Niger: 2019 Article Iv Consultation, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility, and Requests for Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance Criterion, Modification of Performance Criteria, and Extension and Rephasing of the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement—Press Release, Staff Report and Statement by the Executive Director for Niger
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International Monetary Fund. African Dept.
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Publication Date:
22 Jul 2019
eISBN:
9781513508191
Language:
English
Keywords:
ISCR; CR; debt; deficit; welcome effort; governance reform; reform agenda; resolute government response; Non-government investment; declaration regime; Arrears
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2019 Article IV Consultation, Fourth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Requests for Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance Criterion, Modification of Performance Criteria, and Extension and Rephasing of the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement-Press Release; Staff Report and Statement by the Executive Director for Niger

Abstract

2019 Article IV Consultation, Fourth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Requests for Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance Criterion, Modification of Performance Criteria, and Extension and Rephasing of the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement-Press Release; Staff Report and Statement by the Executive Director for Niger

Economic Developments, Program Performance and Outlook

1. The government enjoys a strong parliamentary majority but faces rising external security threats. The 2016 elections gave President Issoufou a strong reform mandate for his final term through early 2021. Progress with improving Niger’s low level of human development is an uphill struggle in the face of mounting cross-border terrorist incursions, climate change, and labor-force growth well ahead of job creation. Determined action has largely prevented terrorist networks from taking root but the tide has yet to be turned and public finances and economic growth are suffering. Social discontent with low living standards, tax hikes, and the electoral code, led to sporadic demonstrations, which drew a resolute government response.

Niger and Selected Regions: Key Development Indicators in Perspective

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Sources: Human Development Index, UNDP; and World Development Inidcators, World Bank.

2. Niger receives large-scale donor support. Financial support is equivalent to some 40 percent of public expenditure, mostly for project support. Much technical assistance is provided, for which absorption capacity is a bottleneck. Niger is a high-intensity user of Fund technical assistance (Annex I). The focus is on revenue mobilization, with quarterly expert visits to tax and customs departments, and on public financial management with a resident advisor on the implementation of a Treasury Single Account (TSA) based in Niger. Officials attend regional seminars and workshops, but the uptake of IMF training courses is limited.

A. Recent Developments and Program Performance

3. Economic developments in 2018 were encouraging. Real GDP growth rose to 6.5 percent supported by bountiful harvests, surging artisanal gold production, and strong activity in the construction and service sectors, which benefitted from the launch of several large projects and preparations for the African Union (AU) summit this July. However, unfavorable international prices and a maintenance stoppage at the oil refinery slowed the uranium and petroleum sectors. The local formal private sector struggles, but has little impact on economic aggregates due to its small size. The unwinding of a food price spike in late 2017 eased inflation to below 3 percent. Financial deepening has remained elusive, with private credit barely keeping pace with economic growth. Large development needs held the current account at an elevated 18.2 percent of GDP, predominantly financed by donors and FDI. Niger has recourse to WAEMU’s pooled foreign reserves, equivalent to 4.3 months of union imports at end-2018.

4. Fiscal consolidation made further headway in 2018 and the first quarter of 2019. The deficit fell from 5.7 percent of GDP in 2017 to 4.1 percent of GDP in 2018, with a fiscal effort of 1 percent of GDP as measured by the improvement in the basic balance.1 Strict control of domestically-financed cash spending and a shift from loan to grant financing in donor-supported investment spending were chiefly responsible. Cash revenues stagnated as a percent of GDP, but this disguises underlying gains from a series of measures and administrative reforms that yielded an estimated 0.6 percent of GDP. Gains were swamped by revenue losses of 0.9 percent of GDP associated with the abolition of a major telecom tax and declines in resource-related revenues, despite a one-off boost to non-tax revenues of 0.3 percent of GDP. Fiscal developments in the first quarter of 2019 broadly matched expectations but reinforcing revenue mobilization efforts would be advisable to keep up with program targets for the remainder of the year.

Niger: Fiscal Developments. 2017–18

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Sources: Niger, Ministry of Finance; and IM F staff calculations.

5. The clearance of domestic payment arrears progressed little. Their complete elimination was envisaged during 2018, but CFAF 43.6 billion (0.8 percent of GDP) remained at the end of the year, just CFAF 10.8 billion (0.2 percent of GDP) less than 12 months earlier. The authorities attributed it to tightness in regional financial markets. Staff acknowledged an unexpected drying up of liquidity last December when Niger cancelled two scheduled auctions. However, markets had been relatively favorable since the fall of 2018 and the arrears problem could have been avoided with nimbler rearrangement of the emission schedule, larger liquidity buffers, and a smaller stock of unpaid bills. In this context, the authorities expressed interest in a Policy Backed Guaranteed (PBG) operation with the World Bank, which would allow Niger to borrow up to US$500 million (5.2 percent of GDP) from foreign banks with a partial guarantee, thereby securing long-term funding at favorable terms. Staff appreciates the benefits of extending maturities but it is essential that the substitution of foreign for domestic debt does not jeopardize Niger’s moderate rating for external debt distress in the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) and that fiscal discipline is maintained. The authorities intend to operate within these constraints.

6. The public debt ratio remained largely flat in 2018 but was revised up relative to the previous review. At 53.8 percent of GDP, it remains manageable and the marginal decline from 2017 is reassuring. Historical debt data were revised up by 3.8 percent of GDP, reflecting the inclusion of four external loans that had previously been inadvertently omitted from the official debt management reports.

7. Program implementation on the quantitative targets has progressed well, albeit with some delays.

  • Three of the four performance criteria (PCs) and all indicative targets (ITs) at end-December 2018 were met. Niger did not incur external payment arrears, the contracting of new external public debt remained below the program ceiling, and the net domestic budget financing target was observed with a wide margin. The targets on the basic fiscal deficit (with and without grants), total revenues, poverty-related spending, and exceptional expenditures were all met. However, the clearance of domestic payment arrears by end-2018 run into challenges in the face of tight financing conditions and was missed by 0.9 percent of GDP (resulting in the continuous target on domestic arrears for 2019 also being missed). The authorities have committed to a major paydown financed through an additional bond emission, funding authorization in a supplementary budget for arrears clearance, and a revised treasury plan consistent with the revised schedule for arrears clearance (prior action). They will also upgrade their monitoring of the evolution of arrears and set up a dedicated debt management unit in the Treasury to better integrate debt and cash management.

  • Finally, performance against the ITs for end-March 2019 was also good. All indicative targets were met.

8. Implementation of the structural agenda progressed well, despite some delays due to the breadth of the reform program and limited capacity.

  • Four out of five SBs were met and the fifth is subject to a prior action. The Treasury Single Account was rolled out as planned, cash payments of tax and custom duties was discontinued, and a white paper on further bankification of fiscal payments was furnished. The preparation of the 2019 performance plans for customs and tax administrations was delayed, but they are being formalized and refined on the basis of the experience with the 2018 plans (prior action).

  • Five of the six recurrent SBs were observed in the fourth quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019 and the sixth one was implemented with delay. Targets related to regular monitoring of budget execution, commitment and cash planning, and debt management were respected. The tallying of discretionary tax exemptions granted since the beginning of 2018 has been completed, though behind schedule.

  • The authorities are also making progress toward end-June 2019 structural targets. The financial inclusion strategy has already been adopted and preparations for a donor-round table are at an advanced stage. The authorities explained that the envisaged tracking system for the main social protection programs can be easily set up, considering the switch to program budgeting in 2018. Internal deliberations on the streamlining of tax exemptions are shifting into high gear, but submission of reform legislation to parliament will likely be delayed.

B. Outlook and Risks

9. The authorities and staff agreed that economic growth will remain strong over the next several years. A marginal slowdown to 6.3 percent is likely in 2019 as agricultural production normalizes following last year’s bumper crop. The construction and services sectors should take over as the main engines of growth as several large projects ramp up, such as airport refurbishment, the Kandadji dam construction, activities by the Millennium Challenge Cooperation, and a cement factory. They are predominantly privately or donor financed. The AU summit in July 2019 in Niamey adds further momentum. Growth is projected to average 7.3 percent annually over the next five years, in large part due to two pipeline projects. One carries refined petroleum products to the border with Burkina Faso. More importantly, a pipeline to the coast of Benin would allow Niger to become a crude oil exporter and a much bigger producer. Growth would jump to some 12 percent in 2022 when it is projected to become operational. Artisanal gold mining is expanding rapidly and could soon overtake uranium as the second largest export earner. Barring droughts, inflation should remain comfortably below the WAEMU’s 3 percent convergence criterion throughout the projection period.

10. The current account seems set to deteriorate further before improving over the medium term. Imports for the large projects will push it from 18.2 percent of GDP in 2018 to a peak of 22.4 percent of GDP in 2020. Once construction winds down and projects come on stream, exports will rise sharply, imports will increasingly be replaced by domestic production, and foreign inputs for construction will decline. By 2024, the current account deficit should have narrowed to about 12 percent of GDP.

11. Niger’s large external deficit reflects primarily large development needs, the authorities and staff concurred. It certainly warrants caution and is weaker than suggested by fundamentals and desirable policy settings (Annex II). However, it can also be seen as the flipside of large capital inflows from donors and foreign investors that respond to the economy’s large development needs. Interlocutors of the private local formal sector expressed competitiveness concerns, but these were more related to structural issues, such as Niger’s unfavorable geographical position, poor infrastructure, pervasive smuggling, and shortcomings in the business environment, rather than any exchange rate misalignment.

12. The authorities are pursuing fiscal consolidation under challenging circumstances. The effort faces strong headwinds that have added over 3½ percent of GDP to the deficit: the fight against terrorism has added at least 2 percent of GDP in security spending since 2011, while weighing down on economic activity and on revenues (Annex III), and weak commodity prices have curtailed revenues by about 1½ percent of GDP since 2014 (Annex IV). But the authorities are committed to making a strong fiscal effort in 2019 and reducing the basic fiscal deficit by about 1 percent of GDP as set out in the budget and backed by a package of measures. A largely deficit-neutral supplementary budget is under preparation, which takes unanticipated foreign aid of 1.2 percent of GDP into account, raises security spending by 0.6 percent of GDP, slightly increases and reshuffles other expenditures, and sets aside substantial funds for arrears clearance. As a result, the fiscal deficit is slight smaller and the basic deficit, which does not take into account grant revenues, slightly larger relative to the third program review. The authorities also expressed their determination to meet the WAEMU convergence criterion of 3 percent of GDP for the overall fiscal deficit in 2020. Extra revenues related to the prospective expansion of crude oil production will allow a further deficit reduction from 2022 in addition to higher development spending.

Niger: Fiscal Measures, 2019

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Source: IMF staff estimates.

13. Public debt dynamics remain generally benign, but Niger’s soft export base limits its capacity to take on external debt.2 The macroeconomic framework agreed between the authorities and staff implies a cumulative reduction of public debt relative to GDP of some 10 percentage points over the next five years. The new public DSA carried out for this review is qualitatively unchanged from the December 2018 vintage: all indicators remain well below applicable thresholds in the baseline, but the debt-to-exports ceiling would be surpassed in case of adverse commodity price shocks. Accordingly, Niger is rated “moderate” for risk of debt distress. Based on the new DSA, the PBG operation as previously requested by the authorities would likely bring the debt-to-exports indicator to applicable thresholds though 2021 before Niger’s export base strengthens with the projected onset of crude oil exports in 2022. All other indicators would remain benign. A discussion based on the new DSA between all stakeholders on the benefits, costs, risks, viability, and suitable design of the operation is needed.

14. Risks to the baseline outlook are tilted to the downside (Annex V). In economic terms, an aggravation of the security situations could take a toll on growth and public finances. The authorities stressed their determination to keep the situation manageable and gradually turn the tide, making adequate security spending the number one priority in the budget with ongoing efforts to raise spending efficiency to help make the most of limited resources. Disappointing implementation of the large projects, especially the pipeline for crude oil exports, could also cloud the outlook (Box). On the upside, a comprehensive big-bang effort to jumpstart the private sector could trigger a virtuous cycle beyond what is incorporated in baseline projections.

