Switzerland
Report on Observance of Standards and Codes
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International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
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Report on Observance of Standards and Codes on the following topics: Banking Supervision, Insurance Supervision, and Securities Regulation

Abstract

Report on Observance of Standards and Codes on the following topics: Banking Supervision, Insurance Supervision, and Securities Regulation

Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision

A. Introduction

1. This assessment of the current state of the implementation of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP) in Switzerland has been completed as a part of a Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) update undertaken by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during 2013.2 It reflects the regulatory and supervisory framework in place as of the date of the completion of the assessment. It is not intended to represent an analysis of the state of the banking sector or crisis management framework, which have been addressed in the broader FSAP exercise.

B. Information and Methodology Used for Assessment

2. An assessment of the effectiveness of banking supervision requires a review of the legal framework, and detailed examination of the policies and practices of the institution(s) responsible for banking regulation and supervision. In line with the BCP methodology, the assessment focused on banking supervision and regulation in Switzerland and did not cover the specificities of regulation and supervision of other financial intermediaries, which are covered by other assessments conducted in this FSAP.

3. The Swiss authorities agreed to be assessed according to the Revised Core Principles Methodology issued by the BCBS (Basel Committee of Banking Supervision) in September 2012. This assessment was thus performed according to a significantly revised content and methodology as compared with the previous BCP assessment carried out in 2002 which was conducted under the first BCP methodology.3 It is important to note that this assessment cannot and should not be compared to the previous undertaking, as the revised BCP have a heightened focus on risk management and its practice by supervised institutions and its assessment by the supervisory authority, raising the bar to measure the effectiveness of a supervisory framework (see box for more information on the Revised BCP).

4. The Swiss authorities also chose to be assessed and rated against the Essential and Additional Criteria. In order to assess compliance, the BCP Methodology uses a set of essential and additional assessment criteria for each principle. The essential criteria (EC) were usually the only elements on which to gauge full compliance with a CP. The additional criteria (AC) are recommended best practices against which the Swiss authorities have agreed to be assessed and rated. The assessment of compliance with each principle is made on a qualitative basis. A four-part grading system is used: compliant; largely compliant; materially noncompliant; and noncompliant. This is explained below in the detailed assessment section. The assessment of compliance with each CP is made on a qualitative basis to allow a judgment on whether the criteria are fulfilled in practice. Effective application of relevant laws and regulations is essential to provide indication that the criteria are met.

5. The assessors reviewed the framework of laws, rules, and other materials provided and held extensive meetings with officials of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), and additional meetings with auditing firms, and banking sector participants. The authorities provided a self-assessment of the CPs, as well as responses to additional questionnaires, and provided access to supervisory documents and files, staff and systems.

6. The assessors appreciated the cooperation received from the authorities. The team extends its thanks to staff of the authorities who provided cooperation, including provision of documentation and access, at a time when staff was burdened by many initiatives related to global regulatory changes and changes in Swiss supervisory processes.

7. The standards were evaluated in the context of the Swiss financial system’s structure and complexity. The CPs must be capable of application to a wide range of jurisdictions whose banking sectors will inevitably include a broad spectrum of banks. To accommodate this breadth of application, according to the methodology, a proportionate approach is adopted, both in terms of the expectations on supervisors for the discharge of their own functions and in terms of the standards that supervisors impose on banks. An assessment of a country against the CPs must, therefore, recognize that its supervisory practices should be commensurate with the complexity, interconnectedness, size, and risk profile and cross-border operation of the banks being supervised. The assessment considers the context in which the supervisory practices are applied. The concept of proportionality underpins all assessment criteria. For these reasons, an assessment of one jurisdiction will not be directly comparable to that of another.

8. An assessment of compliance with the BCPs is not, and is not intended to be, an exact science. Reaching conclusions required judgments by the assessment team. Nevertheless, by adhering to a common, agreed methodology, the assessment should provide the Swiss authorities with an internationally consistent measure of the quality of its banking supervision in relation to the BCPs, which are internationally acknowledged as minimum standards.

9. To determine the observation of each principle, the assessment has made use of five categories: compliant; largely compliant, materially noncompliant, noncompliant, and non-applicable. An assessment of “compliant” is given when all EC and ACs are met without any significant deficiencies, including instances where the principle has been achieved by other means. A “largely compliant” assessment is given when there are only minor shortcomings, which do not raise serious concerns about the authority’s ability to achieve the objective of the principle and there is clear intent to achieve full compliance with the principle within a prescribed period of time (for instance, the regulatory framework is agreed but has not yet been fully implemented). A principle is considered to be “materially noncompliant” in case of severe shortcomings, despite the existence of formal rules and procedures and there is evidence that supervision has clearly not been effective, the practical implementation is weak or that the shortcomings are sufficient to raise doubts about the authority’s ability to achieve compliance. A principle is assessed “noncompliant” if it is not substantially implemented, several ECs are not complied with, or supervision is manifestly ineffective. Finally, a category of “non-applicable” is reserved for those cases that the criteria would not relate to the country’s circumstances.

C. Overview of the Institutional Setting and Market Structure

10. Switzerland has a diversified financial sector that is systemically important to the global markets. It comprises a few significant global players in banking and insurance, two dozen cantonal banks, regional financial institutions, private banks, foreign banks, internationally oriented insurance companies, and many pension funds. It has one of the largest banking sectors globally in terms of assets to GDP. The two large banks rank among the world’s top ten banks and are designated as Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). Switzerland is a global leader in private wealth management with a market share of more than a quarter in global cross-border private banking. The Swiss financial system contributes about 10 percent to Swiss GDP and employs over 5 percent of the labor force.

11. The banking industry is highly concentrated, but also it has a large number of medium and small banks. The banking sector has approximately 70 percent of the total financial sector assets with CHF 2.7 trillion, or over 450 percent of the country’s GDP. The banking sector consists of 297 banks (end-2012), although the two large banks account for about one-half of the Swiss banking system’s global assets and are important intermediaries in global financial markets. They are classified as Category 1 banks by the authorities in terms of size and complexity. The two largest are universal banks in their home Swiss market but focus more selectively abroad, where they are global players in asset and wealth management and in certain investment and corporate banking businesses. They are systemically important domestically as well with a share of over 30 percent in local markets. Major Swiss banks have been leaders globally in the extent of their restructuring and exiting of certain business in response to changed profitability dynamics and enhanced capital and liquidity requirements.

12. Other banks are much smaller, although some of them are relatively large compared to the size of economy and are systemically important domestically or regionally within the country. There are some relatively large banks serving more domestic or European markets on the asset side but many also gathering funds internationally into their asset or wealth management arms. Three Category 2 banks average CHF150B of assets and the 27 Category 3 banks have average assets of some CHF20B. There are 24 cantonal banks included in from Categories 2 to 4, which are historically established by cantonal laws and play an important role in each region, with a share of around 15 percent of the total banking assets. They tend to be classic retail banks with deposit gathering and lending to individuals and enterprises, together with wealth management. There are also a number of small regional banks focusing on traditional retail, mostly mortgage finance, within specific geographical regions. Foreign banks and private banks are heavily involved in cross-border and wealth management activities. Potential risks to smaller banks tend to be in credit risk and interest rate risk in the banking book. Wealth management functions are more exposed to operational and reputational risk. The 250 smallest and least complex banks as classified by FINMA have median assets of CHF250m.

13. FINMA, an independent public law institution, is a unified supervisor which regulates and supervises banks. It was created in 2008 by unifying the Federal Banking Commission (EBK), which was in charge of supervision and regulation of the banking sector, the Federal Office of Private Insurance, the insurance regulator and supervisor, and the Anti-Money Laundering Control Authority, to improve the financial sector supervision and the supervisor’s international role. It started its operation from the beginning of 2009, but it had been long planned as the original bill was drafted in 2006 and the law was approved in 2007. In addition to regulation and supervision of banks and insurance firms, FINMA also regulates capital markets and their intermediaries. In terms of banking regulation, laws and ordinances are submitted by the Federal Department of Finance (FDF) and enacted by the Federal Parliament and Federal Council, respectively. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) has responsibility over the stability of financial system and is in charge of monetary policy operations. It also is responsible for the supply of liquidity and acts as a lender of last resort.

D. Preconditions for Effective Banking Supervision

14. Switzerland has a competitive economy with prudent public finances and one of the highest GDP per capita globally. Sound and sustainable fiscal policies are anchored in a debt brake rule contained in the federal constitution and in constitutions governing 25 of 26 cantonal governments. SNB conducts the country’s monetary policy as an independent central bank. It is obliged by the Federal Constitution and its statute to act in accordance with the interests of the country as a whole. It has to ensure price stability, while taking due account of economic developments. Within this framework, the National Bank Act also confers on the SNB the mandate of contributing to the stability of the financial system

15. The macroeconomic situation in Switzerland has been stable but facing difficulties in the past few years:

  • GDP growth in Switzerland has decelerated and inflation remains negative. Driven by lower net exports, growth slowed in 2012 to only 1 percent and is expected to reach around 1¼ percent in 2013, and to regain momentum only gradually. Core and headline consumer price inflation are negative as the pass-through from the past exchange rate appreciation continues to run its course, while expectations are anchored in positive territory. Unemployment is low, and immigration is fueling labor force growth.

