry.

  • A redefinition of eligible capital (for both Basel II and leverage measures) to anticipate changes planned by the European Union in the revised Capital Requirements Directive.

Stress-testing

  • FINMA is developing a “building block approach” to supplement the existing top down stress tests coordinated by the SNB. Large banks are required to submit sensitivity analyses for their main risk clusters which FINMA uses to assess the impact of its scenarios.

  • FINMA will use the results to inform risk management discussions with the banks (especially vulnerability to future shocks) and possibly as an input into capital adequacy decisions. The two banks submitted initial results in relation to June 2008 data, the analysis of which will help FINMA refine the approach.

Liquidity

  • New requirements are planned to be introduced for the two large banks in 2009 and extended as appropriate to other banks. Banks will have to demonstrate their ability to withstand a liquidity crisis on the basis of scenarios defined by the regulator. The details are under development. They will capture bank specific and market wide stresses.

Remuneration

  • FINMA will issue guidance later this year on remuneration practices. This will be applicable to all regulated financial companies and will address risks in all areas of business, not only investment banking. It will draw on FINMA’s experience in approving 2008 UBS bonus allocations, a FINMA task under the stabilization package.
1

The staff team comprised Mr. Hilbers (head), Ms. Carare, Ms. Ohnsorge (all EUR), Mr. Jobst and Mr. Tower (both MCM), and visited Switzerland during February 26–March 9, 2009.

2

The UBS compensation survey indicates that 2009 nominal wage demands could reach 2½ percent.

3

Switzerland has a relatively high “vulnerability to deflation” indicator and low inflation persistence given inflation shocks (IMF Staff Position Note, “Gauging Risks for Deflation”, January 2009).

4

As noted in previous staff reports, the accounting treatment of investment income overestimates the current account surplus by 4-5 percentage points of GDP.

5

Based on the supervisory budgets of integrated financial sector supervisors in similar industrial countries, and using the size of assets under supervision and the degree of concentration of the sector as comparator metrics, the supervisory budget for Switzerland could be expected to fall within a range of $70-190 million. This tentative calculation abstracts from differences in responsibilities and operating procedures among supervisors.

6

SNB 2008 Financial Stability Report.

7

The authorities noted that bank information remains confidential and that to implement the exchange of information in individual cases on request, Switzerland will renegotiate double taxation agreements bilaterally (http://www.efd.admin.ch).

8

The SNB has a mandate to ensure price stability, while taking economic developments into account. This objective encompasses the prevention of both deflation and inflation.

9

The Swiss franc depreciated by about 4 percent against the euro (to SFr 1.54) on the day of the SNB announcement. Chairman Roth stated that the intervention did not represent a reversal of the SNB’s traditional monetary policy strategy.

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Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
Switzerland: 2009 Article IV Consultation: Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Switzerland
Author:
International Monetary Fund
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2009: Issue 164
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
9781451807417
ISSN:
1934-7685
Pages:
61
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451807417.002
  • View in gallery

    Switzerland’s economic performance during the expansion has been impressive.

  • View in gallery

    External demand and consumption drove growth.

  • Figure 1.
    View in gallery
    Figure 1.

    Switzerland: Developments and Outlook, 1998-2010

    (Year-on-year growth rates in percent, unless otherwise indicated)

  • Figure 2.
    View in gallery
    Figure 2.

    Switzerland: Inflation Developments, 2005-11

    (Year-on-year growth rates, unless otherwise indicated)

  • View in gallery

    Growing slack in the economy should place downward pressure on inflation.

  • View in gallery

    Lower market capitalization tends to be reflected in lower Swiss growth.

  • View in gallery

    The large banks’ RoE outcomes also suggest a decline in growth.

  • View in gallery

    Growth in financial sector assets underpins growth in financial sector value added.

  • View in gallery

    Contribution to Real GDP Growth, 1990-2008

    (percent)

  • View in gallery

    Volatility of currencies jumped in late 2008…

  • View in gallery

    …meanwhile, the Swiss franc REER appreciated sharply.