Policy Discussions

Regarding the review of the Fund-supported program, discussions focused on the assessment of fiscal performance and the fiscal structural reform agenda going forward. The Article IV consultation was centered on steps to spur private-sector development, which holds the key for Niger’s medium-term economic success, and on how to reinforce the government’s governance reforms, in particular in terms of better application. Niger’s implementation record of past Article IV recommendations has been satisfactory (Annex VI).

A. Program Issues

15. Sound public finances as the linchpin for macroeconomic stability remain the principal program objective, the authorities and staff agreed. The 2019 budget and the commitment to reduce the fiscal deficit to no more than 3 percent of GDP in 2020 provide an adequate framework to guide policy in this regard. Staff noted that reaching the 2020 target required a stepped-up fiscal effort, making it imperative to build a strong revenue base by fully implementing reforms already underway and to be bold in streamlining exemptions. Staff also stressed the need to better guard against domestic payment arrears, which hurt the private sector and undermine the government’s credibility. The authorities agreed in principle but pointed to the practical challenge of raising funds on time in sometimes capricious local markets. A debt reprofiling operation in the context of the PBG would usher in a period of more stable funding. There was also consensus on the two-pronged fiscal strategy of stepping up revenue mobilization and raising spending quality. Staff cautioned that excessive fiscal pressure on the local formal private sector risks undermining economic performance. With a mere 550 large and medium-size enterprises registered with tax authorities, there is an urgent need to broaden the tax base.

Macroeconomic Significance of the Oil Export Pipeline

Prospects for Niger’s oil sector are positive. The baseline projections incorporate plans by CNPC to construct a pipeline that will allow Niger to export crude oil. Oil production started in 2011 when CNPC developed an oil field and built a local refinery. However, crude oil output and exports of refined petroleum products are currently constrained by the refinery’s capacity of 20,000 barrels per day and transport logistics. The proposed pipeline, traversing Benin to the coast would be capable of transporting up to 185,000 barrels per day with an initial expansion of production capacity to 90,000 barrels per day. Project construction is expected to start this year and take three years to complete, at a cost of US$5.7 billion for the pipeline and further oil-field development.

The expansion of crude oil production and its export will have a large economic impact. They are expected to start in 2022 and reach full capacity by 2025. It would boost real GDP growth to some 12 percent in 2022, and also lift growth in subsequent years though by lesser amounts. GNI growth would also rise by the amount of local content and additional fiscal revenues. The project will draw in large imports during the construction phase but would benefit the external and domestic balances substantially once crude oil exports flow. Using WEO international oil price projections, export receipts and budget revenues would both peak in 2025 at 9 and 2 percent of GDP, respectively.

However, the project also carries risks. While financially viable under current oil price projections, the project implies negotiating a transit route through Benin and factoring in elevated regional security risks. Consequently, projections need to account for the risks of implementation delays, including for debt.

The project’s economic impact is large. Its indefinite postponement would substantially alter projections for real GDP growth, exports and budget revenues, and key public debt indicators (assuming the objectives for the overall balance in the baseline remain valid). Specifically, an indefinite delay in the crude oil project would temporarily push the present value of external public debt nearer to the 180 percent of exports threshold, threatening Niger’s “moderate” risk rating for public debt distress in the DSA. Fiscal policy needs to take these risks into account and avoid spending future oil receipts before they materialize.

Niger: Impact of Indefinite Delay in Crude Oil Project

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Niger: Present Value of External PPG Debt

(Percent of exports)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Public Financial Management

16. Staff advocated further building on recent progress in public debt management. Since the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Public Debt and Budget Support in mid-2016, the contracting of debt is much better controlled, but the recent revision of debt data and persistent arrears point to room for further improvement. The authorities agreed to have all legal and organizational arrangements in place for establishing a dedicated debt management unit in the Treasury with a modern front-middle-back office structure in line with technical assistance advice from the Fund by year-end (proposed SB for end-December 2019). Considering the rising use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) and some opaqueness surrounding state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) internal debt, the authorities agreed with staff’s suggestion to widen the remit of the inter-ministerial committee to cover the associated fiscal risks. Moreover, they assured staff that, contrary to common perception, only four PPP conventions had been signed since the adoption of new legislation in March 2018. They were all structured as build-operate-transfer (BOT) operations and therefore carried little fiscal risk.

17. Implementation of the TSA is at an advanced stage. With almost all accounts of public entities in commercial banks closed, it remains to strengthen the Treasury’s banking functions. Staff also suggested that the accounts of three important entities that were granted a derogation be transferred as soon as possible. The authorities should also investigate the considerable gap of around 1 percent of GDP between entities’ initial commercial bank balances and amounts received in the TSA. They agreed but cautioned that public entities had legitimate spending needs since the survey was conducted in December 2016. Support from the Fund’s resident technical advisor will continue and also cover cash management issues.

Revenue Mobilization

18. Revenue mobilization is essential for achieving both fiscal consolidation and fiscal space for priority spending. The authorities and staff shared this view, with staff urging an acceleration of administrative measures, not least to establish a strong base for the 2020 budget. On tax policy, meeting the end-June 2019 SB on legislating a reduction of tax exemptions has drifted out of reach. But a committee will present its proposals for discussion in June and legal changes will be part of the 2020 budget law (SBs proposed to be reset for end-June 2019 and end-September 2019). The authorities also underlined scope for improving management of exemptions, especially by better guarding against leakage of tax-exempt imports into the domestic market. In 2022, revenues should get a boost of some 2 percent of GDP from the expected start of crude-oil exports.

19. Important reforms of tax and customs administrations are underway:

  • A dedicated vehicle to collect tax arrears has been established. Staff urged a faster reduction of the arrears stock, which has remained broadly unchanged since the last review, following the quantitative targets in the performance plan for tax administration.

  • Molecular marking of petroleum products would be a highly effective tool in fighting smuggling, which is still rampant despite some success of enforcement measures. The identification of a cost-effective vendor took longer than expected. Marking should be applied from end-2019 according to the authorities.

  • The WTO valuation regime for imports is being implemented with technical assistance from the Fund. Significant revenue gains have already been realized. The ongoing build-up of the valuation database and full application of the valuation regime hold significant further revenue potential.

  • The IT systems of the tax and customs administrations have been linked. Significant results should start to show once the tax intelligence unit ramps up risk-based cross-checking. Technical assistance from the Fund will accompany this reform effort in the context of general support to strengthen tax administration.

  • Performance plans for tax and customs administrations are being finalized (prior action). Authorities and Fund staff agreed on indicators that capture the main undertakings—increasing the number of fiscally active tax payers and widening the application of transaction valuation of imports, based on technical assistance advise from the IMF.

Quality and Efficiency of Government Spending

20. Despite revenue mobilization efforts, Niger’s resource envelope remains tight, putting a premium on high quality and efficiency in government spending. The authorities fully subscribe to this imperative. They stressed, that spending efficiency is particularly important to make room for vital security spending, which itself is closely scrutinized for efficiency, for example by strictly monitoring prices for equipment purchases. Specifically:

  • Program budgeting, first introduced in 2018 with technical assistance advice from the Fund, will be refined for the 2020 budget by better attributing overhead costs to programs and outcome indicators.

  • The double authorization framework (AE/CP) for expenditures will be rolled out for selected ministries with the 2020 budget. Voting three-year spending plans with annual confirmations will help ensure continuity of ongoing programs and facilitate planning. This reform is also supported by technical assistance from the Fund.

  • Improving the efficiency of the public investment program is a high priority for the authorities. The double authorization framework will help, but based on the findings of the recent PIMA report, staff also suggested to better applying the requirement that investment proposals be evaluated before consideration by the selection committee. The coherence of the public investment plan would benefit from fuller integration of PPPs.

  • The authorities have set themselves ambitious targets to reform public procurement. They closely monitor the share of competitive awards with a view to raising it from around two-thirds currently to the WAEMU norm of 95 percent. The backlog of procurement audits is being addressed and the IT system is being upgraded.

  • The authorities assured the mission that fiscal risks associated with PPPs are small. Nonetheless they agreed to bring them under the purview of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Public Debt and Budget Support and to cover them in its quarterly reports. Staff counseled to reduce recourse to unsolicited PPP offers and contract awards without competition where appropriate.

Public Sector Efficiency

21. Additional reforms to improve public sector efficiency are in train.

  • As part of reforming government’s human resource management processes, a functional review of ministries and preparation of a biometric database for civil servants and government employees are underway.

  • The authorities are undertaking a governance reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public administrative entities. Performance audits of key SOEs and public administrative entities have been conducted and are currently being evaluated by the Ministry of Finance. The findings will form the basis for improving governance frameworks, including financial oversight, selection of board members, auditing, and processing of financial information. Staff underlined the importance of sound SOEs to guard against fiscal risks and ensure that the private sector is provided with services of sufficient quality. The audits should be evaluated quickly and shared with staff.

  • The authorities will address the proliferation of government agencies in the context of a review of government functions. Staff registered its concerns about the complex and growing apparatus, which is costly, spreads resources thin, ties up talent in bureaucratic processes, complicates finding appropriate counterparts for donors, and ultimately impinges on the quality of services delivered to the population. Interim measures should be considered while the functional review is underway.

  • A review of the effectiveness of social support programs is ongoing. The authorities are instituting a tracking mechanism for major social programs (SB for end-June 2019), which should strengthen program effectiveness, such as for school lunches.

B. Private Sector Development3

22. Niger’s economic future hinges on developing its still embryonic local formal private sector. The informal and government sectors currently deliver the bulk of GDP growth. The local formal private sector accounts for less than 10 percent of GDP. While its share has been rising slowly over recent years, it faces unfair competition from the informal sector and smuggled goods. With low productivity in the informal sector and limits to the size of government, formalizing the economy and growing the local formal private sector are key for lifting living standards and creating jobs. Indeed, with the world’s highest population growth, Niger needs to complement job creation effort with steps to reduce population growth as set out in its Social and Economic Development Plan 2017–21.

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Niger: Sectoral Contributions to Real GDP Growth, 2013–181

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Sources: Niger Statistical Agency; and IMF staff estimates.1 Extractive includes refinery. Government includes production and distribution of electricity, water, and gas , which are mainly crarried out by SOEs.

23. The authorities and staff agreed that a critical mass of structural reforms could jolt the private sector into higher gear. The authorities are making progress, but an ambitious and comprehensive push focused on private sector development could set a virtuous cycle in motion. The challenge is to provide leadership to frame an effective strategy.

24. The authorities and Fund staff also agreed that it is for the authorities to initiate a broad push by all stakeholders for private sector development. It would be important for the authorities to demonstrate their commitment by proposing a priority list of concrete and attainable measures. Timebound consultations with the private sector and donors would help pin down the government’s agenda. The consultations would also extract commitments from the private sector, such as building infrastructure, and from donors, such as consolidating and focusing their support. Staff cautioned not to create new platforms for the needed dialogue but to combine and consolidate existing ones, which according to private sector interlocutors currently do not allow for much of a two-way dialogue.

25. Limited financial resources and human capacity necessitate a focused approach. The strategy should aim at reforms geared to benefiting the private sector generally. However, where sectoral prioritization is needed, the strategy could reap low-hanging fruits already identified in existing studies: value chain extensions, agricultural productivity, import-substituting activities, and the natural resource sector. High local content, fair fiscal contributions, and contained incentives would maximize benefits from FDI.

26. Priorities for structural reforms are well-known from existing studies. The main obstacles are:

  • Access to financing. Niger’s banks are stable but, at 14 percent of GDP, private sector credit is feeble. Measures are needed to enhance financial intermediation and encourage banks to extend more credit to the private sector. The ongoing bankification of government financial operations should help grow deposits and banks’ lending space. Fiscal consolidation would also help. The now fully functional credit bureau is another boon. Staff recommended making new financing vehicles fully operational and promoting them better. Leasing and warrantage are not yet used in practice, neither the regional BCEAO lending scheme nor the special vehicle FISAN for lending to the rural sector are ready, and donor-supported lending at a special window at the Maison de l’Entreprise is hampered by co-financing requirements.

  • Microfinance. The largely dysfunctional microfinance sector adds 0.7 percent of GDP to credit to the private sector. Building on the new financial inclusion strategy, microfinance should be resuscitated, including by organizing a donor round table for its financing, consolidating institutions, financial literacy programs, and by building capacity in microfinance institutions. The regulator should step up screening of new applicants and supervision of incumbent MFIs.