  • The exchange rate floor was introduced by SNB and it has helped safeguard macroeconomic stability. The floor was introduced in September 2011 as a measure to contain the effects of “safe haven” flows into Swiss assets. These inflows resumed in mid-2012, prompting further heavy intervention and an expansion of the balance sheet of the SNB, but pressures on the Swiss franc have waned since late 2012. Following the introduction of the floor, the real exchange rate has depreciated. While there have been difficulties in some segments, Swiss exports have performed well in recent years. The current account surplus remains sizable, reflecting favorable net interest income.

  • The fiscal position is strong. Discretionary fiscal policy is limited by the structurally balanced budget rule (“debt brake”) at the federal level and other fiscal rules at the cantonal level. With conservative budget planning and execution, the federal government has consistently outperformed the fiscal rule. The debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to fall further to about 45 percent of GDP in 2016, although there are spending pressures over the medium term and long-term challenges from population aging.

  • Developments in real estate and mortgage lending are important macroprudential concerns. With interest rates at historically low levels, mortgage lending has accelerated, bringing mortgage debt to about 140 percent of GDP. In parallel, housing prices have been rising, particularly in certain segments of the market. The authorities have taken measures to address these risks as described below.

16. In terms of financial sector policies, Switzerland’s approach has been to be an early adopter of the new Basel capital and liquidity measures and to tailor them with additional add-ons for certain banks for systemic reasons. Higher minimum capital ratios apply to the two G-SIFIs and to a lesser degree also to other banks except the smallest ones. Stability in the financial sector has been significantly strengthened by the ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) legislative revision for the regulation of systemically important banks. The revision was approved by Parliament on September 30, 2011 and put into force by the Federal Council on March 1, 2012. The corresponding amendments to the Capital Adequacy Ordinance (CAO) and the Banking Ordinance (BO) were passed by the Federal Council, approved by Parliament and entered into force on January 1, 2013.

17. The Federal Council decided on February 13, 2013 to activate the countercyclical capital buffer, targeted at mortgage loans financing residential property in Switzerland. This was on the recommendation of the SNB. Currently, banks have to hold an additional 1 percent of their risk-weighted assets in the mortgage sector as a consequence of imbalances in the real estate sector built up during the last couple of years. FINMA has also introduced measures to raise risk weights for mortgage lending and new requirements for mortgage financing through Swiss Bankers Association, including a minimum down payment and minimum repayment requirements

18. The role of SNB relates to macro-prudential supervision. The SNB is responsible for the designation of the systemically important banks according to Art. 8 of the Swiss Banking Act, and to apply for the activation of the countercyclical capital buffer with the Swiss Federal Council. Between FINMA and the SNB a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is in place. It provides for regular meetings at head of organization level and ongoing exchange of views in the areas of (i) assessment of the soundness of systemically important banks and/or the banking system; (ii) regulations that have a major impact on the soundness of banks, including liquidity, capital adequacy and risk distribution provisions, where they are of relevance for financial stability; (iii) contingency planning and crisis management.

19. Switzerland has a consensus-driven culture with strong support for principles-based, proportional regulation and supervision, once adopted. Rating agencies have described the domestic credit culture as conservative. The system of business laws is well developed, as is the practice of professions important to banking such as accountancy and auditing, the legal profession, and banking and risk management. However, given the size and reach of domestic banks, FINMA (and its predecessor) concluded that there were not sufficient high quality resources available in Switzerland to effectively conduct bank supervision using own resources only. That lead to the development of the supervision model of having the outside auditors of banks, and their global network, conduct regulatory audits on behalf of FINMA (as an ‘extended arm’), but paid for by the banks.

20. All stock corporations and other commercial entities in Switzerland must prepare financial statements including a balance sheet, an income statement and notes. The financial statements of stock corporations are subject to an annual audit. Publicly traded companies, banks, other financial institutions, mutual funds and pension funds are subject to additional reporting requirements. Auditors of public companies are subject to regulation and inspection by an independent authority.

21. FINMA is the supervisory authority and also the insolvency and resolution authority for banks and securities dealers in Switzerland. It is also responsible for intensified supervision of banks in a recovery status. At the point of non-viability, FINMA is responsible for establishing intervention measures, and the resolution or the liquidation of the bank. Systemically important banks, as required by FINMA, need to establish recovery plans which are subject to FINMA’s approval. In addition, FINMA defines institution-specific resolution plans. FINMA is responsible for the international coordination and cooperation process regarding the global resolution strategy for both Swiss G-SIBs.

22. In 2011, FDF, SNB and FINMA signed a tripartite memorandum of understanding on crisis management. The MOU governs exchange of information on financial stability and financial market regulation issues, as well as collaboration in the event of a crisis. In accordance with the MOU, strategic coordination of the crisis management organization and of any intervention is performed by a Steering Committee (SC), comprising the head of the Federal Department of Finance (FDF), the Chairman of the Governing Board of the SNB and the Chairman of FINMA. Meetings of the SC shall be held whenever necessary. FINMA leads international crisis management colleges for the two major Swiss banks, especially with participation of the United States and the United Kingdom.

23. Regarding recovery and resolution, the coming into force of the new Banking Insolvency Ordinance (BIO) established by FINMA was an important step for Switzerland. This Ordinance sets out the process to be followed so that not only shareholders but also bondholders contribute towards restructuring. As part of its restructuring plan, FINMA can order a compulsory conversion of bonds or a waiver of claims (bail-in): it ensures that banks can still continue to operate and safeguard financial stability. In the case of systemically important large banks, additional capital measures have been taken in the form of convertible capital (CoCos). This involves a two-stage approach which, as a first step, converts CoCos into equity capital. If this measure to sustainably stabilize the bank proves insufficient, the next step is resolution at the highest group level by means of a bail-in. This procedure triggers FINMA’s resolution strategy in cooperation with its key host regulators.

24. In 2008 the limit on depositor protection was increased from CHF 30,000 to CHF 100,000, and extended to employee pension accounts. In addition, the upper limit for overall secured assets was increased from CHF 4 billion to CHF 6 billion. In September 2011, the temporary provisions were made permanent in the revised Banking Act. The Depositor Protection scheme is set up as an ex-post financed association with which all banks in Switzerland must be affiliated. In the event of a bank going bankrupt, all members transfer to this scheme the amounts required of up to a total amount of CHF 6 billion within five days. To guarantee this, banks are required to deposit 125 percent of the guaranteed amounts in Switzerland.

E. Main Findings

25. Switzerland has recently made major enhancements in the practice of banking supervision and now has a high level of compliance with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCPs). Not all the results of improvement to date are embedded in the system or yet observable. The Swiss banking system is very large relative to the size of the economy, conducts significant transactions with non-residents, and contains two G-SIFIs with large international operations and a number of banks that are systemically important in domestic terms. The sector faces a number of challenges to parts of its business model as expectations related to transparency and tax authorities increase. Major Swiss banks are also adjusting to the new international prudential standards. More recently, several material issues have arisen in domestic or cross-border markets that have indicated weaknesses in controls or practices that are being dealt with by banks and the authorities. Given the nature of the Swiss banking system and its importance to the country and globally, it is essential that the supervisory system meet the highest standards for effectiveness. To reach that goal, Swiss authorities need to go farther along the path they have already started and aim for a higher level of intensive supervision.

26. Significant portions of guidance and legislation related to qualitative risk management and control standards are not as detailed or comprehensive as in many other major countries and need to be updated and selectively strengthened. Supervisory risk assessments and guidance to auditors, as the extended supervisory arm of FINMA, need to be further materially improved, beyond what is now envisioned. Additional skilled resources within FINMA are necessary to meet these goals and to conduct more on-site supervisory work. The assessors saw many examples of high quality initiatives and practices in FINMA. The model of using auditors is understandable given the structure of the Swiss banking system to multiply FINMA expertise and take advantage of auditor’s global networks, but needs to be handled carefully. Switzerland has one of the most principles based approaches to rules and guidance among major countries. It remains considerably focused on capital and liquidity metrics, and less focused than necessary on qualitative elements of risk management and robustness of internal controls. The recommendations in this report would add to the effectiveness of supervision, would increase FINMA’s ability to assess the quality and completeness of information coming from auditors, and would put more incentive on auditors to perform in a better and more consistent manner. FSAP assessments focus solely on whether the core principles are met in practice, and take no position to endorse or otherwise a country’s basic supervisory approach.

Responsibilities, Objectives and Powers (CP1)

27. The responsibilities and objectives of FINMA that emphasize protecting creditors, investors and insured persons, as well as ensuring proper functioning of the financial market, should be clearly stated in legislation as pre-eminent. The objectives currently indicate that it is through this approach that the competitiveness of the Swiss financial sector is to be achieved. Such a formulation risks misinterpretation as to what FINMAs objectives are. Currently, there are moves in the federal parliament to elevate promoting competitiveness of the financial sector as a separate objective with equal status to FINMAs existing prudential and market mandate. Changes of this nature would risk confusing the purpose of banking regulation and supervision and would not be consistent with the BCP.