  • Figure 3.
    View in gallery
    Figure 3.

    Switzerland: Developments in Credit

    Risk premiums have increased…

  • View in gallery

    The Swiss franc has appreciated since the start of the crisis.

  • View in gallery

    Swiss goods exporters have lost market share in all major markets.

  • View in gallery

    The current account surplus has fallen from it’s 2006 peak.

  • View in gallery

    Losses by banks’ foreign subsidiaries have cut net direct investment income…

  • View in gallery

    …and offset increases in goods and services balances.

  • View in gallery

    Interbank tensions have declined since October.

  • View in gallery

    Swiss banking system exposure to emerging markets is well diversified, but large.

  • Figure 4.
    View in gallery
    Figure 4.

    Switzerland: Banking Sector - Capital Ratios1/

    (Percent)

  • View in gallery

    Investment banking has underperformed while market risks have almost doubled … Large Swiss Banks: Net Income and Market Value-at-Risk VaR, 2004-08

  • View in gallery

    Switzerland has a sizable stock of pension fund assets.

  • Figure 5.
    View in gallery
    Figure 5.

    Switzerland: Monetary Developments

  • View in gallery

    The SNB aggressively relaxed the monetary stance in October by adjusting the 1-week repo rate.

  • View in gallery

    The Confederation yield curve shifted down but long-term rates remain elevated.

  • View in gallery

    Monetary and financial conditions tightened despite interest rate cuts.

  • View in gallery

    Domestic debt markets are relatively small…

  • View in gallery

    … and domestic bond issues have fallen with budget surpluses.1/

  • Figure 6.
    View in gallery
    Figure 6.

    Switzerland: Fiscal Developments

    (Percent of GDP)

  • View in gallery

    General Government Debt and Yield Spreads

  • View in gallery

    Without corrective measures, long-term demographic pressures will push up debt.

Switzerland’s economic performance during the expansion has been impressive.

External demand and consumption drove growth.
Figure 1.

Switzerland: Developments and Outlook, 1998-2010

(Year-on-year growth rates in percent, unless otherwise indicated)
Figure 2.

Switzerland: Inflation Developments, 2005-11

(Year-on-year growth rates, unless otherwise indicated)

Growing slack in the economy should place downward pressure on inflation.

Lower market capitalization tends to be reflected in lower Swiss growth.

The large banks’ RoE outcomes also suggest a decline in growth.

Growth in financial sector assets underpins growth in financial sector value added.

Contribution to Real GDP Growth, 1990-2008

(percent)

Volatility of currencies jumped in late 2008…

…meanwhile, the Swiss franc REER appreciated sharply.
Figure 3.

Switzerland: Developments in Credit

Risk premiums have increased…

The Swiss franc has appreciated since the start of the crisis.

Swiss goods exporters have lost market share in all major markets.

The current account surplus has fallen from it’s 2006 peak.

Losses by banks’ foreign subsidiaries have cut net direct investment income…

…and offset increases in goods and services balances.

Interbank tensions have declined since October.

Swiss banking system exposure to emerging markets is well diversified, but large.
Figure 4.

Switzerland: Banking Sector - Capital Ratios1/

(Percent)

Investment banking has underperformed while market risks have almost doubled … Large Swiss Banks: Net Income and Market Value-at-Risk VaR, 2004-08

Switzerland has a sizable stock of pension fund assets.
Figure 5.

Switzerland: Monetary Developments

The SNB aggressively relaxed the monetary stance in October by adjusting the 1-week repo rate.

The Confederation yield curve shifted down but long-term rates remain elevated.

Monetary and financial conditions tightened despite interest rate cuts.

Domestic debt markets are relatively small…

… and domestic bond issues have fallen with budget surpluses.1/
Figure 6.

Switzerland: Fiscal Developments

(Percent of GDP)

General Government Debt and Yield Spreads

Without corrective measures, long-term demographic pressures will push up debt.