  • Electricity. Access to reliable electricity is a major concern. Benefitting from recent tariff increases and the findings of a new audit report, the state electricity company should be urgently reformed and held accountable for reliable service delivery and financial sustainability, with donors helping to expand access. Consumer prices are now at par with those in the U.S., yet power cuts are pervasive even in the capital city.

  • Informal sector. Difficult-to-control borders, poor enforcement of regulation and taxation, and the small-size of businesses all breed informality. With little accreditation services, difficult contract enforcement, and limited access to credit among several constraints, even for the formal sector, there a few incentives for firms to be formally established. Both costs and benefits need to be tilted to encourage businesses to enter the formal sector. Benefits could include access to special financing vehicles, the services of a revived agencies for standards and norms, which are critical for exporters, and simplified customs procedures. On the over hand, informal firms above a certain size should be subject to adequate enforcement actions. It would also be important to widen the tax base to level the playing field between firms and reduce the burden on those that are already in the formal sector.

C. Fostering Good Governance and Tackling Corruption4

27. Weak governance takes a toll on Niger’s private sector. Corruption in Niger is pervasive, with 86 percent of survey respondents characterizing it as “widespread.” Customs and tax administrations are perceived as the worst offenders, followed by the police and public procurement. Corruption ranks fourth among obstacles for businesses and Fund staff analysis finds a large negative effect of bribery on sales and productivity growth, especially for young firms and exporters.

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Niger: Business Environment Obstacles for Firms

(Percent of firms)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Source: IMF staff calculations based on World Bank Enterprise Survey.

28. The authorities have embarked on welcome reforms but more needs to be done. Niger is party to the anti-corruption conventions of the UN, the AU, and ECOWAS. It established an anti-corruption agency (HALCIA) in 2011 and further strengthened it in 2016. The Ministry of Justice instituted a complaint hotline in 2011 and the government adopted a new anti-corruption strategy last year. The AML/CFT framework has also been substantially strengthened. Moreover, Niger is in the process of reversing its retrograde withdrawal from the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, which it is on track to rejoin by year end. However, gaps remain in the institutional and legal frameworks, and implementation remains a major challenge. The independence of HALCIA needs to be strengthened. Deficiencies in the rule of law are prominent with more progress needed, particularly in contract enforcement.

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Niger: Perception of Corruption Prevalence

(Percent of respondents)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Sources: Nigerien authorities, National Anti-corruption strategy.

29. The authorities and Fund staff agreed on the need to revamp Niger’s asset declaration regime for public officials as a direct anti-corruption measure. The constitution mandates asset disclosure of high-ranking officials. Nevertheless, because of missing subordinate legislation specifying the other high-level officials subjected to asset disclosure and setting the coverage of assets to be declared, and insufficient enforcement, only the declaration of the President’s personal assets is current and publicly available. The authorities are preparing legislation on asset declaration that corresponds to good international practice in consultation with the Fund’s Legal Department (SB for end-September 2019). Staff indicated key elements to include: defining a reasonable remit of government officials subjected to asset declaration requirements; laying out the classes of assets to be declared, including those held by close family members and associates; setting clear deadlines for submission of declaration and fines for non-compliance; and risk-based verification and comprehensive publication of declarations.

30. In parallel to strengthening the legal and institutional frameworks, bolstering efforts toward better implementation will be key. The authorities will review the funding of key institution, such as the audit court, encourage better follow-through by tracking cases, and raise the profile of anti-corruption agencies by better publicizing their work, such as posting HALCIA’s annual reports on its website.

31. The authorities also acknowledged the importance of addressing corruption indirectly by reducing opportunities for corruption. Several reforms already envisaged are helpful in this regard, primarily by streamlining procedures to limit the points of direct contact between public officials with scope for discretionary behavior. These include promoting competitive procurement, improving the governance of SOEs and extractive industries, scaling-back discretionary exemptions, bankification of fiscal payments, establishing a TSA, risk-based inspection regimes at customs, more online automation of administrative processes, and simplification of administrative procedures more generally.

32. The authorities and Fund staff agreed that expanding fiscal transparency would help improve accountability to the public. Enhancing transparency would help contain corrupt practices by empowering civil society to help scrutinize public finances that public officials are too overstretched to carry out on their own. The publication of the 2019 draft budget submitted to Parliament was a first step. The effort will now be broadened by introducing legal requirements for publication of key documents, such as budget outturns on a timely basis, draft and approved budgets, including supplementary ones, a citizen budget, major conventions with foreign investors, PPP contracts, and tender awards. The Government Gazette should be made available online free of charge.

Program Modalities

33. The authorities request a 3-month extension of the program to April 2020 and a re-phasing of disbursements, to retain the semi-annual spacing for the final reviews and give more time to complete key reforms, including domestic arrears clearance and debt management, which would otherwise fall outside the program period. The test date for the completion of the sixth program review would be pushed back to December 2019. New quantitative PCs, SBs, and ITs are proposed for end-December 2019 in line with third-review projections. A new SB is proposed for end-December 2019. Proposed quantitative PC and ITs for March-December 2019 appear in Table 2 of the MEFP. Existing, proposed to be reset, and newly proposed SBs and recurrent SBs for June to December 2019 are set out in Tables 4 and 6 of the MEFP. The revised disbursement schedule appears in Table 7 of the MEFP.

Table 1.

Niger: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2016–24

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Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Revenue excluding grants minus expenditure excluding foreign-financed capital expenditure.

Revenue including grants minus expenditure; WAEMU anchor.

Includes from 2017 onward debt associated with commercial PPPs, standing at some 4.7 and 4.2 percent of GDP in 2017 and 2018 respectively, and gradually being paid off through 2033.

Table 2.

Niger: Financial Operations of the Central Government, 2016–24

(In billions of CFA francs)

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Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

The special accounts include the financing on the National Retirement Fund, Priority Investments Fund, and Fund for Continuous Professional Development.

Revenues minus expenditure net of externally-financed capital expenditure.

Table 3.

Niger: Financial Operations of the Central Government, 2016–24

(In percent of GDP)

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Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

The special accounts include the financing on the National Retirement Fund, Priority Investments Fund, and Fund for Continuous Professional Development.

Revenues minus expenditure net of externally-financed capital expenditure.

Table 4.

Niger: Monetary Survey, 2016–24

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Sources: BCEAO; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
Table 5.

Niger: Balance of Payments, 2016–24

(In billions of CFA francs, unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
Table 6.

Niger: Balance of Payments, 2016–24

(In percent of GDP)

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Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
Table 7.

Niger: Indicators of Financial Soundness, Dec. 2012–Jun. 2018

(In percent)

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Source: BCEAO.

Compilation according to Basel II/III. Not comparable to earlier years.

Credit to the 5 biggest borrowers to regulatory capital.

34. The authorities expressed their commitment to redress shortfalls in program implementation. A plan to clear domestic payment arrears and to guard against their reemergence, and the adoption of performance plans for tax and revenue administrations are proposed prior actions. Because of the delayed arrears clearance, the authorities request and staff supports (i) a waiver for the non-observance of the periodic PC on the arrears stock ceiling at end-December 2018 and on the continuous PC on domestic arrears for 2019 in light of the corrective action under the prior action for this review, (ii) a modification of the continuous PC on the arrears stock ceiling going forward, and (iii) a modification of the adjuster to the PC on the domestic financing ceiling for end-June 2019. Moreover, the authorities request and staff supports introducing a new capped upward and downward adjuster to the PCs on the domestic financing ceiling and the contracting of external debt ceiling, respectively, to accommodate debt reprofiling under a potential Policy Based Guarantee operation with the World Bank.

35. Niger’s capacity to repay the IMF remains adequate, but subject to risk, which program measures seek to mitigate. Considering the strength and implemention of the program so far, Niger should have sufficient capacity to repay the Fund, including when repayments peak at 1.5 percent of tax revenues in 2025 and 1.4 percent of exports in 2021 (Table 8). Key risks are security developments, climatic shocks, and implementation capacity. The program remains fully financed.

Table 8.

Niger: Indicators of Capacity to Repay the Fund, 2018–28

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Source: IMF staff estimates and projections.

Total external debt service includes IMF repurchases and repayments.

36. An updated safeguards assessment of the BCEAO was completed in 2018. It found that the regional central bank had maintained a strong control environment; audit arrangements were in broad conformity with international standards; and the financial statements were prepared in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards. The BCEAO has recently enhanced the oversight role of its audit committee in line with the recommendations of the assessment.

Staff Appraisal

37. The authorities’ implementation of the ECF-supported program remains broadly satisfactory amid challenging circumstances. All periodic quantitative targets for end-December 2018 and end-March 2019 were met, except the end-December target and the continuous PC on clearing domestic payment arrears. The authorities’ commitment to clear all remaining ones by the third quarter of 2019, with a large down-payment in June 2019, and to avoid incurring new ones is welcome. Structural reforms advanced reasonably well, albeit with some delays. The commitment to finalize performance plans for revenue administrations, to guide the process of systematically building capacity for better revenue mobilization, is important. Staff encourages the authorities to push ahead with the full breadth of fiscal structural reforms, especially the reduction of tax exemptions.

38. Niger’s recent growth performance is encouraging. Several large-scale projects financed by the private sector or donors are gathering steam, giving the economy strong momentum. The prospective oil-export pipeline would be an important boon to the economy to the extent that it can capture local content and generate resources for the budget. To sustain momentum, the local formal private sector needs to become part of the success story. It currently faces multiple difficulties that need to be urgently addressed by government and donors alike with an emphasis on solutions for tangible near-term progress on the ground.

39. Niger needs external support to decisively deal with a difficult security environment. The authorities rightly attach the highest priority to security as a prerequisite for development. But limited resources complicate their best efforts. Additional external, non-debt creating support for the security services would be a good investment not only for Niger but the entire region and beyond.

40. Niger has made much progress in strengthening its public finances. The fiscal deficit has been greatly reduced over the past few years with a big step forward in 2018. The authorities remain determined to meet the WAEMU convergence criterion for an overall fiscal deficit of no more than 3 percent of GDP. Prospective oil exports and rising oil production would be an important further boost for public finances, which remain the linchpin for macroeconomic stability.

41. Staff encourages the authorities to keep the course with implementing its broader structural reform agenda. Addressing remaining legislative gaps and efforts to ensure the effective implementation of the frameworks for good governance and the fight against corruption should be the main priority. Moreover, the government’s reform agenda has many elements with the side benefit of reducing the scope for corruption, such as SOE reform, more competitive public procurement, phasing-out cash payments in the public sector, and reducing tax exemptions.

42. Staff supports the authorities’ requests for (i) a waiver for the non-observance of the performance criterion on domestic payment arrears clearance at end-December 2018 and of the continuous performance criterion for 2019, considering the corrective actions under the prior action, (ii) the proposed modifications to performance criteria, (iii) the conclusion of the fourth ECF review, and (iv) the extension of the ECF arrangement. The attached Letter of Intent (LOI) and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) set out appropriate policies to achieve the 2019 program objectives.

43. It is proposed that the next Article IV Consultation be held on the 24-month cycle.

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Niger: Recent Economic Developments and Outlook

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Figure 2.
Figure 2.

Niger: Fiscal Developments 2013–18

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Figure 3.
Figure 3.

Niger: GDP Composition and Output Volatility

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Figure 4.
Figure 4.

Niger: Tax Performance, 2014–18

(Cumulative values, December 2014 = 100, nominal GDP discounted)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Figure 5.
Figure 5.

Niger: Indicators of Financial Inclusion

(Cumulative values, December 2014 = 100, nominal GDP discounted)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Figure 6.
Figure 6.

Niger: Key Indicators of the Microfinance Sector, 2011–18

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Sources: ARSM; and IMF staff calculations. 2018 data refer to June 2018.
Figure 7.
Figure 7.

Niger: Demographics

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Source: IMF staff estimates.

Annex I. Capacity Development Strategy Note

Strategy

1. The strategy for Niger in FY20 broadly extends the previous strategy. (1) It continues to prioritize revenue mobilization as a key program objective by strengthening both tax policy and revenue administration, including simplifying tax policy in line with administrative capacity. (2) It puts more emphasis on strengthening budget preparation and execution in the context of the introduction of program budgeting, with greater attention to quality control, including a public investment management assessment and public expenditure review. (3) The strategy will support Niger’s capacity to manage natural resource revenues in light of the large projected increase in oil output. (4) It also continues to support improving macroeconomic and financial statistics, especially the nexus of government finance and monetary statistics in the context of rolling-out the treasury single account.