28. There is a legal framework in place that is highly principles-based. As noted in several CPs, additional qualitative rules, guidance or supervisory methodology should be put in place in selected areas to meet the BCP. While FINMA uses its general authority to make up for deficiencies, experience elsewhere shows this may not be sufficient in times of stress. Without more detailed guidance, the criteria for regulatory auditors assessment is not sufficiently clear. That reduces the effectiveness of the regulatory audit and reduces FINMA’s ability to judge what the regulatory audit is really accomplishing. FINMA has recently updated several regulations and guidance. Nevertheless, there are other areas where regulations (ordinances) and FINMA guidance either need to be enhanced with respect to qualitative standards, or where FINMA rules need to make explicit reference to international principles as the standards that they expect banks to meet and regulatory auditors to assess against. FINMA is rightly sensitive that guidance appropriate for international banks should not apply to smaller banks. There are ways to deal with this proportionality challenge while still enhancing clarity of supervisory expectations.

Independence, Accountability, Resourcing and Legal Protection for Supervisors (CP2)

29. FINMA has limited on-site and off-site supervisory resources that have been increased in recent years, but are now subject to a self-imposed headcount cap, which should be relaxed. Resources of FINMA are too little to supervise and regulate the entire banking system in a way that meets the core principles, including sufficient in-depth on-site work, and oversight of supervisory work done by external auditors particularly for medium and small banks. This is contributing to shortcomings in supervision and regulation, and weak practical implementation in certain areas, as described in various CPs. FINMAs adherence to a head-count freeze, that it has decided upon, needs to be relaxed to achieve compliance.

30. FINMA has well established operational independence, which is enshrined in legislation. Accountability arrangements are to the Federal Council through the federal Minister of Finance. FINMA is governed by an executive reporting to a board which plays more of an oversight role, though it has authority for FINMA guidance in circulars, and general authority to involve itself in any individual supervisory decision. The recently published rules addressed a problem that Board members were not precluded from also having certain positions in the financial sector. More clearly delineating and limiting the FINMA Board’s ability to be involved in individual decisions could enhance sound governance and ability to attract Board members. Current moves in Parliament require the Federal Council to transfer FINMA’s power to set general Pillar 2 capital buffers to the Council. These changes should either not be proceeded with, or the legislation should indicate that the Council’s Pillar 2 power will be exercised only on the formal advice of FINMA.

Cooperation and Collaboration (CP3)

31. There is a well-developed framework for cooperation on prudential matters between FINMA, the Swiss National Bank (SNB), and the Federal Department of Finance, and between FINMA and other prudential supervisors internationally that are important to FINMA. This consists of MOUs domestically and combinations of MOUs and other arrangements internationally. These are important to FINMA’s effectiveness given the significant international structure of a number of major banks. Assessors reviewed evidence of these arrangements working effectively in practice during the course of the mission

Permissible Activities, Licensing, Transfers Of Ownership, Major Acquisitions (CPs 4–7)

32. FINMA has a well-developed system of ensuring that permissible activities, as required by law, are only conducted by authorized banks, and the licensing process is actively used to provide notification of, and control the extent of, bank’s activities. FINMA takes action to shut down unlicensed banking activities, or those holding themselves out to be licensed who are not, including on the internet. Banks are required during licensing to have their internal corporate documents specify their high-level organization structure, and the business lines and geographies they intend to pursue. Changes in these require FINMA notification and approval, which triggers an assessment by FINMA of the bank’s ability to conduct the new business, or in a new country, with appropriate risk management and controls.

33. For transfers of ownership, FINMA has a well-developed regime that is based on notification and approval requirements well before changes in control. FINMA reviews are extensive including fit and proper requirements, beneficial ownership, business plans, and related matters. FINMA has a well-developed ability to assess the capability of foreign supervisors’ regimes and exercises due care in approving foreign acquisitions. But the scope of what entities are included in the definition of those able to significantly influence a bank’s activities, and who therefore have to be approved as owners, is less clear than desirable.

Supervisory Approach, Supervisory Tools, Supervisory Reporting, Corrective and Remedial Powers (CPs 8–11)

34. Switzerland has a unique supervisory process involving a mix of FINMA resources and extensive resources of audit firms doing regulatory audits on FINMA’s behalf. FINMA has materially enhanced supervisory processes and practice in the past three years to address identified deficiencies and the new intensity expected post the financial crisis. This welcome development is necessary and beneficial. The new process requires audit firms to be more forward looking and effective in their work, adds capability for FINMA to do more supervisory work itself, and enhances FINMA interventions. Assessors saw evidence of how that process is working in practice.

35. However, that process only started to be implemented recently, certain of the impacts were not able yet to be observed by assessors, and the quality and depth of that process and the oversight and direction of auditors work by FINMA need to be further enhanced to meet international standards. In particular, risk assessments that drive the supervisory process should be made more consistently forward looking, more granular and thus more useful for the larger and mid-size banks, and more consistent across audit firms. Revisions to risk analysis methodology to improve granularity are planned. ‘Deep dive’ onsite work by FINMA should be increased in frequency and depth, selectively assessing the quality of various risk management governance and internal control systems on a proactive rather than reactive basis. That would complement FINMAs excellent work on quantitative capital and liquidity-related matters for larger banks. This will require materially more resources at FINMA. This will also require more ability for FINMA off-site staff to direct, monitor and compare during the supervisory cycle the audit work being done on their behalf. FINMA will also need more resources to participate periodically in the regulatory work of audit firms for major banks, especially in assessments in international locations, to assure themselves of its quality. This includes selective participation in ‘deep dive’ work done by the firms for FINMA. They should also participate more frequently in foreign supervisory reviews of the major Swiss banks. FINMA itself should conduct more theme reviews in areas where it, rather than regulatory auditors, is best placed to do so, because of expertise or because it “sees” the whole sector.

36. FINMA makes extensive use of its general corrective and remedial powers to achieve prudential results. FINMA has especially used Pillar 2 add-ons as a supervisory tool. Experience with FINMA supervisory requirements and recommendations, is that they are treated very seriously by licensed banks. FINMA has experience in closing smaller institutions, and has progressed in recovery and resolution planning for its two largest banks. For enforcement of prudential matters for banks, the fact that FINMA does not have power to fine institutions is not a serious problem. If having that power meant that standards of proof in enforcement matters were raised, that could reduce the effectiveness of the current system.

Consolidated Supervision and Home-Host Relations (CP12–CP13)

37. FINMA consolidated supervision is of high quality, but the legal framework should be enhanced to support such supervision. The legal framework does not apply all powers available at the level of the bank to the holding company in banking or conglomerate groups. FINMA is, however, able to achieve its goals indirectly in those cases. Experience in other jurisdictions suggests that, in extremis, the power to act at the level of the individual institution may not be enough to achieve group-wide results. As a preventative measure, the law should be strengthened to allow interim and permanent enforcement decrees to be applied at the holding company level.

38. FINMA has a well-established and effective network of home-host relations for prudential matters. This is based on a network of MOUs and other bilateral relations. Communication and coordination with the U.K. and U.S. is particularly close, given the operations of the major Swiss banks in those jurisdictions. Work in crisis management colleges on recovery and resolution plans is proceeding. The BCP assessment did not consider the state of international information sharing or cooperation on conduct of business or enforcement matters, which are outside the BCP methodology.

Board of Directors (CP14)

39. FINMA practice in the governance area is evolving as is the case with other supervisors and assessment of governance effectiveness should be improved. Interaction with boards of major institutions is extensive. However, the level of banking and risk expertise in boards of a range of mid-size institutions appears to be less than desirable, as does the prevalence of separate risk committees. Guidance is incomplete, but could easily be updated to add more specificity and reference international standards. FINMA plans to revise relevant circulars in 2014. There is room to formalize and enhance practice of assessing boards by FINMA and/or by external auditors.

Risk Management (CP15)

40. FINMA generally has high expectations of banks’ risk management. However the comprehensiveness of qualitative guidance in certain areas should be improved and updated or explicit reference should be made to Basel texts. Guidance to banks and/or auditors should be put in place re enterprise-wide risk measurement and risk management. This would enhance institutions’ understanding of FINMA expectations, and would also enhance the extent to which regulatory audits are appropriately addressing the right things. More domestic systemically-important mid-size banks should elevate the position of CRO to be a full executive board member, and more mid-size domestically systemic banks should be required to have a separate board risk committee and interact more regularly with the risk function. FINMA should review thematically risk appetite frameworks and capital planning and related stress testing across mid-size banks, building on the general approach to mortgage stress testing they have recently done.

Capital Adequacy (CP16)

41. Switzerland has a robust capital adequacy framework fitting with its strategy to be an early adopter of new Basle rules without exceptions, and to provide significantly higher requirements on too big to fail banks. New requirements based on Basel III rules have become effective in 2013, and are assessed as consistent with the Basel rules by BCBS. The old standardized approach for domestic banks will be phased out in a few years. Substantially higher capital requirements are imposed on the largest banks including core capital and bail-in instruments. Lesser levels of Pillar 2 add-ons are also required of the other banks except the smallest ones. Such a framework ensures that Swiss banks will continue to have very high capital adequacy ratios. The number of banks using advanced approaches is limited, but FINMA has a robust framework to assess and validate models and methods used by banks for these approaches. The recent Parliamentary initiative to bring FINMA’s power to require Pillar 2 add-ons to a group of banks to the Federal Council and to potentially set the maximum amount to be charged would be counterproductive for the safety of the banking system.