Overall Priorities Going Forward

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Main Risks and Mitigation

2. The authorities welcome technical assistance (TA) from the Fund and have exhibited a strong determination to absorb and implement this assistance. However, absorption faces human resource constraints accentuated by a bunching of TA delivery, an over-centralization of the reform effort, and high turnover of senior staff. The authorities could make greater use of training opportunities offered by the Fund’s Institute for Capacity Development and by Afritac West, the regional center for TA and training.

Authorities’ Views

3. The authorities welcome Fund TA and thought it appropriately targeted. They welcome diagnostic TA from HQ and appreciate ongoing operational TA from Afritac West. They have expressed a concern that the TA mission timetable is over-crowded at times.

Annex II. External Sector Assessment

Niger’s external position was weaker than implied by fundamentals and desirable policy settings in 2018. However, the sizable current account deficit is largely driven and financed by donors and foreign direct investors, which is desirable in view of Niger’s daunting development needs. Going forward, large foreign investment and donor support are set to widen the external deficit further in the construction phase and to substantially narrow it in the subsequent production phase. The solution to Niger’s external weakness lies in developing a meaningful private sector in the medium run rather than near-term exchange rate depreciation.

1. Niger’s current account deficit is large. At 18.2 percent of GDP, it is estimated to have been the second largest in Africa and the largest in the WAEMU. Indeed, even though Niger accounts for only 7½ percent of the union’s GDP, its current account was responsible for nearly one fifth of the external deficit of 6.8 percent of GDP. Deficits increased sharply from 2008 onward, averaging 18.6 percent of GDP over the last ten years. The collapse of international prices for key uranium exports following the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 put pressure on Niger’s external accounts, but commodity exports are not the main driver.

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Niger: Current Account Deficit and Natural Resources, 2000–18

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

2. Niger’s external deficit is the flip-side of donor loans and foreign direct investment. Over the past decade they financed some 90 percent of the current account deficit, fluctuating in a range of 75–100 percent over the years. The completion of the HIPC program with Niger in 2016 opened the door to more donor support in the form of loans and capital transfers, and the deterioration of the security situation from around 2012 gave further impetus. Even more importantly, the HIPC completion point coincided with the advent of sizable foreign direct investment, primarily by CNPC to develop oil fields and build a refinery. Given Niger’s modest GDP of just US$9 billion in 2018, such projects quickly correspond to a large percentage of GDP.

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Niger: Financing of Current Account Deficits, 2000–18

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

3. The Fund’s EBA-lite current account model assesses Niger’s current account as substantially weaker than fundamentals would suggest. Concretely, Niger’s current account deficit is 9.5 percent of GDP larger than the norm calculated from the model’s key fundamental variables. Deviations of economic policies from their medium-term desired levels play a negligible role in explaining this gap – the deficit-enhancing effects of a relatively large fiscal deficit and relatively stringent capital controls are largely neutralized by the deficit reducing-effects of insufficient accumulation of external reserves and relatively low private-sector credit growth. Closing the gap by exchange rate adjustment alone would require a large depreciation of 17 percent, assuming an export elasticity of 0.47 and an import elasticity of 1.32 as calibrated for Niger by Tokarick (IMF WP/10/180). However, these results need to be interpreted with caution considering that the EBA-lite model does not take all factors pertinent to the case of Niger into account. For example, it disregards large capital grants of 5.9 percent of GDP in 2018. If these were considered a fundamental instead and deducted from the current account deficit, overvaluation would decline to 6 percent.

Niger: Results EBA-lite Model

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Source: IMF staff calculations.

4. The Fund’s equilibrium real exchange rate model finds a considerably smaller exchange rate overvaluation. It estimates a real exchange rate that would be in line with fundamental directly and assesses the gap to the actual exchange rate. In contrast to the EBA-lite model, the current account balance is not explicitly considered but it considers foreign aid and puts more emphasis on demographics and per-capita income. This approach finds a more modest overvaluation of Niger’s real effective exchange rate of 3.9 percent.

Niger: Results REER Model

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Source: IMF staff calculations.

5. On balance, staff assesses Niger’s external position as weaker than suggested by fundamentals and desirable policy settings. The less favorable results of the EBA-lite current account model need to be qualified by this approach not accounting for capital transfers, which are important in Niger’s case, and balanced against the moderate overvaluation identified in the exchange rate model. Perhaps most importantly, there are good reasons for Niger’s large current account deficits for the time being, considering its enormous development needs as the world’s most underdeveloped country and record high population growth. Both require investment well beyond domestic financing capacities. In this sense, foreign direct investment and donor support are welcome and, by extension, the implied external deficit. That said, the flags raised by the models and the sheer size of the current account deficit warrant close monitoring of Niger’s external position. It will be paramount to put the external resources to good use, ensure high-quality investment, seek out external grants rather than loans, and, most importantly, develop Niger’s still embryonic domestic private sector so that it can better substitute for imports and export more going forward.

Annex III. Economic Impact of Security Tensions

1. Niger’s stability is vulnerable to security pressures largely from external sources. They mostly take the form of cross-border terrorist incursions from Nigeria, Mali, and Burkina Faso. While terrorist networks have generally not taken root on its soil, Niger is nevertheless at risk to get embroiled in the broader regional security tensions. Niger’s position, straddling a key transit route through the Sahel, has also exposed it to organized crime related to human and drug trafficking toward Europe. The number of terrorist-related incidents in Niger rose sharply from 2015 to reach 2 incidents per 1 million population in 2018, with 250 related casualties. Nonetheless, this remains relatively modest compared to Mali, which suffered 7 times as many incidences. The deteriorated regional security situation has also been accompanied by a surge of refugees and internally displaced persons in Niger, currently about 350,000, or 1.8 percent of the population.1

2. The regional dimension of the security threat has attracted a broad international response. Niger’s strategic importance and vulnerability has brought donor support and military assistance through foreign troops, hardware based in Niger for regional and domestic purposes, and limited equipment for Nigerien forces. In addition, US$600 million have been pledged toward the ‘G5 Sahel’ joint fighting force, comprising Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Mauritania, although it is not yet fully operational and much of the funds remain to be disbursed.

3. Niger’s heightened vulnerability has obliged the Government to increase security spending significantly while addressing large development needs. Starting the decade at around 2 percent of GDP, security spending has since broadly doubled, peaking at 5.2 percent in 2015. The increase has been largely geared toward defense and related investment. Comparable cross-country data is scant, but military spending in a narrower sense indicates that Niger’s is comparable to its peers: Niger, Mali and Chad have each allocated 2 percent of GDP, while Nigeria and Cameroon have spent around 1.3 percent of GDP.2

4. Security spending in the budget is predominantly financed by domestic resources and has contributed to higher domestic deficits and domestic debt. Pressures from security spending came at a time when domestic revenues were adversely affected by weak commodity prices and economic disruption from the security tensions. As a result, the deficit on the domestic budget (the basic balance deficit) deteriorated over the decade, from 3.3 percent of GDP in 2010–11 to 5.5 percent of GDP over 2015–17 and peaked at 7.4 percent of GDP in 2015. The larger part of the domestic budget deficit was financed by domestic debt, which rose from 4 to 17 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2017, broadly matching the additional security spending.

5. Higher donor financing helped sustain social spending, but at the cost of higher external debt. Security spending doubled its share of the domestic budget to 22 percent—a shift that, though not necessarily detrimental to development with security a pre-requisite, threatened other spending priorities in the domestic budget, including social spending. This included social and development spending needed in areas affected by the security threat. But a sharp increase in donor financing of about 4 percent of GDP alleviated the fiscal pressures. The overall budget envelope expanded by 8 percent of GDP and social spending, if anything, rose relative to GDP. However, the additional donor support for social spending was not costless as about half came in the form of loans that doubled external debt through the decade to over 30 percent of GDP.

6. The impact of security threats on economic activity is difficult to discern, but Fund staff analysis suggests that it may be sizable in the case of Niger. A recent IMF cross-country study found that conflict reduces real per-capita GDP growth by 1 to 3 percent in each conflict year depending on conflict intensity.3 Applying the model to Niger suggests that growth was reduced by under 1 percent during 2012–14 but by 2.7 percent during 2015–18 when conflict intensity picked up, for a cumulative negative impact of about 12 percent. This is consistent with the pronounced slowdown in growth observed from 2015. The results are also comparable to the cumulative impact over the same period in Chad but are well below those for Mali and Nigeria of over 20 percent.

7. The study found that the impact runs primarily through productivity, investment, and exports, as well as through pressures on public finances. These channels appear to have been operating in Niger. One clear indication of the impact on economic activity is that inbound travel fell sharply in 2012, reducing GDP growth by 0.3 percentage points in that year.4 Merchandise exports were similarly affected: exports to Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Mali, which were worth about 5 percent of GDP in 2012–13, fell 80 percent. The higher fiscal deficit might have provided some offsetting economic stimulus, but it was probably limited to the extent that deficits widened because of security spending, which has a high import content.

8. The necessary security outlays make it important to mobilize revenues and improve spending efficiency, including in security spending itself. The 2019 budget took a first step in this direction by reviewing spending programs and applying selected cuts, including in the allocations for the Defense and Interior Ministries, but efforts to raise spending quality have further to go. Transparency International’s Defense Anti-Corruption Index for 2015 rated Niger poorly. An EU security expenditure review in 2016 noted extra-budgetary revenues and expenditures and scope to improve budget forecasts and spending execution.5

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Niger: Security Spending, Domestic Budget Financing, and Domestic Public Debt

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Source: IMF staff calculations.
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Niger: Impact of Security Tensions on Economic Activity

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2019, 239; 10.5089/9781513508191.002.A001

Source: IMF staff calculations.

Sahel Countries: Terrorism Incidents

(Per 1 million of population)

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Sources: Control Risk; and IMF staff calculations.

Niger: Security Expenditure in Perspective, 2010–17

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Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

Total budget spending, excluding debt repayments.

Total budget spending not financed by external project aid, excluding debt repayments and ordres de paiements.

Net of amoritzation payments on external debt.

Excluding ordres de paiements.

Annex IV. Economic Significance of the Natural Resource Sector

1. Niger’s resource sector is passing through a transition period. Uranium, oil, and gold currently accounts for 8 percent of GDP and half of export receipts. Uranium mining long dominated but faces an uncertain future following the collapse of international prices. It could be supplanted by a large expansion in oil and possibly gold output. These developments could more than double commodity GDP and export receipts in the medium term. Fiscal revenues would also benefit greatly.

Sectoral Developments

2. The outlook for the uranium sector is fragile. Uranium’s strategic value has attracted substantial foreign investment since the early 1970s, mainly from France with the government as minority shareholder, making Niger the world’s fourth largest producer. But the sector is under pressure from prolonged weak international demand and prices following the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. Output volumes and export receipts have halved since their peak in 2012. The loss of budgetary revenues has been even more pronounced. Investments were delayed, operations in one of Niger’s three mines was suspended, development of a new mine, which would have been the world’s second largest, has been put on ice, and, more recently, mines started incurring losses. But indications of recently recovering prices give cautious hope.

3. Prospects for the oil sector are positive. Oil production commenced in 2011 when CNPC developed an oil field and built a refinery, of which the government owns just under half. Absent a pipeline for crude oil exports, production is constrained to around 20,000 barrels per day, which serves the local market and allows for modest exports of refined products. Long-standing plans to build an export pipeline via Benin finally seem to be coming to fruition, with MOUs and some conventions signed in late 2018. If realized, this would make Niger a crude oil exporter from 2022, producing around 100,000 barrels per day, comparable to Cameroon, Chad, or Ghana. Large investments would be required (US$2.1 billion for the pipeline and US$3.6 billion for additional production capacity), which will likely be borne almost entirely by CNPC. The expansion in oil output could have a significant impact: the level of real GDP could rise by 12 percent, annual export receipts by about US$1 billion, and direct fiscal revenues by some 2 percent of GDP.

4. The gold sector in Niger is experiencing a large expansion. There is only one formal company which produced 1.3 tons of gold in 2017 with an export value of 0.5 percent of GDP but negligible budget revenues. However, much of gold production is artisanal which is not properly captured in official statistics. Unofficial estimates range from 4 to 10 tons, compared to 28 tons in Burkina Faso and 40 tons in Mali, which would arguably make gold Niger’s largest resource export. The projections in the Annex Table adopt a more conservative stance. The World Bank estimates that the artisanal sector directly employs between 100,000 to 500,000 people with large revenue benefits for local jurisdictions.

Macroeconomic Implications

5. The resource sector’s economic contribution has weakened in recent years. This follows the decline in export prices, especially for uranium. Export receipts fell, the contribution to real GDP growth weakened, and fiscal revenues suffered. The decline in direct budget revenues from the resource sector by 2 percent of GDP from 2014 to 2018 has been particularly pronounced and came at a time when security tensions and cross border smuggling were chipping away at border revenues. The decline in resource sector revenues has contributed to Niger’s lackluster revenue performance, plausibly adding up to 10 percent of GDP to Niger’s domestic debt since 2014.

6. Looking ahead, the resource sector is expected to make a strong positive economic contribution. This is largely because of the anticipated expansion in crude oil production and exports but also because of a projected recovery in uranium prices. Under cautious assumptions, the resource sector could add some 12 percent to overall growth in 2022–23, more than double export receipts by 2024 and raise budget revenues by some 2 percent of GDP. The outcome is sensitive to price assumptions and, for example, with the international oil price around US$70 instead of US$60 per barrel projected through the medium term, the fiscal revenue yield from higher oil exports could reach 4 percent of GDP within the decade.

Resource Sector Management

7. Niger needs to strengthen natural resource governance to formalize the artisanal sector, reduce illicit untaxed exports, and strengthen budget receipts. The Natural Resource Governance Institute rates Niger within the top third of 89 countries reviewed but nevertheless as weak and points to a large gap between the legal framework and practice. The WAEMU’s directives lay out principles that are not yet fully transposed. The emergence of the artisanal gold sector motivated a revision of the Mining Code in 2017, but the control mechanisms established have yet to be implemented. An important step would be Niger rejoining the EITI as early as this year.

8. It will be important to ensure that Niger benefits adequately through two channels. The first is through the budget. The authorities could strengthen capacity to monitor operations to ensure transparency and compliance with tax regulations. Firmer control of fiscal arrangements, especially tax exonerations, is needed. The second is through local content. Ensuring domestic spillovers will require further effort to strengthen the business environment to support domestic suppliers and human capital formation to provide the skilled labor needed. It is important to maximize benefits through these channels to avoid that only GDP, but not national income, gets a big boost.

9. The expansion of the resource sector raises difficult policy challenges. The authorities will need to consider the macroeconomic ramifications of a large expansion in resource exports receipts and budget revenues. Specifically, the authorities will need to consider whether to use the additional budget revenues to add to savings, and thereby reduce domestic debt; or else whether to use the additional revenues to finance spending and, if so, what sort of spending and at what pace.

Niger: Natural Resource Sector, 2012–24

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Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

Direct resource budget revenues includes only royalties, tax oil, profit oil, and artisanal exploitation tax. The broader definition includes corporate and employee income tax, property tax, and border taxes. In the case of the oil sector, these other revenue items are also sourced from the refinery and domestic distributers.

Excludes State dividends from its holdings in the uranium mining sector.

Annex V. Risk Assessment Matrix

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Annex VI. Status of Key 2016 Article IV Consultation Recommendations

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Appendix I. Letter of Intent

Niamey, June 13, 2019

Madame Christine Lagarde

Managing Director

International Monetary Fund

Washington DC, 20431

Madame Managing Director,

1. Niger continues to make notable economic progress in the context of its reform program supported by the ECF arrangement. Real GDP growth picked up to an estimated 6.5 percent in 2018 and should average at least 7 percent annually over the next five years with the economy developing new dynamism, catalyzed by several large private and public investment projects, notably the development of a pipeline for crude oil exports, and the hosting of the African Union summit this July. Inflation has fallen well below the 3 percent WAEMU norm. Fiscal consolidation in 2018 outperformed the program with the fiscal deficit declining to 4.2 percent of GDP. This progress was achieved despite a tense security situation, low prices for uranium exports, and daunting development challenges.

2. Implementation of our ECF-supported reform program is broadly on track. All performance criteria and indicative targets for end-December 2018 and end-March 2019 were met, except the clearance of domestic payment arrears owing to intermittently tight conditions in regional financial markets and pressing security spending needs. However, a substantial paydown is a prior action for the completion of this review. Structural reforms also advanced. All but one structural benchmark through end-March 2019 have been met. Achieving this objective is also a prior action. Progress toward the end-June 2019 structural benchmarks is well advanced.

3. The Government of Niger remains fully committed to the objectives of the program. Sound public finances for macroeconomic stability is a top priority. No efforts will be spared to meet the WAEMU convergence criterion for a fiscal deficit of at most 3 percent of GDP in 2020, to ensure debt sustainability, and to preserve Niger’s moderate risk rating for public debt distress. The critical drive to mobilize more revenues will continue, flanked by steps to improve spending quality and debt management. The government also recognizes the importance of developing a stronger local private sector, of further improving governance, and of advancing girls’ education.

4. The government’s program for the remainder of 2019 and the medium-term is detailed in the attached Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP). The government believes that the measures and policies set forth therein will serve to achieve the established objectives. It stands ready to take any additional measures that may prove necessary and will consult with the IMF on the adoption of such measures and before making changes to the policies set out in the MEFP in accordance with the IMF’s policies on consultations. Timely information needed to monitor the economic situation and implementation of policies relevant to the program will be provided, as agreed under the attached Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU), or at the IMF’s request.

5. The Government of Niger requests a 3-month extension of the ECF arrangement to April 2020. This way the semi-annual spacing of program targets can be retained for the sixth and final program review, providing a more realistic timeframe for completing the implementation of envisaged reforms.

6. Considering the prior actions—reducing domestic payment arrears together with reassurances on the government’s commitment and adopting performance plans for tax and customs administrations—and the resolve to implement the program, the Government of Niger requests (i) a waiver for the non-observance of the end-December 2018 performance criterion on domestic payment arrears clearance, (ii) a waiver for the non-observance of the continuous performance criterion on keeping domestic arrears below the CFAF 5 billion ceiling in 2019; (iii) the modification of the continuous performance criterion on the stock of domestic arrears from the date of completion of the fourth review onward and modification of the arrears adjuster to the domestic financing performance criterion at end-June 2019; (iv) the completion of the fourth program review; (v) the disbursement of the fifth tranche of SDR 33.84 million under the ECF arrangement; and (vi) a 3-month extension of the ECF arrangement through April 22, 2020 and the rephasing of disbursements as detailed in Table 7 of the MEFP. Performance criteria, indicative targets, and structural benchmarks for 2019 are set out in Tables 2, 4, and 6 of the MEFP.

7. In keeping with our longstanding commitment to transparency, we agree to the publication of the staff report, this letter of intent, the MEFP, and the TMU on the IMF’s website.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

Mamadou Diop

Minister of Finance

Attachments: I. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies.

II. Technical Memorandum of Understanding.

Attachment I. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of the Government of Niger

Introduction

1. This memorandum of economic and financial policies (MEFP) supplements and updates the MEFPs signed on December 21, 2016, November 30, 2017, May 15, 2018, and November 21, 2018. It describes recent economic developments, the macroeconomic outlook, progress with program implementation, and policies for the remainder of 2019, and the medium-term. The program supported by the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement is in line with the government’s Economic and Social Development Plan 2017–21 (PDES 2017–2021). Program priorities are focused on: (i) maintaining macroeconomic stability; (ii) creating fiscal space through better revenue mobilization and higher efficiency in public spending; (iii) improving public financial management, including cash and debt management; (iv) supporting private sector and financial development; (v) increasing transparency and governance, including in the mining and oil sectors; (vi) poverty alleviation; and (vii) managing demographic challenges, including by increasing school attendance of girls.

Recent Economic and Financial Developments

2. Recent economic developments are broadly in line with projections established at the time of the previous program review. Real GDP growth rose to an estimated 6.5 percent in 2018, driven by agriculture, construction and service sector. Inflation started to recede quickly late in the year, bringing the 2018 annual average to 2.7 percent. The external current account deficit widened further, mainly on account of weak natural resource exports and increasing imports of capital and intermediate goods. It is mostly financed by donors and foreign investors, but an overall deficit of 2.3 percent of GDP remains. As a WAEMU member, Niger has recourse to the union’s pooled reserves currently standing at 4.3 months of union imports. Financial deepening remains weak, with private sector credit expanding by only 6.9 percent for the year on average and hence less than the 9.2 percent increase in nominal GDP.

3. Fiscal consolidation is progressing. The overall fiscal balance declined somewhat more than programmed from 5.7 percent of GDP in 2017 to 4.1 percent of GDP in 2018, reflecting restraint in current expenditure and domestically-cash-financed investment, as well as a shift from loans to grants in foreign-financed investment. Revenue mobilization efforts began to bear fruit thanks to new measures, such as performance plans for revenue administrations, the gradual rollout of transaction valuation for imports in customs, the removal of some tax exemptions, and efforts to strengthen the taxation of the informal sector. However, weak contributions from the resource sector and the abolition of a telecom tax weighed on this performance. The clearance of domestic payment arrears stalled in the face of intermittently tight conditions in the regional financial markets and demands from security-related events.

Performance Under the ECF-Supported Program

4. Program implementation has progressed well, despite some implementation delays.

5. All performance criteria (PCs) and all indicative targets (ITs) through end-March 2019 were met, except the clearance of domestic payment arrears, a substantial paydown of which has been set as a prior action for this review. Most importantly, the domestic financing PC was respected, as were the ITs on revenues, basic fiscal balances, social spending, and exceptional spending. But the plan to eliminate domestic payment arrears by end-2018 and keep them below a minimal technical threshold thereafter run into implementation challenges in the face of intermittently tight financing conditions. Arrears clearance was thus delayed into June 2019 when market tightness had eased.

6. Implementation of the structural agenda covered by structural benchmarks (SBs) also progressed well, despite some slippages in the timetable due to the breadth of Niger’s reform program and limited capacity. The phasing-out of cash payments in the public sector went beyond program commitments to do so in the main tax and custom offices and prepare a plan for further bankification. Salary payments of contractual civil servants have been bankarized since January 2019 and the salaries of other civil servants, hitherto paid in cash, since March 2019. Almost all bank accounts of pertinent public entities were transferred to the Treasury Single Account (TSA) as envisaged. The electronic interconnection between tax and customs administration was established within the March 2019 deadline. However, finalization of the 2019 performance plans for customs and tax administration are addressed only as a prior action for this review. Preparation for the structural reforms covered by end-June 2019 SBs is on track, except for delays in the preparation of legislation to reduce tax exemptions.

7. The government complied with all but one recurrent SB in the fourth quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019. Quarterly spending allocations are released within the first month, based on the decisions of the Inter-Ministerial Budget Regulation Committee. Quarterly commitment plans with corresponding cash and debt management plans were prepared. The Inter-Ministerial Debt Management Committee met quarterly. However, establishing the status of newly granted discretionary tax exemptions since the beginning of 2018 also took longer than expected but is now completed and has been shared with IMF staff.

The Macroeconomic Framework for the Remainder of 2019 and the Medium Term

8. The economic outlook for 2019 and the medium-term remains favorable. As explained in the context of the preview program review, GDP growth should receive a jolt in 2019 from hosting the African Union summit and the launch of many large projects by private investors, donors, the government, and public-private partnerships (PPPs). For the most part, projects will be executed over several years, spurring economic activity in their construction phase and contributing to Niger’s productive capacity thereafter. Most importantly, the construction of a pipeline for crude oil exports through Benin is set to boost GDP, exports, and fiscal revenues when it becomes operational in 2022. Against this backdrop, real GDP growth should average at least 7 percent annually over the next five years, but will diminish slightly to 6.3 percent in 2019 as agricultural production normalizes after the surge in 2018. Inflation is likely to remain moderate, below the WAEMU norm. Niger’s external position is bound to move further into deficit as execution of the large projects pushes up imports, but it should improve over the medium term, especially when crude oil exports commence. Private sector credit and broad money growth are projected to outpace nominal GDP growth as the financial sector starts to deepen.