Credit Risk and Problem Assets (CP 17-CP18)

42. FINMA qualitative rules and guidance re credit risk management and provisioning are not fully comprehensive or as detailed as in many jurisdictions. However, the supervisory and auditing process fills gaps, is comprehensive and allows FINMA to understand the quality of credit risk management and satisfy itself as to the adequacy of provisions. Some improvements to guidance and instructions to regulatory auditors could be made to ensure that their work is focusing consistently on credit risk management across the full range of banks and audit firms involved in regulatory audits. No issues were identified with respect to provisioning policies or approach.

Concentration Risk and Large Exposures (CP19)

43. Rules, guidance and/or instructions to regulatory auditors need to be expanded to ensure that relevant concentrations are picked up appropriately in banks’ risk management processes and are supervised correctly by statutory auditors on FINMAs behalf. Assessments of other forms of concentration risk should be conducted by FINMA under an enhanced stress testing program. Requirements for statutory auditors to express an opinion of concentration risk have only recently been clearly articulated. Assessment of concentrations beyond single name credit concentrations, such as concentrations resulting from possible system-wide stress events, or concentrations of funding, are better addressed by FINMA rather than by external auditors, given the skills and system-wide view needed for such assessments. That should occur through active use of stress and scenario testing and should be built on the efforts made by FINMA to date. Major banks appear to run relatively sophisticated approaches, but beyond single-name exposure verification, they have not been assessed comprehensively by the supervisory process.

Transactions with Related Parties (CP20)

44. The definition of what constitutes a related party, and the requirements for dealings with related parties to be at market terms and conditions, and for board oversight, need to be updated. Major problems in this regard have not been identified, but the current rules and guidance have a potential to miss transactions that should be caught, thus unnecessarily undermining the reputation of the system. Reporting of related party transactions to the supervisor should also be brought in line with international standards. The updated framework, possibly in a circular, should explicitly cover a full range of transactions, and stipulate requirements for policies and processes for managing the related risk. Guidance should be clearer that these are expected to be at market terms and conditions, and provide reporting requirements on aggregated related party exposures to the supervisor.

Country and Transfer Risk, Market Risk and Interest Rate Risk In The Banking Book (CP21-23)

45. Assessors reviewed rules and guidance applying to country and transfer risk, market risk and interest rate risk and believe that it sufficiently meets Core Principle requirements. Discussions with major banks indicated, as expected, generally sophisticated approaches to these risks. Country risk and market risk is generally much less for mid-size and smaller banks. Even midsize and smaller banks, for which interest rate risk can often be a major issue to be managed, showed a degree of awareness and ability to manage the risk that is necessary. Supervisory practice should be enhanced, including FINMA thematic reviews on these risks (for relevant mid-size and smaller banks), but that is part of the more general issue raised in other CPs.

Liquidity Risk (CP24)

46. FINMA has enhanced liquidity quantitative information gathering (LCR reporting from mid-2013) and has updated liquidity risk guidance in progress that reflects international standards and enhances qualitative guidance for all banks. This circular will be in place at the beginning of 2014. However, application of its elements to smaller banks could be broadened, such as the requirement for diversification of funding structure. Quantitative requirements for large banks are of high quality but those for other banks are outdated. The authorities’ current plan to implement LCR according to the agreed international schedule will provide a substantial improvement.

47. Looking forward, it is essential for FINMA to have close dialogue with mid-size and smaller banks as well as regulatory auditors to set expectations for implementation and supervisory assessment of liquidity risk. FINMA needs to monitor to minimize the risk that the proportionality argument is used by these banks to apply qualitative liquidity requirements in an insufficient manner. FINMA should conduct a thematic review of the new circular after a few years and revise it, and supervisory instructions to auditors, to reflect lessons learned.

Operational Risk (CP25)

48. The current regulatory framework on operational risk has limited application of basic qualitative requirements, and lacks requirements on operational risk regarding information systems. FINMA’s supervisory rating system should explicitly incorporate operational risk to aid in this risk getting more strategic focus. Operational risk may be the primary risk for banks specializing in asset or wealth management, and is increasing in relative importance at the largest banks. Changing the rating system would have the benefit of giving operational risk more priority overall in the FINMA supervisory approach, which is appropriate given the strategic orientation of Swiss banks. There is also absence of clear expectations of reporting of operational risk related incidents to the supervisor, with the exception of the two large banks. Given the importance of operational risk in the country, it is also important for FINMA to assess common risk factors in the operational risk area in a proactive manner. Based on the assessment, FINMA should conduct thematic supervisory reviews by itself from time to time. This will require additional resources.

Internal Controls and Audit, Financial Reporting and External Audit, Disclosure and Transparency (CP26-CP28)

49. FINMA has a well-developed focus on internal controls and audit, which is understandable and necessary given its supervisory approach. Regulatory auditors are in a good position to judge the effectiveness of internal audit. FINMA also focuses on this directly, and through regulatory audit, and intensity has increased recently. Recent highly-publicized breakdowns related to compliance at a number of banks have, in some cases, been related to fraudulent behavior which supervision cannot fully prevent, but ex-post FINMA reviews have found that significant control weakness at banks contributed to the matters not being detected sooner. The supervisory approach as regards qualitative risk management and controls needs to be ramped up proactively to reduce the risk of serious breakdowns. This is part of a more general issue of supervisory approach that is assessed under CP8/9.

50. Use of Swiss GAAP is prevalent (outside the largest banks), but Swiss GAAP is similar or more conservative generally than IFRS. Disclosure obligations of Swiss GAAP are generally less than for IFRS. However in the banking sector additional Pillar 3 disclosure requirements are applied. The recent regulatory capital review found Switzerland complying with Pillar 3 disclosure requirements of the Basel capital rules.

Abuse of Financial Services (CP29)

51. The Swiss regulatory framework regarding abuse of financial services is well developed and the banks’ compliance against it is rigorously checked through significant work done by external auditors and FINMA. Laws and regulations provide comprehensive and very detailed requirements to prevent abuse of financial services, in particular in regards to AML/CFT issues. Not only banks’ adherence to these requirements is subject to annual regulatory audits by external auditors, which in turn reviewed by FINMA, but also the supervisor itself has carried out onsite reviews on the issue from time to time.

Table 1.

Switzerland: Summary Compliance with the Basel Core Principles—Rosc

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F. Recommended Actions

Table 2:

Switzerland: Recommended Actions to improve Compliance with the Basel Core Principles

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G. Authorities’ Response to the Assessment

52. The Swiss authorities would like to thank the IMF for its “detailed assessment of observance” relating to the “Basel Core Principles (BCP) for Effective Banking Supervision” as part of its comprehensive Financial Stability Assessment Program on Switzerland. Discussions about Switzerland’s compliance with the BCPs were always constructive.

53. Overall, the Swiss authorities welcome the positive assessment of compliance with the BCPs, which acknowledges the strong efforts of Swiss authorities in recent years to enhance the effectiveness of banking supervision. In this context it is worth highlighting again that Switzerland has been ahead of most countries in implementing enhanced regulation, as recently evidenced by the Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In order to continue on this path, effective rule making remains an essential prerequisite. That is why the Swiss authorities welcome the observation on BCP2 that FINMA’s power to set general Pillar 2 capital buffers should not be removed.

54. From a Swiss perspective some clarifications are required concerning the assessment results and recommendations provided by the IMF. The first important issue relates to observations on BCP2, where the IMF concludes that “resources of FINMA are too little to supervise and regulate the entire banking system in a way that meets the core principles”, which is “contributing to shortcomings in supervision and regulation, and weak practical implementation in certain areas”. It is important to highlight that with its current level of resources FINMA feels well equipped to effectively supervise the Swiss banking system, a belief borne out by its recent track record in prevention, correction and, where necessary, enforcement. In addition, the Swiss authorities believe that the comment “FINMA’s adherence to a head-count freeze, that it has decided upon, needs to be relaxed to achieve compliance” does not reflect the preparedness to act where needed. FINMA clearly has the budgetary independence required for additional resources to be added to the supervisory functions if deemed necessary.

55. A similar comment is made by the IMF on BCP9 relating to FINMA’s supervisory techniques and tools, stating that FINMA’s resources and the auditors’ methodology do not result in adequate indepth supervisory reviews on a proactive basis. FINMA disagrees with this assessment, given its track record in prevention and the view that the currently applied risk-based approach to performing supervisory reviews, with experienced and skilled people has been successful. Concerning the auditors’ methodology FINMA only recently introduced amended guidance on risk analysis for auditors where it is too early to judge its effectiveness.

56. The IMF has provided the Swiss authorities with recommendations of which many are already in the process of being implemented. Others will be additionally considered of which the following are worth mentioning. As part of an already planned policy review FINMA will assess whether and where amendments are required to better reflect qualitative risk management and governance standards as well as expectations regarding skill sets on boards and enterprise-wide risk management. To maintain and further improve the effectiveness and efficiency of FINMA’s supervisory and regulatory processes the adequacy of FINMA’s resources will periodically be reassessed and, if deemed necessary, corresponding measures to reallocate or adjust resources will be taken.

Iais Core Principles for Effective Insurance Supervision

A. Introduction

57. This report is a detailed assessment of Switzerland’s compliance with the Insurance Core Principles (ICPs) of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), as adopted in October 2011 and revised in October 2012. The review was carried out as part of the 2013 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) assessment of Switzerland, and was based on the regulatory framework in place, the supervisory practices employed, and other conditions as they existed in September 2013. The assessment was carried out by Dr. Rodolfo Wehrhahn, Technical Assistance Advisor in the Financial Supervision and Regulation Division, a part of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF and Ms. Mimi Ho, Consultant.

B. Methodology Used for Assessment

58. Supervision of the private insurance industry in Switzerland is the responsibility of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA). FINMA is the supervisory authority of the insurance sector that includes insurers, reinsurers, intermediaries as well as entities and organizations which, in any form, perform functions partly included in the operational cycle of insurance or reinsurance undertakings.

59. The assessment is based solely on the laws, regulations and other supervisory requirements and practices that are in place at the time of the assessment in September 2013. Ongoing regulatory initiatives are noted by way of additional comments. The assessors had access to a complete self-assessment on the ICPs and responses to a detailed questionnaire FINMA provided prior to the commencement of the exercise. Anonymized examples of actual supervisory practices and assessments provided by the authorities enhanced the robustness of the assessment. Technical discussions with and briefings by officials from FINMA also enriched this report, as did discussions with industry participants.

60. The assessment has been informed by discussions with regulators and market participants. The assessors met with staff from FINMA, insurers, industry associations, professional bodies and audit firms. The assessors are grateful for the full cooperation extended by all.

C. Main Findings

61. The insurance industry in Switzerland is well developed having among the highest insurance penetration and expenditure per capita in the world. Insurance penetration is the fourth highest in the world with 14.1 gross premium as percentage of GDP, well above the EU average penetration of 7.8 percent. Expenditure per capita on insurance leads worldwide with over CHF 10 thousand. Total premium in 2012 amounted to CHF 83 billion, of which 40 percent corresponds to life insurance, and 30 percent each to non-life and to comprehensive health insurance. Total assets of the sector are CHF 460 billion or around 15 percent of the financial sector assets, of which two thirds correspond to life insurance. Over half of the investments on own account are in fixed income instruments, 17 percent in real estate and mortgages, and only 2 percent in equities.

62. The sector is dominated by a few players writing significant international business. The life sector is dominated by two players, responsible for 54 percent of the business and the top ten life insurers account for 97 percent of the market. The non-life sector is also concentrated but less than the life sector; here the top ten insurers account for 65 percent of the business. Without taking Swiss Re and Zurich Insurance Group into account, the Swiss insurance groups write on average around 35 percent of the premium outside Switzerland and over 45 percent of their assets are related to foreign business. For Swiss Re and Zurich Insurance Group the domestic premium is only 1.7 percent and 9.8 percent, respectively, of their total premium income.

63. The industry has weathered the 2008 crisis well; however the current low interest rate environment is affecting the sector. The negative impact on the share prices of Swiss insurers during the crisis has basically been reversed. However, the ensuing challenging economic environment is adversely affecting the industry, which has not been growing, except for the mandatory occupation pension business, which grew 6 percent in 2011. Low interest yields have reduced the government-mandated guarantees that insurers are required to offer, making their products less attractive, and has probably created negative spreads in a few portfolios. Measures being introduced include the reduction in 2012 of the statutorily guaranteed return for the occupational pensions to 1.5 percent.

64. The lack of availability of Swiss government bonds to match long term liabilities of life insurers and pension funds could be a source of vulnerability. The long term nature of the liabilities of life insurers and pension funds could in principle be matched by investment in Swiss government securities. However, the CHF one trillion of assets managed by life insurers and pension funds is disproportionate to the CHF 80 billion outstanding bonds by the federal government. Before taking diversification benefits into account, the cost of capital under the Swiss Solvency Test (SST) to hold equity investments can require high returns; thus leaving real estate as the main domestic alternative for investments; this in turn runs the risk of contributing to the creation of a real estate bubble, and possibly raise liquidity issues.

65. Significant regulatory reforms and increased supervision since 2003 have updated Switzerland’s regulatory and supervisory regime for the insurance industry to levels consistent with international best practices. The Financial Market Supervisory Authority Act of June 22, 2007 (FINMASA), together with two related Ordinances, serves as an umbrella law for sector-specific laws governing financial market regulation and supervision and also establishes the integrated financial services supervisor FINMA. The new insurance law effective on January 2006 and the introduction of the SST have reoriented the regulatory focus towards a risk based supervision supported by a strong risk sensitive solvency regime.

66. The Swiss authorities succeeded in passing and implementing a state-of-the-art solvency regime. This Swiss solvency test should serve to properly asses the risks run by the insurers; however, its risk sensitive provisions showing at an early stage the negative effects of the low interest rate environment on the solvency ratio has led the authorities to introduce temporary measures to offset the stress to the sector, partly to avoid that Swiss companies become disadvantaged vis-à-vis those from areas without an advanced regime. The temporary measures have been taken with care and maintaining as much transparency as possible; however the measures have implicitly reduced policyholders’ protection and it is recommended to remove them as scheduled in 2016.

67. Supervision focuses on ensuring sufficiency of liquid assets to meet policy liabilities. There are statutory accounting methods to determine technical provisions and value of assets on a prudent basis for “tied asset” purposes. Insurers (excluding reinsurers) are required to earmark and ring-fence assets designated as tied assets subject to a liquidity test to back the technical provisions plus a risk margin. Policyholders have priority claims over the tied assets. In addition, robust solvency requirements ensure there is sufficient capital to safeguard the insurers’ financial soundness under adverse conditions. The triple focus on the adequacy of technical provisions, liquidity and safety of tied assets, and the adequacy of capital forms the basis of FINMA’s supervision.

68. FINMA supervision is particularly strong in quantitative analysis and group supervision, while risk management, internal control and governance requirements are relatively new. FINMA has highly qualified staff. A large group of actuaries and mathematicians support the offsite reviews, internal model approval and other SST quantitative work. All but two domestic insurance groups have active colleges in place that engage in group wide supervision. The granular and aggregated approaches towards solvency of a group are also commendable. Qualitative assessment of insurers’ operating environment is newer. The Swiss Qualitative Assessment (SQA) was first carried out in 2008, covering all insurers. The second SQA was carried out in 2012 and was risk-prioritized to cover groups and insurers in the high-risk categories. For SQA various means are used to gather information and carry out the analyses, including a questionnaire answered separately by key functions of the insurer, followed up with onsite visits to discuss findings and set out remedial steps if needed.

69. Increasing the intensity of onsite supervision will complement FINMA’s strong supervisory framework. Increasing the intensity of onsite supervision will complement FINMA’s strong supervisory framework. In addition to onsite inspections, FINMA uses a variety of other ways to gather information and make assessments. As a result, FINMA’s onsite inspections tend to be focused in scope and, compared to some jurisdictions, less frequent. The main purpose of a FINMA inspection is either to verify a specific concern identified during offsite analysis, to gain understanding of an observed emerging trend, or determine if the insurer has a weakness or is not complying in a specific area. There is a danger that FINMA may not be able to identify weaknesses in the insurer’s operation without direct observation and verification through onsite inspections. FINMA should therefore increase the frequency and scope of inspections. More in-depth onsite inspections will enhance FINMA’s understanding of insurers’ operations and facilitate more accurate risk ratings. FINMA is encouraged to maintain its direct supervision of insurers, limiting the use of external auditors to checking compliance with clearly defined guidelines that require minimal or no supervisory judgment.

70. The position of Switzerland as global insurance center and a reinsurance hub sets additional demands on the regulatory framework.

  • In 2012 FINMA started a review of the possibility of expanding public disclosure requirements, taking into account international standards and practices. It is recommended that FINMA completes its review and Swiss authorities institute the necessary regulatory changes to be more in line with international standards.

  • While laws clearly stipulate the intention to protect policyholders and entrust FINMA to intervene on behalf of the policyholders and their beneficiaries, FINMA has yet to articulate specific rules on business conduct. Supervision of tied agents is indirectly through insurers. Supervision of brokers is minimal. There are no on-going reporting requirements for intermediaries. It is recommended that Swiss authorities press on with the legislative effort to improve policyholder protection and enhances brokers’ supervision.

  • The requirements on the investments of reinsurers need to be strengthening. Notwithstanding the specific characteristics of the reinsurance business, the lack of the requirement to have tied assets backing up reinsurance liabilities could weaken the asset quality of reinsurers as well as the ability of FINMA to liquidate them. Ultimately this could impact on policyholder’s protection given that cedents can use reinsurance recoverable as part of their tied assets. FINMA’s legal reach to the assets in case of liquidation is particularly relevant in its role as home supervisor given the ability of reinsures to operate in foreign jurisdictions without local capital requirements.