9. Regarding public finances, the goal is to comply with the WAEMU deficit criterion by 2020. Following the consolidation efforts in 2019, the overall fiscal deficit will be brought in line with the 3 percent of GDP threshold in 2020 and gradually decline over the medium term to 2 percent of GDP. Consolidation relies primarily on revenue mobilization, but expenditure restraint remains a second line of defense in case revenue performance were not satisfactory. Throughout, the government will make efforts to raise the quality of spending with a view to making the most of limited resources. The likely revenue boost from crude oil exports will be used to reduce the deficit further to some 2 percent of GDP, replace donor-funded spending, and finance priority spending. This will keep public finances on a sustainable path, with public debt gradually declining from 54 percent of GDP currently to 43 percent of GDP by 2024 and Niger preserving its “moderate” rating for public debt distress risk.

Fiscal Policies and Reforms for 2019 and 2020

10. The government remains committed to implement fiscal policies for 2019 as agreed in the previous program review. This means following the budget adopted by the National Assembly in December 2018, except for holding back CFAF 17.1 billion (0.3 percent of GDP) in appropriations unless revenues overperform program targets and except for some largely deficit-neutral reshuffling in the June 2019 supplementary budget to account for higher foreign aid and military spending needs. Unused budget allocations from 2018 have been cancelled. More generally and in line with the corresponding recurrent SB, spending allocations will be released as appropriate in the first month of each quarter, after consideration by the Inter-Ministerial Budget Regulation Committee. The 2019 budget is backed by a variety of strong measures:

  • The partial reinstatement of the tax on incoming international calls, TATTIE, with a discount for companies that purchase a 4G license, strikes a balance between revenue needs and sector development. It is expected to yield CFAF 23.4 billion (0.4 percent of GDP).

  • Substituting a dedicated financial sector tax, TAFI, for the VAT on banking services should generate CFAF 5 billion (0.1 percent of GDP) in additional revenues. This reform also implements a WAEMU directive.

  • Revenue gains of at least CFAF 5.8 billion (0.1 percent of GDP) are expected from better taxing the informal sector. Raising the VAT threshold and subjecting more small businesses to lump sum taxation makes better use of scarce tax administration resources. In addition, lump sum taxes are raised, and VAT under-reporters will be subjected to a turnover tax.

  • Integrating the receipts of the telecommunication regulator, ARCEP, into the general budget is expected to yield another CFAF 5.2 billion (0.1 percent of GDP).

11. The government will redouble its efforts to strengthen tax administration reforms to help underpin revenue mobilization in 2019 and beyond. The focus will be on expanding the tax base and combatting fraud, while avoiding putting further pressure on compliant firms in the small formal private sector.

  • The drive to collect tax arrears will be stepped up and the names of the major delinquents will be published on the DGI’s website. A reduction of the stock of arrears deemed collectable by 40 percent, equivalent to CFAF 30 billion or 0.6 percent of GDP), is envisaged for 2019.

  • Molecular marking of petroleum products has fallen behind the scheduled launch date of January 2019, but an international firm is being identified and implementation is likely to start before end-2019. It should generate at least CFAF 3 billion (0.05 percent of GDP).

  • Formal communication by the Minister of Finance of the 2019 performance plans for DGI and DGD, as described in the previous program review and based on the lessons from the 2018 performance plans, is a prior action for this review, including in particular indicators tracking the breadth of DGI’s tax base. The plans should help systematically build administrative capacities over time, thereby complementing high-frequency quantitative revenue targets.

  • Revenue performance should also benefit from better cooperation between DGD and DGI. The link between the administrations’ IT systems, ASYCUDA and SISIC, is established, which will facilitate cross-checks to detect tax evasion and fraud. While it is being made fully made operational, the DGI will post a live database of fiscally active tax identification numbers on its website, allowing DGD to quickly identify delinquents and block their imports.

  • The streamlining of the tax exemption regime holds important revenue potential. The government will provide IMF staff with concrete proposals for reductions with substantial revenue impact for discussion (SB proposed to be reset for end-June 2019). Legislation to this effect will be submitted to the National Assembly as part of the 2020 draft budget law (SB proposed to be reset for end-September 2019). In addition, the administration of exemptions will be strengthened by upgrading the functionality of IT systems and concentrating control efforts in a dedicated unit.

  • The implementation of transaction valuation of imports will be stepped up with the help of a newly established working group. The immediate goal is to codify more goods for inclusion in the valuation database and adjust the IT system so that processing cannot proceed without valuation checks. The gradual shift to a more risk-based inspection regime at DGD with heightened emphasis on post-clearance audits is continuing.

12. Regarding public expenditure, the government will strive to improve spending quality. In the context of the 2019 draft, several spending items were reviewed and streamlined, but more far-reaching reforms are envisaged:

  • To improve the efficiency of public investment, the inter-ministerial selection committee in charge of the public investment plan will henceforth consider proposals only if they have been properly vetted.

  • The successful introduction of program budgeting in 2018 has provided a solid basis to sharpen program targets and to apportion the wage bill across programs and actions. This is a critical tool to better assess and improve the effectiveness of government spending.

  • The double authorization framework (AE/CP) for budget allocations will be piloted in selected ministries starting with the 2020 budget to improve long-term planning and guard against disruptions of ongoing programs and investment projects.

  • Public procurement will be overhauled: the share of competitive purchases will be targeted to gradually rise from around two-thirds to the WAEMU norm of 95 percent and the backlog of procurement audits will be addressed. Procurement audits will also cover key public administrative entities that receive large government subsidies and transfers, such as CAIMA and OPVN.

  • The government will strive to consolidate and streamline administrative entities following a functional review.

  • PPPs will be strictly controlled to contain fiscal risks and ensure value for money. In this framework, new projects will be considered outside the public investment plan only on an exceptional basis. Going forward, the mandate of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Public Debt and Budget Support will cover PPPs. The government will furnish copies of all conventions to IMF staff on a timely basis.

  • The drive for spending efficiency will not impede the government’s anti-poverty and social protection drive. As per the end-June 2019 SB, a tracking system for the major social spending programs has been set up. Together with the ongoing review of social spending, it should help raise efficiency and scale up promising programs, such as the school lunch program or the cash transfer program.

13. The government remains committed to improving debt and cash management.

  • The clearance and prevention of domestic payment arrears will be underpinned by strong measures. As a prior action for this review the government: (i) schedules an additional emission of government paper in the amount of at least CFAF 30 billion to finance arrears clearance; (ii) requests the national assembly to authorize funding of some CFAF 56 billion for arrears clearance in the context of a cabinet-approved supplementary budget for 2019; (iii) provides IMF staff with proof of arrears payments of at least CFAF 30 billion; and (iv) prepares and shares with IMF staff an updated treasury plan consistent with the PC on arrears reduction in the second half of 2019. To keep better track of arrears and float, the treasury will compile data on a monthly basis with a one-month lag and share them with IMF staff. The government is also committed to keeping the stock of arrears below CFAF 25 billion throughout the third quarter of 2019 (adjusted ceiling for the continuous PC on domestic arrears) and below CFAF 5 billion throughout the fourth quarter of 2019.

  • TSA implementation is entering its final stretch. The accounts of public administrative entities that have received a derogation, notably ARCEP, will have their accounts transferred from commercial banks to the TSA before end-September 2019. Those of CAIMA and OPVN will be transferred before end- 2019. The banking functions of the Treasury will be further strengthened. The government is analyzing the large gap of some CFAF 60 billion (1.2 percent of GDP) between the initial balances of the transferred accounts and the amounts received by the TSA. A copy of the final report will be shared with IMF staff by end-September 2019.

  • The government remains committed to preserving the upgraded functionality of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Public Debt and Budgetary Support. Quarterly meetings will continue to be held to assess and pronounce on public debt and guarantees. It will also validate compliance with established selection procedures for debt-financed projects. Its remit will be widened from mid-2019 to also cover PPPs, debt of major SOEs and public administrative entities, and local governments. In line with the recurrent SB, quarterly debt management reports will be prepared and shared with IMF staff. They report on the decisions taken by the committee and describe and analyze the evolution of public debt and guarantees within its remit and PPPs.

  • To further improve debt and cash management, institutional arrangements will be strengthened by consolidating the management of all public debt in a dedicated unit at the Treasury with a front-middle-back office structure. All legal and organizational arrangements will be in place for the unit to start operating by year end (proposed SB for end-December 2019). The unit will also serve as the secretariat for the Technical Committee on Public Debt and Budget Support.

14. Additional reforms to improve public sector efficiency are also being pursued. This notably includes civil service reform and governance reform of state-owned enterprises and public administrative entities. A review of the government’s human resource management processes, a functional review of ministries, and preparation of a biometric database for civil servants and government employees are underway. Following performance audits of five large SOEs and public administrative entities, an action plan to improve the governance framework, including financial oversight, board member section, auditing, and processing of financial information, is being developed.

15. Reaching the fiscal objective for 2020 will make budget preparation challenging. Every effort will be made to start a broad consultative process early on with a view to building consensus around the difficult measures that will be required to reduce the budget deficit to at most 3 percent of GDP as per WAEMU requirements.

Structural Reforms

16. Developing a strong private sector is indispensable for a lasting increase in living standards and job creation. Beyond its existing efforts to improve the business environment, the government plans to kick off later this year a concerted effort on one of the existing consultation platforms to develop a stronger private sector in partnership with the private sector and donors, with a view to set a self-sustaining dynamism into motion, while respecting fiscal constraints. It will take the first step by putting a critical mass of concrete, measurable, and time-bound reforms on the table, challenging the private sector and donors to do the same. Implementation will be monitored, and subsequent consultation rounds will correct course as needed and extend the agenda. The government will also strive to strengthen incentives for the local private sector to formalize.

17. Financial deepening and financial inclusion are key ingredients to private sector development. The government will push ahead with developing to full potential new financing vehicles, such as leasing, warrantage, the regional financing scheme under the BCEAO, and lending co-financed through the Maison de l’Entreprise. The framework for mobile banking and payments is in place, but the new possibilities need to be popularized further, interconnectivity improved, and infrastructure gaps addressed. Reducing domestic financing for the budget would give banks more space to lend to the private sector. The government is determined to revive microfinance. The new microfinance strategy is an important step in this context. It will be swiftly implemented once the donor round table has been held. Legacy issues in the microfinance sector will be addressed.

18. Improving governance and fighting corruption remains high on the reform agenda. The effort proceeds along several tracks:

  • Follow the strengthening of the legal and institutional framework, better implementation is now key. The government will review the funding of key institutions, such as the audit court, encourage better follow-through by tracking cases. It will also better publicize the work of anti-corruption agencies by, for example, posting HALCIA’s annual reports on its website.

  • The asset declaration regime for high-level government officials will be improved by strengthening legal obligations and improving compliance. The government is working with IMF staff to better align it with good international practice, regarding the appropriate remit of government officials subject to the regime; a suitable list of assets to be declared; the plugging of loopholes; clear deadlines for the submission of declaration and sanctions in case of non-compliance; and publication of declarations. The associated necessary legal changes will be submitted to National Assembly or issued by decree by end-September 2019 in line with the SB.

  • The government will also redouble its effort to rejoin the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), with a target date of end-2019.

  • Regarding AML/CFT, Niger will adopt the just completed National Risk Assessment Report required by the 2012 FATF standard and act upon the its recommendations.

  • The government recognizes that a number of its broader reforms have positive side effects on governance by reducing vulnerabilities to corruption. This includes competitive procurement, scaling-back of discretionary exemptions, bankification of fiscal payments, establishing a TSA, risk-based inspection regimes at customs, and simplification of administrative procedures more generally.

19. To improve accountability and communication with the public, the government will prepare a fiscal transparency package. The publication of the 2019 budget as submitted to the National Assembly was a first step. The government will continue to respect legal requirements for publication of key documents, such as budget outturns on a regular and timely basis, draft and approved budgets, including supplementary ones, a citizen budget, major conventions with foreign investors, PPP contracts, and tender awards. The Government Gazette will be made available online and free of charge.