  • All reinsurers established in Switzerland are supervised by FINMA, although branches of companies headquartered outside Switzerland and conducting only reinsurance business are exempted from supervision. The scope of relevant Swiss law on this point (ISA Art. 2 (2)) is transparent and known in the marketplace in addition, FINMA is in close contact with their home supervisors where needed. However, given the relevance of reinsurance for the stability of the insurers abroad, it may be helpful for FINMA to more actively communicate its approach in regard of the supervision of branches of foreign reinsurers. A more prudent approach would be for FINMA to bring such reinsurance activity into its supervisory ambit.

Table 3.

Switzerland: Summary Compliance with the IAIS Core Principles—ROSC

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D. Recommended Actions

Table 4.

Switzerland: Recommendations to Improve Observance of the ICPs

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E. Authorities’ Responses to the Assessment

71. The Swiss authorities would like to thank the IMF for the thorough and professional assessment of Switzerland’s observance of the Insurance Core Principles of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.

72. We are very pleased that the assessment recognizes the considerable work and progress Switzerland has made in these areas. While we appreciate the recognition on the regulatory side, we believe our efforts have been as strong on the supervisory side.

73. We were also pleased to see that in the most critical areas the assessment shows Switzerland in observance, and that our practices in the solvency area are recognized as market leading.

74. We acknowledge there are areas requiring further improvement. In some of these areas we had already begun actions prior to the assessment. In others we will be working on action plans as part of our commitment to continuous improvement. The IMF observations will be very useful in this regard.

75. In earlier exchanges with the IMF we shared observations on where we believe the assessment did not take sufficiently into account how Switzerland meets the spirit and substance of certain aspects of the ICP. Here we would like to summarize only two points.

Licensing

76. We strongly believe Switzerland meets the necessary threshold of observance of ICP 4 as a whole but also in respect of each of its components. Thus our review of our practices against each of the standards under ICP 4 shows consistency therewith. As we demonstrated, we have a clear and thorough licensing process, which has been improved further recently, including with the introduction of an approvals committee. We also interact with other supervisors where needed during the licensing review process to ensure all relevant considerations are taken into account. We do not deem the observations of the IMF—including regarding the current exemption for branches of foreign reinsurers which is already taken into account under ICP 13 —as sufficient for lowering our rating from “Observed” to “Largely Observed”.

Reinsurance

77. Switzerland effectively regulates and supervises reinsurers in a manner that we believe is consistent with the requirements of ICP 13. In earlier exchanges with the IMF, we indicated how we believe we meet ICP 13, including in respect of matters involving 1) treaties and documentation, 2) risk transfer, and 3) monitoring and acting on inappropriate risk concentrations. The fact that we currently do not supervise branches of foreign insurers is transparent in our law and supervision, though we will be considering ways to make this even better known publicly. Further, as already communicated, we will be considering changes to our regulation to cover branches of foreign insurers.

78. The Swiss authorities have already launched a process to systematically evaluate all IMF recommendations in order to assess in detail how, within which timeframe and to what extent the recommendations can be considered for implementation.

Iosco Objectives and Principles Of Securities Regulation

A. Summary

79. Switzerland has made progress in addressing the recommendations from the IOSCO assessment of the 2001-02 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Major achievements include the establishment of the Federal Audit Oversight Authority (FAOA) to supervise and enforce compliance with audit quality and independence requirements. The Collective Investment Schemes Act (CISA) has also been recently revised, and provides a strengthened framework for regulating and supervising the offering and management of collective investment schemes (CIS). The discussions about the regulation and supervision of independent asset managers are gaining momentum, and the intention is to subject offers of unlisted securities and of some other currently unregulated products to regulation under the upcoming Federal Financial Services Act (FFSA). At the same time, Switzerland is preparing to introduce a new legislative framework for operators of financial market infrastructures and exchanges, also for the purpose of complying with the G-20 over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives commitments.

80. In supervision, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) has further developed the risk-based supervisory system that it uses to determine the supervisory approach for each supervised entity. The approach is determined by the entity’s potential systemic impact, and its firm level risk. Less systemic and/or less risky entities are subject to less intrusive supervision. In those cases, the supervision continues to largely rely on annual audits conducted by regulatory auditors. FINMA is in the process of gradually increasing the intensity of its own direct supervision for the more systemic and riskier entities. For the entities covered by the scope of the IOSCO assessment, the approaches taken across various FINMA Divisions differ to some extent. For example, all non-bank securities dealers are subject to relatively limited supervision, whereas some other entities solely active in securities markets (such as fund management companies and CIS asset managers) are expected to become subject to more intrusive supervision. In relation to securities markets, FINMA’s own supervisory reviews are still largely to be introduced, with the exception of some thematic reviews conducted on banks’ securities activities such as investment banking and wealth management.

81. FINMA’s enforcement powers have recently been enhanced through the introduction of specific prohibitions on insider trading and market manipulation in the Federal Act on Stock Exchanges and Securities Trading (Stock Exchange Act, SESTA). This enables FINMA to complement the enforcement of the more narrowly defined criminal market abuse provisions with the use of its administrative enforcement powers. Establishing cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (Attorney General’s Office), to which the criminal enforcement powers were transferred from the cantonal prosecution authorities, has progressed well. Cooperation with the Legal Services of the Federal Department of Finance (FDF) in other areas of criminal enforcement is more established following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2011. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether the Swiss administrative and criminal authorities as a whole have an appropriate range of sufficiently dissuasive sanctions at their disposal. For example, FINMA can address market abuse by unsupervised entities only through the issuance and possible publication of decrees, and orders for the disgorgement of profits. Therefore, the authorities need to further explore the possibility of introducing an administrative fining power. If such power is not achievable, the authorities should consider whether the current criminal enforcement powers are a sufficient deterrent.

82. The Swiss authorities will face a significant challenge in coping with the upcoming securities regulatory overhaul. The planned framework will impact on practically all the areas of FINMA, as it is likely to require the assumption of new tasks in relation to the regulation and supervision of the issuance of unlisted securities, financial market infrastructures, independent asset managers, and conduct of business of banks and securities dealers. New regulatory challenges will also emerge from the international regulatory agenda, including on shadow banking. Given the pace and scope of change, the authorities need to assess the impact of all these changes on the resources and organization of FINMA in anticipation of the legislative process. This will also provide an opportunity to consider on how best to strengthen conduct of business supervision more generally.

B. Introduction

83. An assessment of the level of implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (IOSCO Principles) was conducted in Switzerland from September 11 to October 1, 2013. The assessment was made as part of the IMF FSAP by Eija Holttinen, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF. The previous IOSCO assessment of Switzerland was conducted in 2001-02 before the first IOSCO Assessment Methodology had been developed. Comparisons with the prior assessment are discouraged since the process has since been refined to promote consistency and has become progressively more rigorous.

C. Information and Methodology Used for Assessment

84. The assessment was made on the basis of the IOSCO Principles approved in 2010 and the Assessment Methodology adopted in 2011. As has been the standard practice, Principle 38 was not assessed due to the existence of separate standards for securities settlement systems and central counterparties.

85. The IOSCO Assessment Methodology requires that assessors not only look at the legal and regulatory framework in place, but also at how it has been implemented in practice. The ongoing global financial crisis has reinforced the need for assessors to make a judgment about supervisory and other operational practices and to determine whether they are sufficiently effective. Among other things, such a judgment involves a review of the inspection programs for different types of supervised entities, the cycle, scope and quality of inspections, as well as how the relevant authorities follow up on findings, including by using enforcement actions.

86. The assessment was based on several sources. These comprise (i) a self-assessment and additional written responses prepared by the authorities; (ii) reviews of the relevant legislation and regulations; (iii) meetings with the management and staff of FINMA, the State Secretariat for International Financial Matters (SIF), the FDF, the Attorney General’s Office, and the FAOA; and (iv) meetings with self-regulatory organizations and market participants, including the SIX Exchange Regulation (SER), SIX Swiss Exchange Ltd (SSX), Swiss Bankers Association (SBA), Swiss Funds and Asset Management Association (SFAMA), banks, securities dealers, fund management companies, asset managers, issuers, audit firms, and retail investor representatives.

87. The assessor wants to thank the Swiss authorities and market participants for their cooperation and willingness to share information. The views of authorities and market participants on the current status and the best way forward for the regulation and supervision of the Swiss securities markets provided an essential input to the conclusions of the mission. In the organizational side, particular thanks go to Mr. Lukas Wyss from FINMA, who coordinated the arrangements for the assessment mission with patience, efficiency and good humor.

D. Institutional and Market Structure—Overview

Regulatory Structure

88. FINMA is the supervisory authority responsible for the authorization and prudential and conduct of business supervision of almost all entities covered by the IOSCO assessment. The exception is audit firms, which fall under the remit of the FAOA. FINMA is also the administrative enforcement authority and, where necessary, conducts restructuring and bankruptcy proceedings. FINMA is organized into six Divisions: Banks, Insurance, Markets, Enforcement, Strategic Services, and Operations.

89. Listing of securities and setting and monitoring compliance with the related disclosure requirements is undertaken by SER, which is the self-regulatory unit of the SIX Group (see Section B). SER and the Swiss based subsidiary of Eurex Group Ltd (Eurex Zurich Ltd) also have other statutory self-regulatory functions, in particular in the area of market surveillance. The Swiss Takeover Board (TOB) has been established to ensure compliance with the rules applicable to public takeover bids, while FINMA maintains a role as the appeal body for the TOB’s decisions.