20. The government is committed to addressing Niger’s demographic challenges to attain the objectives laid out in the PDES 2017–2021. Leveraging the updated National Gender Policy and the decree on the Education of Girls, awareness campaigns, geared toward religious leaders and the public at large, will be stepped up. The donor community will be invited to expand various projects in the areas of gender and demographics. There are also important synergies between social protection spending on the one hand and demographic and gender issues on the other. For example, an expanded school lunch program would help keep girls in school longer, thereby discouraging early marriage and child bearing.

Program Monitoring

21. In view of the progress made in implementing the ECF-supported program and the policies envisaged under the MEFP, the government requests a waiver for non-observance of the end-December 2018 target on the clearance of domestic payment arrears, as well as on the continuous performance criterion on keeping arrears below the CFAF 5 billion ceiling in 2019; the modification of the continuous performance criterion on the stock of domestic arrears from the date of the completion of the fourth review onward and the arrears adjuster to the domestic financing performance criterion at end-June 2019; the approval of the fourth review under the arrangement; the disbursement of SDR 33.84 million; and an extension of the ECF arrangement through April 22, 2020 to retain the semi-annual spacing of program targets between the final program reviews and give more time for reform implementation.

22. Program monitoring will be based on performance criteria (Tables 2) and structural benchmarks (Tables 4 and 6). The authorities will provide IMF staff with the statistical data and information identified in the attached Technical Memorandum of Understanding, and any other information they deem necessary or that IMF staff may request for monitoring purposes.

23. The program will be monitored through semiannual reviews. The fifth and sixth program reviews are expected to take place at or after end-October 2019 and April 8, 2020, respectively.

Table 1.

Niger: Quantitative Performance Criteria and Indicative Targets (March–December 2018)

(Billions CFA Francs)

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Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. Note: The terms in this table are defined in the TMU.

Program indicators under A and B are performance criteria at end-June and end-December; indicative targets otherwise.

The ceiling on domestic financing of the budget will be adjusted if the amount of disbursements of external budgetary assistance as defined in footnote 4 falls short of program forecasts, the quarterly ceiling will be raised pro tanto, up to a maximum of CFAF 30 billion. Net domestic financing of the government will also be adjusted up (down) for any excess (shortfall) in domestic payment arrears clearance. The upward adjustment is capped at CFAF 30 billion.

Minimum; for the PC/IT on the reduction in domestic payments arrears, negative sign means a reduction and positive sign means an accumulation. Targets will be adjusted for over- and underperformance in 2017, subject to a cap of zero. Updated adjustment amount to account for revisions to 2017 data after the second review of the ECF arrangement.

External budgetary assistance (excluding net financing from the IMF).

Excluding ordinary credit for imports or debt relief.

Excluding debt relief obtained in the form of rescheduling or refinancing.

Exceptional expenditures refer to payment made by the treasury without prior authorization, excluding debt service payments and expenditures linked to exemptions.

Table 2.

Niger: Quantitative Performance Criteria and Indicative Targets (March–December 2019)

(Billions CFA Francs)

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Sources: Nigerien authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. Note: The terms in this table are defined in the TMU.

Program indicators under A are performance criteria at end-June and end-December, and indicative targets for end-March and for end-September.

The ceiling on domestic financing of the budget will be adjusted if the amount of disbursements of external budgetary assistance as defined in footnote 5 falls short of program forecasts, the quarterly ceiling will be raised pro tanto, up to a maximum of CFAF 30 billion.

From end-June 2019, the ceiling on domestic financing of the budget will be increased/reduced by the reduction/increase in the stock of outstanding domestic payment obligations since end-2018, excluding the supplementary period adjustment. Domestic payment obligations comprise arrears and float and stood at CFAF 95.8 billion at end-2018. This adjuster will be reduced by the amount of any external budget support in excess of the program amount as quantified in the memorandum item of this table and will be capped at CFAF 50 billion.

From October 1, 2019 onward, the ceiling on net domestic financing will be lowered by the amount of borrowing under the PBG operation.

External budgetary assistance (excluding net financing from the IMF).

The stock increases to CFAF 25 billion effective on the date of completion of the fourth review and remains continuously at this level until September 30, 2019. On October 1, 2019 the continuous PC stock is reduced to CFAF 5 billion until the end of the arrangement.

From October 1, 2019 onward, the ceiling on the PV of newly-contracted external PPG debt will be raised by the amount of borrowing under the PBG operation up to an amount of CFAF140 billion.

Exceptional expenditures refer to payments made by the treasury without prior authorization, excluding debt service payments and expenditures linked to exemptions.

Table 3.

Niger: Recurrent Structural Benchmarks for the Program, December 2018–March 2019

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Table 4.

Niger: Recurrent Structural Benchmarks for the Program June–December 2019

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Table 5.

Niger: Structural Benchmarks, December 2018–March 2019

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Table 6.

Niger: Prior Actions and Structural Benchmarks, June–December 2019

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Table 7.

Niger: Proposed Disbursements Scheduled Under the ECF Arrangement, 2017–20

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With respect to previously completed reviews, the date indicated refers to the date of the Executive Board meeting.

Source: International Monetary Fund.

Attachment II. Technical Memorandum of Understanding

Niamey, June 13, 2018

1. This technical memorandum of understanding defines the performance criteria and indicative targets of Niger’s program under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement for the period Q2–2018 to Q1–2020. The performance criteria and indicative targets for 2018 and for 2019 are set out in Tables 1 and 2 of the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) attached to the Letter of Intent of November 21, 2018. Structural benchmarks appear in Tables 3 to 6. This technical memorandum of understanding also sets out data-reporting requirements for program monitoring.

Definitions

2. For the purposes of this technical memorandum, the following definitions of “government,” “debt,” “payment arrears,” and “government obligations” will be used:

  • a) Government refers to the central government of the Republic of Niger; it does not include any political subdivision, public entity, or central bank with separate legal personality.

  • b) As specified in paragraph 8 of the Guidelines on Public Debt Conditionality in Fund Arrangements, adopted by the Decision No. 15688-(14/107) of the Executive Board of the IMF of December 5, 2014, debt will be understood to mean a current, i.e., not contingent, liability, created under a contractual arrangement through the provision of value in the form of assets (including currency) or services, and which requires the obligor to make one or more payments in the form of assets (including currency) or services, according to a specific schedule; these payments will discharge the obligor of the principal and/or interest liabilities incurred under the contract. Debts can take a number of forms, the primary ones being as follows: (i) loans, i.e., advances of money to the obligor by the lender made on the basis of an undertaking that the obligor will repay the funds in the future (including deposits, bonds, debentures, commercial loans, and buyers’ credits) and temporary exchanges of assets, that are equivalent to fully collateralized loans, under which the obligor is required to repay the funds, and usually pay interest, by repurchasing the collateral from the buyer in the future (such as repurchase agreements and official swap arrangements); (ii) suppliers’ credits, i.e., contracts where the supplier permits the obligor to defer payments until sometime after the date on which the goods are delivered or services are provided; and (iii) leases, i.e., arrangements under which property is provided that the lessee has the right to use for one or more specified period(s) of time that are usually shorter than the total expected service life of the property , while the lessor retains the title to the property. For the purpose of this guideline, the debt is the present value (at the inception of the lease) of all lease payments expected to be made during the period of the agreement, excluding those payments necessary for the operation, repair, or maintenance of the property. Under the definition of debt set out above, arrears, penalties, and judicially awarded damages arising from the failure to make payment under a contractual obligation that constitutes debt are debt. Failure to make payment on an obligation that is not considered debt under this definition (e.g., payment on delivery) will not give rise to debt.

  • c) Present value (PV) of new public and publicly-guaranteed external debt contracted discounts at a five percent annual rate the future payment stream, except for loans with a negative grant element, in which case the PV is set equal to the value of the loan. The calculation of the PV is based on the loan amount contracted in a given year, independent on when disbursements take place.

  • d) Domestic payment arrears are domestic payments owed by the government but not paid. They include committed and authorized fiscal year expenditures that are not paid within 90 days. External payment arrears are external payments due but not paid.

  • e) Government obligation is any financial obligation of the government accepted as such by the government (including any government debt).

A. Quantitative Performance Criteria

Net Domestic Financing of the Government
Definition

3. Net domestic financing of the government is defined as the sum of (i) net bank credit to the government; (ii) net nonbank domestic financing of the government, including government securities issued in CFAF on the WAEMU regional financial market and not held by resident commercial banks, proceeds from the sale of government assets, and privatization receipts.

4. Net bank credit to the government is equal to the balance of government claims and debts vis-à-vis national banking institutions. Government claims include cash holdings of the Nigerien Treasury, secured obligations, deposits with the central bank, and deposits of the Treasury (including regional offices) with commercial banks. Government deposits with commercial banks are excluded from government claims insofar as they are used solely to finance externally financed capital expenditure.

5. Government debt to the banking system includes assistance from the central bank (excluding net IMF financing under the ECF), the CFAF counterpart of the 2009 General SDR Allocation, assistance from commercial banks (including government securities held by the central bank and commercial banks) and deposits with the CCP (postal checking system).

6. The scope of net bank credit to the government, as defined by the BCEAO, includes all central government administrations. Net bank credit to the government and the amount of Treasury bills and bonds issued in CFAF on the WAEMU regional financial market are calculated by the BCEAO.

7. Net nonbank domestic financing includes: (i) the change in the stock of government securities (Treasury bills and bonds) issued in CFAF on the WAEMU regional financial market and not held by resident commercial banks; (ii) the change in the balance of Treasury correspondents’ deposit accounts; (iii) the change in the balance of various deposit accounts at the Treasury; and (iv) the change in the stock of claims on the government forgiven by the private sector. Net nonbank financing of the government is calculated by the Nigerien Treasury.

8. The 2018 and 2019 quarterly targets are based on the change between the end-December 2017 and end-December 2018 levels, respectively, and the date selected for the performance criterion or indicative target.

Adjustments

9. The ceiling on net domestic financing of the government will be subject to adjustment if disbursements of external budgetary support net of external debt service and external arrears payments, including disbursements under the ECF, fall short of program projections.

10. If disbursements of external budgetary support fall short of the projected amounts at the end of each quarter, the corresponding quarterly ceilings will be raised pro tanto, up to a maximum of CFAF 30 billion. From October 1, 2019 onward, the ceiling on domestic financing will be reduced by the amount of borrowing under the World Bank’s Policy Based Guarantee operation.

11. For 2018, but not 2019, the ceiling on net domestic financing will also be adjusted for deviations from programmed domestic payment arrears clearance. Specifically, the ceiling on domestic financing will be adjusted up (down) one-for-one for arrears clearance in excess (in deficit) of programmed levels. The upward adjustment is capped at CFAF 30 billion. From end-June 2019, the ceiling on domestic financing of the budget will be increased/reduced by the reduction/increase in the stock of outstanding domestic payment obligations since end-2018, excluding the supplementary period adjustment. Domestic payment obligations comprise arrears and float and stood at CFAF 95.8 at end-2018. This adjuster will be reduced by the amount of any external budget support in excess of the program amount as quantified in the memorandum item of the PC table and will be capped at a maximum of CFAF 50 billion.

Reporting Requirement

12. Detailed data on domestic financing of the government will be provided monthly, within six weeks after the end of each month.

Stock of Domestic Payment Arrears
Definition

13. For 2018, the reduction of domestic payment arrears is equal to the difference between the stock of arrears at end-2017 and the stock of arrears on the reference date. For 2019, there is a continuous ceiling on the stock of outstanding domestic payment arrears. The ceiling is set at CFAF 25 billion from the date of the completion of the fourth review to September, 30 2019, inclusive, and starting on October 1, 2019is reduced to CFAF 5 billion through the end of the arrangement period.

14. The Centre d’amortissement de la dette intérieure de l’Etat (CAADIE) and the Treasury are responsible for calculating the stock of domestic payment arrears on government obligations and recording their repayment.

15. Data on the stock, accumulation (including the change in Treasury balances outstanding), and repayment of domestic arrears on government obligations will be provided monthly, within six weeks after the end of each month.

Adjustments

16. Programmed arrears clearance in 2018 will be adjusted up (down) one-for-one for any shortfall (excess) relative to programmed arrears clearance programmed for end-2017. The adjusted target on domestic payment arrears clearance shall not be negative.

17. For the purpose of evaluating performance against the end-December 2018 target, domestic payment arrears clearance includes arrears’ reduction during the supplementary budget period.1

18. For the purpose of evaluating performance against the targets in 2019, the stock of outstanding domestic arrears will be assessed excluding the arrears’ reduction during the supplementary period.

External Payment Arrears
Definition

19. Government debt is outstanding debt owed or guaranteed by the government. For the program, the government undertakes not to accumulate external payment arrears on its debt (including Treasury bills and bonds issued in CFAF on the WAEMU regional financial market), with the exception of external payment arrears arising from debt being renegotiated with external creditors, including Paris Club creditors.

Reporting Requirement

20. Data on the stock, accumulation, and repayment of external payment arrears will be provided monthly, within six weeks after the end of each month.

Short-Term External Debt of the Central Government
Definition

21. The government will not accumulate or guarantee new external debt with an original maturity of less than one year. This performance criterion applies not only to debt as defined in paragraph 8 of the Guidelines Public Debt Conditionality in Fund Arrangements, adopted by the Decision No. 15688-(14/107) of the Executive Board of the IMF of December 5, 2014, but also to any obligation contracted or guaranteed for which no value has been received. Short-term loans related to imports are excluded from this performance criterion, as are short-term securities issued in CFAF on the regional financial market.

Reporting Requirement

22. Details on all external government debt will be provided monthly, within six weeks after the end of each month. The same requirement applies to guarantees granted by the government.

Present Value of Public and Publicly-Guaranteed External Debt
Definition

23. For program purposes, the definition of debt is set out in paragraph 8(a) of the Guidelines on Public Debt Conditionality in Fund Arrangements attached to IMF Executive Board Decision No. 15688-(14/107), adopted on December 5, 2014. (http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4927)

  • (a) For the purpose of these guidelines, the term “debt” will be understood to mean a current, i.e., not contingent, liability, created under a contractual arrangement through the provision of value in the form of assets (including currency) or services, and which requires the obligor to make one or more payments in the form of assets (including currency) or services, at some future point(s) in time; these payments will discharge the principal and/or interest liabilities incurred under the contract. Debts can take a number of forms, the primary ones being as follows:

    • (i) loans, i.e., advances of money to the obligor by the lender made on the basis of an undertaking that the obligor will repay the funds in the future (including deposits, bonds, debentures, commercial loans and buyers’ credits) and temporary exchanges of assets that are equivalent to fully collateralized loans under which the obligor is required to repay the funds, and usually pay interest, by repurchasing the collateral from the buyer in the future (such as repurchase agreements and official swap arrangements);

    • (ii) suppliers’ credits, i.e., contracts where the supplier permits the obligor to defer payments until sometime after the date on which the goods are delivered or services are provided; and

    • (iii) leases, i.e., arrangements under which property is provided which the lessee has the right to use for one or more specified period(s) of time that are usually shorter than the total expected service life of the property, while the lessor retains the title to the property. For the purpose of these guidelines, the debt is the present value (at the inception of the lease) of all lease payments expected to be made during the period of the agreement excluding those payments that cover the operation, repair, or maintenance of the property.

  • (b) Under the definition of debt set out in this paragraph, arrears, penalties, and judicially awarded damages arising from the failure to make payment under a contractual obligation that constitutes debt are debt. Failure to make payment on an obligation that is not considered debt under this definition (e.g., payment on delivery) will not give rise to debt.

24. For the purposes of the relevant performance criteria, the guarantee of a debt arises from any explicit legal obligation of the government to service a debt in the event of nonpayment by the debtor (involving payments in cash or kind).

25. For the purposes of the relevant performance criterion, external debt is defined as debt denominated, or requiring repayment, in a currency other than the CFA franc. This definition also applies to debt contracted among WAEMU member countries and with WAEMU financial institutions.

26. For the purpose of this performance criterion, the public sector includes the government, as defined in paragraph 2 above, and the following public enterprises: (i) Société Nigérienne d’Electricité (Nigelec); (ii) Société de Construction et de Gestion des Marchés (Socogem); (iii) Société Nigérienne des Produits Pétroliers (Sonidep); (iv) Société Nigérienne des Télécommunications (Sonitel); (v) Société de Patrimoine des Mines du Niger (Sopamin); and (vi) Société propriétaire et exploitante de l’Hotel Gaweye (SPEG).

27. External debt is defined as debt contracted or serviced in a currency other than the franc of the Financial Community of Africa (CFAF).

28. The performance criterion (PC) is a ceiling and applies to the present value of all new external debt (concessional or non-concessional) contracted or guaranteed by the central government, including commitments contracted or guaranteed for which no value has been received. This performance criterion does not apply to:

(a) Short-term supplier or trade-related credit with a maturity of up to three months;

(b) rescheduling agreements; and

(c) IMF disbursements.

29. Applicable contractual date. For program monitoring purposes, external debt is deemed to be contracted or guaranteed at the date of effectiveness of the contract, including its approval, where required, by the member(s) of the government of Niger with authority to do so.

30. Currency Denomination. For program purposes, the value in CFAF of new external debt of 2018 is calculated using the average exchange rate for January 2018 in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database.

31. PV Calculation. Present Value of new external debt is calculated by discounting all projected disbursements and debt service payments (principal and interest) on the basis of a program discount rate of 5 percent and taking account of all loan conditions, including projected disbursements, the maturity, grace period, payment schedule, front-end fees and management fees. The PV is calculated using the IMF “DSA template,” which is based on the amount of the loan and the above parameters. In the case of loans for which the grant element is zero or less than zero, the PV is set at an amount equal to the face value.

Adjustment

32. The ceiling on the PV of new PPG external debt will be raised by the amount of borrowing under the World Bank’s Policy Based Guarantee operation up to an amount of CFAF140 billion from October 1, 2019 onward.

Reporting Requirement

33. The authorities will inform IMF staff of any planned external borrowing and the conditions on such borrowing before the loans are either contracted or guaranteed by the government and will consult with staff on any potential debt management operations.

B. Quantitative Targets

Definitions

34. Total revenue is an indicative target for the program. It includes tax, nontax, and special accounts revenue, but excludes proceeds from the settlement of reciprocal debts between the government and enterprises.

35. The basic fiscal deficit is defined as the difference between (i) total tax revenue, as defined in paragraph 36; and (ii) total fiscal expenditure excluding externally financed investment expenditure but including HIPC-financed expenditure.

36. According to the WAEMU definition, the basic fiscal deficit is defined as the basic balance described under paragraph 37 plus budgetary grants.

37. The floor on poverty-reducing expenditure is an indicative target for the program. This expenditure comprises all budget lines included in the Unified Priority List (UPL) of poverty-reducing and HIPC-financed expenditures.

38. A limit is set on the amount of expenditures paid through exceptional procedures (without prior commitment) excluding debt service payments and expenditures linked to tax exemptions. The limit is 5 percent of total authorized expenditures during the quarter for which the target is assessed.

Reporting Requirement

39. Information on basic budget revenue and expenditures will be provided to the IMF monthly, within six weeks after the end of each month.

40. Information on UPL expenditures will be provided to the IMF quarterly, within six weeks after the end of each quarter.

41. Information on exceptional expenditure will be provided to the IMF quarterly after six weeks after the end of the quarter.

Additional Information for Program Monitoring

A. Government Finance

42. The authorities will forward the following to IMF staff:

  • Detailed monthly estimates of revenue and expenditure, including priority expenditure, the payment of domestic and external arrears, and a breakdown of customs, DGI, and Treasury revenue.

  • The Table of Government Financial Operations with comprehensive monthly data on domestic and external financing of the budget, and changes in arrears and Treasury balances outstanding. These data are to be provided monthly, within six weeks after the end of each month.

  • Comprehensive monthly data on net nonbank domestic financing: (i) the change in the stock of government securities (Treasury bills and bonds) issued in CFAF on the WAEMU regional financial market and not held by resident commercial banks; (ii) the change in the balance of various deposit accounts at the Treasury; (iii) the change in the stock of claims on the government forgiven by the private sector.

  • Quarterly data on expenditure for UPL lines (statement of appropriations approved, disbursed, and used).

  • Quarterly reports on budget execution, including the rate of execution of poverty-reducing expenditure and, in particular, the use of appropriations by the line ministries concerned (National Education, Public Health, Equipment, Agriculture, Livestock).

  • Monthly data on Treasury balances outstanding, by reference fiscal year, with a breakdown of maturities of more than and less than 90 days.

  • Monthly data on effective debt service (principal and interest) compared with the programmed maturities provided within four weeks after the end of each month; and

  • List of external loans contracted in process of negotiation and projected borrowing in the next six months, including the financial terms and conditions.

B. Monetary Sector

43. The authorities will provide the following information each month, within eight weeks following the end of each month:

  • Consolidated balance sheet of monetary institutions and, where applicable, the consolidated balance sheets of individual banks;

  • Monetary survey, within eight weeks following the end of each month, for provisional data;

  • Borrowing and lending interest rates; and

  • Customary banking supervision indicators for banks and nonbank financial institutions (where applicable, these same indicators for individual institutions may also be provided).

C. Balance of Payments

44. The authorities will provide IMF staff with the following information:

  • Any revision of balance of payments data (including services, private transfers, official transfers, and capital transactions) whenever they occur;

  • Preliminary annual balance of payments data, within six months after the end of the reference year.

D. Real Sector

45. The authorities will provide IMF staff with the following information:

  • Disaggregated monthly consumer price indexes, within two weeks following the end of each month;

  • The national accounts, within six months after the end of the year; and

  • Any revision of the national accounts.

E. Structural Reforms and Other Data

46. The authorities will provide IMF staff with the following information:

  • Any study or official report on Niger’s economy, within two weeks after its publication;

  • Any decision, order, law, decree, ordinance, or circular with economic or financial implications, upon its publication or, at the latest, when it enters into force.

  • Any draft contract in the mining and petroleum sectors, including production and sales volumes, prices, and foreign investment; and

  • Any agreement with private sector stakeholders having economic or financial repercussions for the government, including in the natural resources sector.

Summary of Data to be Reported

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1

The basic balance is the domestic cash revenues less domestically-financed cash spending.

2

See Niger: Debt Sustainability Analysis, June 2019.

3

See forthcoming IMF Working Paper “Constructing a Positive Shock to Unlock the Private Sector in Niger.”

4

See Selected Issues Paper “Navigating the Challenges of Governance in Niger.”

1

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

2

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

3

IMF Sub-Saharan African Regional Economic Outlook: “The Economic Consequences of Conflict”, Spring 2019.

4

UN World Travel and Tourism Council: ‘Niger: Travel and Tourism Economic Impact Report, 2018’.

5

Union Européenne: ‘Revue des dépenses publiques du secteur de la sécurité au Niger, 2014–16’.

1

The fiscal accounts for the current year are revised to incorporate transactions for expenditure engagements made in the current fiscal year but not finalized until the supplementary period (January and February) in the subsequent fiscal year.

Same Series

Other IMF Content

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Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
Niger: 2019 Article IV Consultation, Fourth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Requests for Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance Criterion, Modification of Performance Criteria, and Extension and Rephasing of the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement-Press Release; Staff Report and Statement by the Executive Director for Niger
Author:
International Monetary Fund. African Dept.
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2019: Issue 239
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
9781513508191
ISSN:
1934-7685
Pages:
118
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513508191.002

Niger: Present Value of External PPG Debt

(Percent of exports)

Niger: Sectoral Contributions to Real GDP Growth, 2013–181

Niger: Business Environment Obstacles for Firms

(Percent of firms)

Niger: Perception of Corruption Prevalence

(Percent of respondents)
Figure 1.

Niger: Recent Economic Developments and Outlook
Figure 2.

Niger: Fiscal Developments 2013–18
Figure 3.

Niger: GDP Composition and Output Volatility
Figure 4.

Niger: Tax Performance, 2014–18

(Cumulative values, December 2014 = 100, nominal GDP discounted)
Figure 5.

Niger: Indicators of Financial Inclusion

(Cumulative values, December 2014 = 100, nominal GDP discounted)
Figure 6.

Niger: Key Indicators of the Microfinance Sector, 2011–18
Figure 7.

Niger: Demographics

Niger: Current Account Deficit and Natural Resources, 2000–18

(Percent of GDP)

Niger: Financing of Current Account Deficits, 2000–18

(Percent of GDP)

Niger: Security Spending, Domestic Budget Financing, and Domestic Public Debt

Niger: Impact of Security Tensions on Economic Activity