90. FINMA was established on January 1, 2009 through the merger of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission, the Federal Office of Private Insurance and the Anti-Money Laundering Control Authority. FINMA’s objectives, tasks and responsibilities are set out in the Federal Act on the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMASA). The other main Acts covering the scope of the IOSCO assessment are the Federal Act on Stock Exchanges and Securities Trading (Stock Exchange Act, SESTA), the Federal Act on Collective Investment Schemes (Collective Investment Schemes Act, CISA), the Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks (Banking Act, BA), the Federal Act on the Licensing and Oversight of Auditors (Auditor Oversight Act, AOA), and the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO).

91. The Federal Acts are complemented with related Federal Ordinances issued by the Swiss Federal Council that clarify or supplement the legislative provisions included in the Federal Acts. The relevant authorities, such as FINMA and the FAOA, may also issue their own Ordinances, if so provided in the relevant Act. Ordinances have a binding effect on the relevant market participants. FINMA and the FAOA may also issue Circulars regarding the application of financial market legislation (cf. Art. 7 FINMASA). Although the Circulars are not binding, FINMA may base the orders it issues in individual cases on the policies expressed in its Circulars. Regulatory expectations are also set in standards issued by industry associations that FINMA has endorsed as a minimum standard – for example, for securities dealers and management of collective investment schemes, FINMA has recognized numerous standards issued by the SBA and SFAMA.4

92. FINMA cooperates with the FDF, the Swiss National Bank (SNB), the Attorney General’s Office and the FAOA to coordinate the activities with shared responsibilities. MOUs have been signed between the authorities to formalize cooperation in relation to financial stability and crisis management (FINMA, the SNB, and the FDF), enforcement (FINMA and the FDF Legal Services), and the planned transfer of FINMA responsibilities for the oversight of regulatory auditors to the FAOA. FINMA is signatory to the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU), and has several bilateral MOUs with foreign authorities.

Market Structure

Exchanges

93. There are two main securities exchanges in Switzerland: the SSX and SIX Structured Products Exchange Ltd (SIX Structured Products Exchange) that are both part of the SIX Group.5 SSX is the primary exchange in Switzerland, offering listing and trading in various financial instruments, including equities, bonds, and exchange traded funds (ETFs). Equity securities can be listed on four market segments (Standards): Main Standard, Standard for Investment Companies, Standard for Real Estate Companies, and Domestic Standard. SIX Structured Products Exchange is specialized in listing and trading structured products. Since the end of June 2013, SIX Structured Products Exchange is fully owned by the SIX Group after its joint venture shareholding by the SIX Group and Deutsche Börse was terminated. The holding company of the group, SIX Group Ltd, is owned by approximately 150 banks that are also the main users of the group’s services. The SIX Group also provides central counterparty (CCP) clearing services through SIX x-clear Ltd and operates SIX SIS Ltd., a central securities depository (CSD). It is also possible to clear SSX trades in LCH. Clearnet Limited in the United Kingdom. The Eurex Group has a derivatives exchange subsidiary in Switzerland, Eurex Zurich Limited (Eurex Zurich). The clearing of trades made on Eurex Zurich takes place in Eurex Clearing AG (Eurex Clearing) in Germany. Finally, BX Berne exchange has a limited authorization to conduct “stock exchange-like business”6 and primarily serves small and medium sized companies, and is a secondary listing location for some SSX listed companies.

94. Key market information on the most important products traded on the SSX is provided in the following table:

Table 5.

Switzerland: Key SSX Market Information

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Source: SSX

95. Eurex Zurich and SIX Structured Products Exchange also conduct significant trading activities, while BX Berne exchange is much smaller. Eurex Zurich had listed 1,945 derivatives at the end of 2012, and traded a total of 249 million contracts the same year, with an average daily trading volume of 980,436 contracts. At the end of the year, it had 96 trading participants. At the end of 2012, SIX Structured Products Exchange had 32,496 tradable instruments and 119 trading participants, and its yearly trading turnover was approximately USD 34 billion. At the end of 2012, BX Berne eXchange listed 38 shares, and had 10 trading participants. Its total trading turnover in 2012 was USD 54 million.

Securities Dealers

96. Provision of securities dealing services is dominated by banks in Switzerland. The total market share of the two largest banks (UBS AG and Credit Suisse AG) is more than 40 percent. They are also significant providers of discretionary asset management services, although reliable statistics on the total value of assets under management (AUM) in Switzerland are not available, because authorization is not required when only asset management services are provided. The following table provides additional information on the division of the market share between banks/securities dealers and non-bank securities dealers.

Table 6.

Switzerland: Market Shares of Bank and Non-Bank Securities Dealers

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Source: FINMA
CIS

97. The fund management industry is also significant in Switzerland, and in addition to Swiss funds, a large number of foreign CIS are distributed in Switzerland. At the end 2012, there were 46 fund management companies and 98 CIS asset managers authorized in Switzerland.7 They managed a total of 1,421 funds, out of which 754 were retail funds and 667 were funds for qualified investors. At the same time, the number of the representatives of foreign CIS8 was 111, and a total of 5,899 foreign funds had been approved for distribution in Switzerland.9 The development of the AUM of the Swiss CIS in the past three years is presented in the following table.

Table 7.

Switzerland: Assets under Management in Swiss Collective Investment Schemes

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Source: FINMA

E. Preconditions for Effective Securities Regulation

98. The CO includes the relevant provisions on company formation, duties of directors and officers, and shareholder rights. At a high level, it also regulates the public offers of securities that are not intended to be listed on a stock exchange. SESTA and related ordinances include requirements on takeover bids, while other change of control transactions are regulated in the Federal Act on Merger, Demerger, Transformation and Transfer of Assets (Merger Act, MerA). Listing and related disclosure requirements are not subject to any statutory provisions, but are dealt with through the requirements set by the stock exchanges. Significant shareholders of listed companies are subject to a legal, criminally enforceable duty to disclose any transactions leading to material changes in their shareholdings. The transfer of rights attaching to securities is covered in the Federal Act on Intermediated Securities (Federal Intermediated Securities Act, FISA.)

99. The Federal Act on Unfair Competition and the Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints of Competition (Cartel Act, CartA) prohibit anti-competitive practices, unfair barriers to entry and abuse of a market dominant position. Courts provide the main channel for dispute resolution in Switzerland; the Swiss Federal Constitution guarantees legal equality and requires every person to be treated in good faith and in a non-arbitrary manner by state authorities. The Swiss Civil Procedure Code includes provisions on arbitration.

F. Main Findings

100. Principles for the Regulator. FINMA’s regulatory and supervisory responsibilities and objectives are clearly set out in FINMASA. FINMA has a broad range of powers to meet its responsibilities, although its administrative enforcement powers do not include the ability to impose pecuniary fines. FINMA is operationally independent in its day-to-day activities, and subject to appropriate accountability mechanisms. Certain deficiencies in its governance arrangements may have been perceived to undermine its independence, but the FDF and FINMA have recently taken some measures to address those deficiencies. FINMA is self-funded through fees and charges from the industry, but some Divisions are thinly resourced and some are subject to high staff turnover. Appropriate governance and procedural arrangements, consultation practices and staff conduct requirements are in place. Internal processes for monitoring systemic risk are being improved, whereas the process to review the regulatory perimeter relies heavily on following developments in other jurisdictions. Supervised entities are subject to requirements to avoid, manage or disclose conflicts of interest.

101. Principles for self-regulation. Exchanges, as the only SROs in Switzerland, are subject to authorization and a requirement to submit their rules to FINMA for approval. Supervision by FINMA currently relies on meetings, reviews of reports and regulatory audits by audit firms.

102. Principles for enforcement. FINMA has sufficient inspection and investigation powers vis-à-vis supervised entities and other persons, but has outsourced the exercise of these powers to a significant extent to audit firms and investigating agents. Its requirements on the planning of and reporting on audit firms’ regulatory audits are in the process of being enhanced. FINMA’s own supervisory reviews are very limited. FINMA is active in investigating suspected market abuse and other misconduct, and has imposed a number of administrative sanctions in the past. However, it does not have the power to impose pecuniary administrative fines. For criminal offenses, the responsibilities are divided between the Legal Services of the FDF and the Attorney General’s Office. Disciplining issuers is the sole responsibility of the stock exchanges’ self-regulatory arms.

103. Principles for cooperation. Subject to FINMA’s compliance with additional conditions, IOSCO approved FINMA as a full signatory to the IOSCO MMOU in 2010. FINMA has sufficient powers to share information with other domestic and foreign authorities. FINMA has provided assistance to numerous requests for information from foreign authorities under the MMOU. Foreign requests for client information may lead to an obligation to notify the client who can then lodge a court appeal against FINMA’s decision. The requirement to preserve client confidentiality consumes FINMA time and resources.

104. Principles for issuers. The full disclosure requirements apply only to issuers of listed securities, and the relevant requirements are developed through stock exchange self-regulation and monitored and enforced for compliance by the exchanges. The basic rights of shareholders are addressed in the regulatory framework. In principle, the obligation to make a public tender offer applies above the threshold of 33 1/3 percent of voting rights, unless the company has opted out from the requirement or applies a higher threshold. Acquisitions of large shareholdings in listed companies are required to be disclosed, and non-compliance is subject to criminal enforcement under SESTA. However, compliance with the directors’ and senior managers’ obligations to report their equity transactions is based only on self-regulation, and can be enforced by SER only vis-à-vis the listed company. Issuers of listed securities can choose between several accounting standards depending on the security issued and the market segment where it is listed. Certain issuers can use Swiss accounting standards, whose establishment is not subject to cooperation with or oversight by public authorities.

105. Principles for auditors, credit rating agencies, and other information service providers. The FAOA is responsible for the oversight of all audit firms carrying out statutory audits of public companies. It performs regular reviews at audit firms, and can stipulate remedial measures in case of non-compliance. Sufficient requirements on auditor independence are in place, but there is no requirement for a public company to have an Audit Committee to oversee the process of selecting and appointing external auditors. Public disclosure of the premature resignation of an auditor is required only on an annual basis. Auditing standards to be used depend on the accounting standards applied. In addition, the Swiss Auditing Standards (SAS), which are aligned with the international ones, always apply. Certain supervised entities are required to use credit ratings for specific regulatory purposes, which require the credit rating agency (CRA) to be recognized by FINMA, subject to compliance with the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for CRAs. However, CRAs are not supervised on an ongoing basis. Supervised entities employing sell-side analysts are subject to the SBA self-regulatory requirements on financial research recognized by FINMA as a minimum standard.

106. Principles for collective investment schemes. All types of CIS and all entities involved in administering them, managing or safekeeping their assets, or distributing their units or shares are subject to authorization on the basis of comprehensive legal and regulatory requirements. FINMA is in the process of enhancing its supervisory approach in this area to complement the regulatory audits. Relevant fund documentation is subject to preapproval by FINMA. The fund management company and custodian have to be separate entities, but can be related parties. Some safeguards to avoid conflicts of interest are in place, but compliance with the relevant requirements is not sufficiently reviewed. The content of the initial and periodic disclosure requirements is stipulated in the legal framework. There are detailed requirements on the valuation of CIS assets, subscription and redemption of CIS units/securities, and circumstances when redemptions can be suspended. The standard regulatory and supervisory framework for CIS applies also to hedge funds.

107. Principles for market intermediaries. There are comprehensive criteria for authorization of market intermediaries, with the exception of independent asset managers that are not subject to any regulatory requirements in Switzerland. Securities dealers are subject to initial and ongoing capital requirements, including on a consolidated basis. The organizational requirements for securities dealers build on those applied to banks. Regulation of conflicts of interest and conduct of business largely relies on the SBA standards recognized by FINMA as minimum standards. There are appropriate segregation requirements for clients’ securities, whereas those applicable to clients’ funds are less clear (see Principle 32). Securities dealers and banks’ securities activities are subject to relatively limited supervision. FINMA’s early warning mechanisms to identify a failing bank or securities dealer focus on the more systemic entities. FINMA does not have a specific plan to deal with a failure, but its powers are set out in legislation and have been used on several occasions. There is a deposit protection scheme in Switzerland, but no equivalent schemes protecting clients’ securities from the failure of a securities dealer.

108. Principles for secondary markets. Exchanges and exchange-like institutions are required to be authorized. Certain gaps in the legal requirements for exchanges are due to be filled in the upcoming Financial Market Infrastructure Act. The exchanges have the front line responsibility for market surveillance. FINMA is in the process of introducing a new supervisory approach for exchanges intended to enhance its supervision from the current relatively limited level. Sufficient pre- and post-trade transparency requirements apply to trading on the SSX. The recently revised regulatory framework prohibits market abuse through both administrative and criminal provisions. The exchanges’ market surveillance units, FINMA and the Attorney General’s Office cooperate to investigate and address market abuse under the new framework. There are shortcomings in the cooperation arrangements to monitor open positions and deal with market disruptions, and regulatory and reporting requirements on short selling are limited.

Table 8.

Switzerland: Summary Implementation of the IOSCO Principles—Detailed Assessments

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G. Recommended Action Plan and Authorities’ Response

Table 9.

Switzerland: Recommended Action Plan to Improve Implementation of the IOSCO Principles

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H. Authorities Response to the Assessment

109. The Swiss authorities wish to express their appreciation to the IMF assessment team for the dedication, time and resources committed to this assessment and for the constructive exchange of views for which the assessment has provided the opportunity.

110. We broadly agree with the findings of the report. Regarding certain deficiencies in the area of conduct regulation and supervision (principles 1, 12, 16, 18, 29, 31) as well as in the area of financial market infrastructure regulation (principles 9, 33, 34, 37) we would like to highlight – as is also stated in the report – that there are ongoing legislative projects that were initiated prior to the FSAP review which aim at reshaping the regulatory architecture to be in line with international principles in these areas

111. On some points the Swiss authorities do not share the views expressed in the report and think that these aspects warrant further clarification to reflect the Swiss situation appropriately:

112. Regarding the independence of FINMA (principle 2) the report acknowledges the measures recently taken by the Federal Council to reinforce the Board’s independence. However, the report unjustifiably criticizes that the conditions for removal of FINMA BoD members are not sufficiently specific. We would like to point out that the recently published (and priorly already existing) requirements for FINMA BoD members are not just applicable for the appointment but also for the duration of the exercise of the function. The legal clause for removal of BoD members (FINMA Art. 9) refers to these specified conditions for the exercise of the BoD function. In our view this implies that the conditions for the removal of BoD members are sufficiently specified as well. And therefore, given the recent governance changes, we are of the strong opinion that the principle 2 should be rated as “implemented.”

113. Regarding the level of FINMA’s engagement with banks and securities dealers of lower supervisory categories (principles 12 and 31) we would like to point out that this current allocation of FINMA resources is justified by the prudential risks associated with the respective entities. The current allocation of supervisory resources is based on FINMA’s prudentially focused, risk based supervisory approach, in accordance with the regulatory focus of the Swiss legislator. However, the ongoing legislative project for the Federal Financial Services Act will put more emphasis on conduct supervision.

114. Regarding the supervision of credit rating agencies (principle 22) the report does, in our view, not adequately reflect the fact that, with one exception, all credit rating agencies that provide ratings used for regulatory purposes are subject to supervision in their home jurisdiction. The IOSCO methodology explicitly provides for the option for “ongoing supervision […] not necessarily by the regulator in whose jurisdiction the ratings are used.” Regarding the one domestic CRA it is important to note that the regulatory use of these ratings is very limited in scope, such that the lack of an ongoing supervision by FINMA poses no material risk to investors.

115. Regarding the existing safeguards for related party custody (principle 25), in Switzerland, fund management companies and custodian banks can be related parties. There do exist safeguards and independence requirements between both entities. In this sense, there can be no overlap between the two entities on an operational level including the executive committee. Also, it is not possible to have people responsible for the custodian bank activities within the Board of Directors of the Fund Management Company. Regulatory audits are already in place as to the independence between those two entities. Furthermore, these independence requirements are verified with every approval and authorization within FINMA. Every amendment within the organization of the custodian bank is subject to FINMA’s prior authorization and any amendments within the Fund Management company’s Board of Directors or Executive Committee is also subject to FINMA’s authorization. Therefore, we are of the opinion that compliance with the relevant requirements is sufficiently reviewed.

116. Regarding the lack of coverage by the deposit insurance scheme for losses that are caused by non-segregated securities holdings (principle 32), the Swiss authorities are of the opinion that the Swiss solution provides equivalent protection to the clients of securities dealers: In case of failure of a securities dealer and if the segregated securities do not suffice to cover the claims of the clients, non-segregated securities are segregated ex-post for the clients benefit. The theoretical possibility of the total of available securities being insufficient to cover the clients’ claims is of no practical relevance.

117. The Swiss authorities have already launched a process to systematically evaluate all IMF recommendations in order to assess in detail how, within which timeframe and to what extent the recommendations can and should be implemented.

1

Further information on the FSAP program can be found at http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fssa.aspx.

2

The assessment team was comprised of Nick Le Pan and Mamoru Yanase.

3

A factual update of BCP assessment was conducted in 2007 although with a limited coverage.

4

These are referred to as self-regulation in Switzerland, but the associations are not self-regulatory organizations in the meaning of Principle 9 of IOSCO Principles, because they conduct only regulatory, but not supervisory and enforcement tasks.

5

Until December 31, 2013, the name of SIX Structured Products Exchange Ltd was Scoach Switzerland Ltd. This exchange is referred to with the new name throughout this report.

6

Entities authorized for stock exchange-like business conduct more limited activities than fully fledged exchanges, and are in practice not subject to as stringent regulatory requirements.

7

There were also 8 open-ended investment companies (SICAVs) and 33 subfunds of open-ended investment companies.

8

See Principle 24 for the tasks of a representative.

9

A significant number of these foreign funds are managed by Swiss fund management companies and asset managers, but the funds themselves are registered in a foreign jurisdiction, in the majority of cases either in Luxembourg or Ireland.

10

These are typically private equity funds.

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